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This study is an examination of the concept of education as 
liberation. The premise of this study is that the potential for 
greatness and fullness of being, implicit as a premise within humankind, 
can be made an explicit reality through employing a pedagogy of 
liberation, a pedagogy developing critical thought through a dialogical 
methodology within a curriculum of dialectical consciousness interacting 
with existing historical situations. An analysis of the theories of 
Freire, Freud, and Hegel indicates the extent of internal and external 
limitations operating within consciousness and thus prohibiting the 
development of human potential but also reveals that a liberation from 
such limitations can be effected through integrating primal energies 
with the rational processes and through educating consciousness by the 
dialectical process. This dissertation is an examination of education 
as an ongoing process of dialogical encounters in which individuals 
continue a development of dialectical consciousness to create and 
recreate selves and social situations in which they are placed. 
The purpose of Chapter I is to objectify Freire's banking concept 
of education as the pedagogy of the oppressor for its universal 
application so that an emergence from this pedagogy and a resistance to 
it can engender a movement into liberation from it. Chapter II is an 
analysis of Freud's theory of psychoanalytical thought as a means of 
recognizing and integrating primal energies with the rational process. 
Chapter III is a study of Hegel's insights into the spiritual force 
inherent in the dialectical process and instrumental in moving 
consciousness into succeeding higher modes of thought until fulfillment 
becomes an actuality in Absolute Knowing. Chapter IV is an examination 
of Freire's pedagogy of liberation into becoming more fully human with 
particular emphasis on the nature of true dialogue and the transforming 
dynamics of dialectical interaction with existing reality. Chapter V 
is an overview of Hegelian and Freudian insights that support and 
illumine Freire's praxis and support the premise of this dissertation, 
that education as liberation is a continuing process of dialectical 
consciousness development that can make actual that which is potential 
for humanity and for society. 
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PREFACE 
Writing this dissertation is more than an intellectual exercise 
or a fulfillment of an academic requirement; it is the culmination of 
a search for meaning that has slowly evolved through years of public 
school teaching where erosion of humanistic ideals and subsequent 
dehumanization of both teachers and students reached a negative 
momentum that forced me to seek understanding of what had gone wrong 
by returning to the primal source of education—the university. Thus 
when I write of Freire's dehumanization of oppressor-oppressed, I 
write theoretically and personally. When I write of Hegel's 
dialectic and probe it to determine its transforming process and to 
reveal its power inherent in spirit, I do so on two levels. When I 
turn to Freud, it is again to find the lost humanity I note, to 
locate the soul that is silenced and estranged. There is always an 
awareness of the larger context of public schooling, of teachers 
reduced to depositors of knowledge, of students so molded into 
receivers of knowledge that they are unable to develop a critical 
consciousness, and of administrators so overwhelmed by bureaucracy 
they adamantly refuse to consider the risk of innovation. My search 
has been to find the reason for this state of education, to 
understand the negative consequences that further perpetuate this 
condition thereby intensifying its dehumanizing force with each new 
school year, and to find the means by which to effect change in a 
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moribund institution in need of new life. I cannot devote my energy 
to an ideal gone astray without seeking to contribute to its 
restoration or renewal. My own passion for the development of innate 
potential implicit but undeveloped within humans will not permit me 
to accept this state of education as a barrier, as what constitutes 
the nature of reality and hence must be accepted. 
Writing this dissertation is then a statement of a faith in the 
potential of humankind to be more, to become all that is humanly 
possible, to be in Hegelian terms the full oak of which the acorn is 
only a potential oak awaiting full growth. Thus when I speak of a 
cormunity of conscious life in which the solidarity and ongoing 
dialogue constitute the proper nutrients for the growth of the acorn, 
I am referring not only to Freire's concept but to my own belief in 
potential that has found nourishment for full growth in the 
Department of Curriculum and Foundations at the University. In this 
department is found the very community of consciousness about which 
Hegel and Freire speak in terms of a new birth, a new age. This 
canmunity conveys a new beginning for education in its nurturing of 
minds and spirits, in its transcendence of alienating competition, 
in its sharing of thoughts, interests, and time. There are always 
those who want to listen and share, those who dialogue and clarify. 
This community of curriculum is one of such interconnection that it 
can diminish despair by sharing it and magnify a minor success into a 
true celebration. This canmunity reflects and supports Freirean 
solidarity and ongoing dialogue; it exemplifies the renewing force of 
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Hegelian dialectic; it witnesses to Freudian concepts of souls 
speaking to other souls. 
I am not referring to an abstract concept—an idealistic or 
Utopian oonmunity. This is a very human community containing within-
it human frailties and human passions that at times lead one to try 
to name the world for another. These aspects are significant only 
in that they indicate ferments of growth. They are in Hegelian 
thoughts the bud, blossom, and fruit that at each stage seem unrelated 
but are still necessary stages for development, for they belong to the 
organic whole. The result is then the Hegelian process of working out 
the purpose by breaking down fixed thoughts so that consciousness can 
transcend to new levels of thought and engender new responses of 
action to that thought. This curriculum department epitomizes all 
that Freire, Hegel, and Freud advocate for liberation into becoming 
more fully human. 
Such a department is the creation of its chairperson. The genius 
of this department that shapes its curriculum, inspires its growth, 
guides its course offerings, and selects the professional colleagues 
that adhere to its ideals is that of Dr. David Purpel. He holds a 
vision of education that becones a reality for all who participate in 
this curriculum—students, professors, and cortmunity members of 
global dimension. What Dr. Purpel has fostered and created within 
this curriculum department is in actuality the experience of the 
theory I find in Freud, Hegel, and Freire. What is happening in this 
department is a microcosm of what can be for education everywhere. 
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Thus ray vnriting is a statement of faith and also one of witness to the 
actuality of which I speak. This dissertation is an intellectual 
seeking of the wisdom of others to clarify and formulate the meaning 
of liberation in education; it is also a recognition that what is 
written on the community of consciousness exists as an on-going 
reality in the curriculum department. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This study arises from an initial concern over the inability of 
mankind to develop into a fuller state of being through developing the 
latent potential for greatness of being inherent within human 
consciousness and evolves into a central recognition that such 
development of consciousness into wholeness of being is contingent 
first on the development of consciousness into a state of becoming 
more fully human and second on developing pedagogical methods and 
curriculum that can liberate human consciousness into self-beccming. 
This study recognizes Paulo Freire's philosophical tenet that "man's 
ontological vocation is to be more fully human" as basic to a 
consideration of the pedagogical means by which human consciousness 
can be shaped or educated so that human consciousness can develop its 
potential for fullness of being. The focus of this study is on the 
relationship of traditional pedagogy of education to the socio­
economic interests and values of the larger society traditional 
education serves. An examination of this relationship reveals a 
limiting effect on the development of human consciousness into 
becoming more fully human through reducing the act of knowing to the 
method of imparting knowledge and through confining the act of 
knowing to a curriculum of unquestioned acceptance of material. The 
act of knowing as structured in this pedagogy prohibits the 
development of critical thought and thereby reduces the human 
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potential for creating and re-creating self and society in a dialectical 
relationship. This study recognizes the act of knowing as one of 
critical reflection on the experiences and thoughts of self and on the 
practices of society in a dialectical reciprocity of creation and 
re-creation of self and society. The purpose of this study is therefore 
to propose a dialectical-dialogical method of pedagogy and a curriculum 
of reflective and critical thought as a pedagogy of liberation for 
consciousness into the state of becoming "more fully human." 
This study shares a concern of educators, philosophers, and poets 
that the individual on the average does not bring to fruition the 
premise or potential of fuller being contained as a promise within him/ 
her. Writers and poets have pointed out, for example, the human 
tendency to be content to dwell in the illusion of limitation, to 
seek comfort in the pleasure of a meal or in the release of sleep, and 
to allow innate potential to slumber. Writers have urged mankind to 
awaken from this slumbering consciousness to a higher form of being. 
Chaucer, for example, prefaces most of his telling verses with the cry 
of "Awak!" as if to stir the reader into a higher and hence into an 
awakened understanding of greatness contained within as potential 
awaiting expression. Hegel the philosopher insists that mankind cannot 
fully be human until reason is developed and perceives mankind's 
tendency to keep "within the feeling-states" as a tendency that is 
"anti-human, the conditions of mere animals" (Hegel, 1807/1931, p. 127). 
Shakespeare challenges this unreflected state of being in Hamlet with 
his question of "What is man if the chief good and market of his time 
be but to feed and sleep?-' and answers with "A beast, no more" 
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(III, viii, 1133-35). Heidegger in his philosophical contemplation of 
what limits mankind perceives that the individual's refusal to accept 
responsibility for being results in giving the being away to the world 
so that the "they-self" of the world dictates action and becomes the 
conscience of the individual. Heidegger maintains that until the 
individual wrests his/her being back frcm the world that an authentic 
life of responsibility for developing the individual's being cannot be 
achieved. Implicit in all of these concerns is the assumption that the 
individual can awaken frcm this slumbering state, make life authentic 
by assuming control and responsibility, and consequently move from a 
state of limitation to a state of liberation. 
This study proposes that the individual's life of limitation and 
inauthentic being has been created for him or her and that it is 
impossible to ask the individual to awaken to what is not and cannot be 
perceived. There must first be the individual's perception and 
awareness of the limiting historical-cultural situation in which he or 
she has been placed. Secondly, there must be the perception of the self 
as a Subject capable of emerging from this situation and acting upon that 
situation and consequently transforming it. Such transformation can 
only result frcm a change in consciousness, from a consciousness of an 
Object being acted upon to a consciousness of a Subject capable of 
acting. Inherent in this perception is the act of knowing itself. 
Consciousness is the experience of knowing and is at the same time the 
insight into the act of knowing. Paulo Freire, an educator whose 
work focuses on a liberating pedagogy in the revolutionary context of the 
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Third World, clarifies the liberating tendency in the act of knowing, 
of critical reflection, that applies to any situation; 
In the revolutionary perspective, the learners are 
invited to think. Being conscious, in this 
sense, is not simply a formula or a slogan. It is 
a radical form of being, of being human. It pertains 
to beings that not only know, but know that they 
know. (1976/78, p. 24) 
Freire adds that "knowing with the people how they know things and the 
level of that knowledge" involves critical thought. It involves 
challenging them, through critical reflection, 
regarding their own practical experience and the ends 
that motivate them in order, in the end, to 
organize the findings, and thus to replace mere 
opinion about facts with an increasingly rigorous 
understanding of their significances. (1976/1978, p. 25) 
Such knowing involves "increasingly rigorous understanding" of 
not only the self as a consciousness capable of knowing but also 
consciousness of the given reality as an historical situation that is 
not one of limitation or one of a given situation but one amenable to 
change and subject to transformation. Consciousness evolving in 
"critical reflection" also knows there is an underlying principle of 
identity between the individual and the situation and knows therefore 
that alteration in one necessitates alteration in the other as well. 
Until the act of knowing comes into the experience of consciousness 
with its critical reflection and perception and its attendant power 
to recreate knowledge, the relationship of individual to society 
remains one in which the individual is limited and ultimately 
dehumanized; at the same time the society which the individual helps 
shape or by which he or she is shaped remains limiting and 
dehumanizing as well. A liberation of consciousness into potential 
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to be more fully human releases creativity of thought and action so 
that the individual not only acts upon the historical-cultural 
situation to recreate it but is recreated by it. 
Liberation into consciousness of being more fully human is not 
easily achieved. It is a liberation that cannot be told or given to 
another but it is a state of consciousness that the individual must be 
helped to achieve. This liberation must occur within the individual 
as a consciousness of the nature of the situation that limits him or 
her and as a consciousness of the self as a being capable of acting 
on and transforming that situation. To this end of liberating 
consciousness through the act of knowing there must be the help of a 
liberating pedagogy that employs dialogue as a catalyst. Equally 
needed and contained within this pedagogy as an inherent part is the 
dialectical process that the dialogue initiates. Hegel in his 
Phenomenology of Mind reveals that the dialectical process is the 
movement of all knowing and constitutes the nature of the development of 
reason through progression of knowing or consciousness states until 
consciousness reaches Absolute Knowing. According to Hegel's insight 
into the nature of knowing or the experience of consciousness, the inner 
reality of the world is Spirit or Mind that finds its highest expression 
in Reason and includes the ethical and the right of freedom and justice. 
It can consequently be understood that the individual consciousness in 
its liberation into being more fully human by critical reflection moves 
in its "increasingly rigorous understanding" of self and situation 
toward the justness and rightness of an ethical society. Reason in 
this sense is not the development of rules, creeds, or regulations 
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that constrict the individual but is the act of knowing in critical 
and dialectical thought that moves human consciousness into higher and 
more ethical states of being. Hegel makes clear that the development 
of consciousness, that of gaining insight into the act of knowing, will 
release the potentiality of being more fully human, will make explicit 
that which is implicit as potential: 
While the embryo is certainly, in itself, implicitly 
a human being, it is not so explicitly, it is not by 
itself a human being; man is explicitly man only in 
the form of developed and cultivated reason, which 
has made itself to be what it is implicitly. 
(1807/1931, p. 83) 
Hegelian reason is thus not imposed but is cultivated and 
developed and carries with it a corresponding development of freedom. 
It is not to be confused with the distortion of reason that occurs 
when it is utilized as an instrument for political, social, and 
economic purposes. Richard J. Bernstein, in his Introduction to 
Habermas and Modernity, notes that the perception of social critics in 
Europe defines "instrumental reason" as one affecting and infecting 
"the entire range of social and cultural life encompassing economic 
structures, law, bureaucratic administration, and even the arts" 
(1985, p. 5). Bernstein adds that "the hidden logic of this form of 
rationalization is a logic of increased domination and repression" so 
that the "domination of nature turns into a domination of human beings 
over other human beings, and ultimately into the nightmare of self-
dcmination" (Bernstein, 1985, p. 6). Although the European social 
critics are referring to a process of utilizing reason that 
culminates in a totalitarian state in which mankind is known to be 
7 
dehumanized, a democratically free society is not iitmune to a 
corresponding form of perverted rationality or corrupted reason. In 
fact, Bernstein observes that these social critics argue that the 
"seeds of instrumental reason" are contained in the "origins of 
western rationality" (1985, p. 6). His observation becomes even more 
significant in the recent American criticism of education that 
expresses a concern over not just what might be considered the seeds 
but what is the visible growth for a condition corresponding to 
instrumental rationality. This concern finds its main focus in the 
school of free society that transmits and perpetuates the ideology of 
the dcminant power and hence serves the interests of this ideology. 
Ilenry Giroux, in "Teacher Education and the Ideology of Social 
Control," analyzes ideology as a "set of beliefs, values, and social 
practices that contain oppositional assumptions about varying 
elements of social reality, that is, society, economics, authority, 
human nature, politics, and so on" (1983, p. 409). Giroux maintains 
that when the dominant society institutionalizes this ideology, the 
ideology loses its "oppositional power" and serves to "legitimize 
existing institutional arrangements and social practices" (p. 409). 
His further reveals that ideology reaching the influence of hegemony 
"presents private interests as public goods" and elevates cannon 
sense1 to a universal truth" (p. 410). Charles Reich, in The 
Greening of America, analyzes how the social and historical rise of 
the Corporate State includes a concomitant rise of power over 
consciousness,, Reich perceives the power that has evolved in a 
democratic society is one of consciousness control: 
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The fact is that America still has...a democratic form. 
Power is not exercised in this country by force of 
arms, as in seine dictatorships. Power rests on control 
of consciousness. (1970, p. 307) 
What Reich does denote is a power to which people consent 
unknowingly. There is no force involved in this control. Thus the 
power of the dominant group to perpetuate what Reich calls "a false 
consciousness"is not an act of overt repression; it is rather 
dominance that is accepted in general because it is covertly projected 
through the values, myths, assumptions, and traditions that are shaped 
and eventually institutionalized by those in power. This ideology 
becomes so much a part of the fabric of life as it is known and of 
reality as it is perceived that individuals are incapable of questioning 
its existence. It is impossible to question what is not perceived and 
what is accepted as normal or traditional. What has occurred in this 
free society then is a hegemony that affects consciousness. Joseph 
Femia in "Hegemony and Consciousness in the Thought of Antonio Gramsci" 
defines hegemony as a term referring to a "situation in which a social 
group or class is ideologically dominant" and to which other groups 
give consent: 
Hegemony is therefore the predominance obtained by 
consent rather than force of one class or group 
over other classes; and it is attained through the 
myriad ways in which the institutions of civil 
society operate to shape, directly or indirectly, 
the cognitive and affective structures whereby men 
perceive and evaluate problematic social reality. 
(1975, p. 31) 
Femia records Gramsci's analysis of domination as consisting of two 
types. One is overt control by "coercive organs of the state" and the 
other is covert control of hegemony in which "the moral and 
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intellectual leadership" is "objectified in and exercised through the 
institutions of civil society, the ensemble of educational, religious 
and associational institutions" (p. 30). As a further explanation of 
the power of hegemony to control consciousness development, Femia 
refers to Gwyn Williams' definition of hegemony contained in Williams' 
introduction to his work on Gamsci: 
To be more specific, hegemony consists, according 
to Gwyn Williams' introductory definition, in "an 
order in which a certain way of life and thought 
is dcminant, in which one concept of reality is 
diffused throughout society, in all its 
institutional and private manifestations, 
informing with its spirit all tastes, morality, 
customs, religions and political principles, and 
all social relations in their intellectual and 
moral connotations." (1975, p. 30) 
It can be determined that the ideology, projected in the many 
textures of hegemony, so invades all aspects of life and constitutes 
the milieu into which the individual is born and in which he lives that 
it would never be possible to question that which is accepted by all and 
has traditionally been in existence. Charles Pierce, in The Crack in 
the Cosmic Egg.reiterates the pervasiveness of cultural hegemony and 
proposes that it becomes in this pervasiveness the only reality known: 
There is no escaping this rich web of language, 
myth, history, ways of doing things, 
unconsciously-accepted attitudes, notions, and 
so on, for these make up our only reality. (1971, p. 4) 
Pierce further adds that it is necessary to find the source, the loon, 
of this web before it becomes destructive: 
If this social fabric tends to become our shroud, 
the only way out is by the same weaving process, 
for there is only the one. So we need to find out 
all we can about the loom involved, and weave with 
imagination and vision rather than allow the process 
to happen as a random fate. (1971, p. 4) 
The necessary step in a liberating process, however, is not to weave 
another hegemony more in keeping with justice but to know that the 
given reality woven by hegemony is not fixed and static but dynamic 
and alterable; it is to know that reality is an ongoing process. It 
is also to know what is the node of consciousness resulting from this 
hegemony. Valerie Suransky analyzes the dominant mode of 
consciousness and the nature of social reality in "Phenomenology: An 
Alternative Research Paradigm and a Force for Social Change." 
Suransky recognizes that the "dominant mode of consciousness which 
characterizes our attitudes and values" is an "objective consciousness" 
in which humans have teen reduced to objects. To the observation of 
reality as an ongoing process capable of being transformed, Suransky 
contributes her observation that "this objective consciousness" is only 
a result of a "present historical situation" and is not a static 
reality but an "arbitrary construct": 
The myth of objective consciousness is an 
arbitrary construct, in which our society, 
in its present historical situation, has 
invested its sense of meaningfulness and 
value. Hence, like any mythology, it can be 
overturned and called into question by other 
milieus which find meaning and value 
elsewhere. (1980, p. 172) 
To "overturn and call into question" in Suransky's view is not to 
replace one form of dominance with another or to weave another 
hegemony. It is not a solution but a process in which liberation 
continues in progressive degrees through a dialectical interaction 
with the historical situation found in society. It is "an open-
ended pursuit of understanding": 
Phencmenology leads vis in a direction of critically 
unveiling the present codification system and 
presents us with a new humanistic attitude: based 
on the dialectical and carrmitted to dealing with 
essences. It is opposed to the mechanized view of 
the human being and seeks to restore the latter to 
a central and active role in education, social 
science, and psychology. It has no "solutions" and 
no "product" to offer but is an open-ended pursuit 
of understanding based on dialogical encounter and 
the perception of socio-cultural relativism and its 
concomitant meaning-structures. (1980, p. 172) 
"To overturn and call into question" the cultural hegemony that 
shapes consciousness is to became aware of the dehumanizing process 
resulting from this corruption of reason through shaping society, 
particularly schools, to justify socio-economic and political 
purposes. It is to liberate consciousness into the potential of being 
human in the Freirean sense of a "radical form of being" that 
exercises critical thought to "call into question" the existing 
historical reality or situation of limitation. It is ultimately to 
irove into a dialectical relationship with reality as an ongoing process. 
There are indeed no "solutions," for liberation cannot be prescribed or 
given. There is instead the critical reflection that calls for action 
upon that reflection or what Freire calls "praxis" for a creation and 
recreation of reality and consciousness in solidarity and love with 
others. In this development of critical thought, liberation and 
cultivation of Reason bring mutual recognition, freedom, and cormiunity. 
Freire's concept of human potential rises from a deeper conviction 
that "man's ontological vocation is to be a Subject who acts upon and 
transforms his world, and in so doing moves towards ever new 
possibilities of fuller and richer life individually and collectively" 
(Freire, 1970/1985, p. 13). It is to Freire the birthright of mankind 
to be helped to liberate consciousness into beaming more fully human 
and into self-becoming. Tb this birthright is added a universal 
dimension that Marcuse observes and that Habermas records: 
If we appeal to humanity1s right to peace, to the 
right to abolish exploitation and oppression, we 
are not talking about self-defined, special, group 
interests, but rather and, in fact, interests 
demonstrable as universal rights. (Habermas, 1985, 
p. 77) 
This study posits the futility of lamenting the lack of developed 
potential in mankind and the equal pointlessness of formulating new 
educational goals of developing potential fully until there is a 
liberation of consciousness into the potential of being human. Being 
human is here used in the Freirean sense of a "radical form of being 
human" that exercises critical thought and is dialectically involved in 
the act of knowing. The purpose of this study then beccmes one of 
offering to individuals the means by which the individual can achieve 
liberation into becoming more fully human. This study proposes such 
means through a humanizing pedagogy of dialogical-dialectical encounter 
with reality in the context of a curriculum based on reflective thought 
of self and situation. 
This study is organized into five chapters. A brief indication 
of the content and focus of each chapter in developing the purpose of 
this study is contained in the following description of each chapter: 
Chapter I examines the oppressive reality perceived 
by Freire as the underlying basis for the rise of 
hegemonic ideology that shapes consciousness. This 
examination turns to a further exploration of the 
effects of oppressive reality on consciousness, as 
seen in the oppressor-oppressed consciousnesses that 
result from the dominant ideology. Chapter I 
concludes with the effects of the oppressive reality 
and the oppressive consciousness on the pedagogical 
methods and curriculum of public schools. The 
relationship becanes evident between the hegemonic 
ideology of oppressive reality and the shaping of 
consciousness through a pedagogy that serves the 
interests and reflects the values of this hegemony. 
Chapter II narrows to a focus on the nature and 
characteristics of oppressed consciousness as 
presented in the Freudian theory of psychoanalysis. 
It is here in the realm of mind that the Ego-
oppressor and the Id-oppressed divert the flow of 
being into channels of irrational behavior, into the 
by-paths of unintended language, and into the 
manifestations of physical symptoms of internal 
oppression and conflict. What occurs as oppression 
in the social structure of hegemony creates within 
the consciousness a battleground of oppression and 
expression. What results then in this conflict is 
not an unimpeded flow of being into a fully integrated 
human but a fragmented and alienated being who is 
less in development than what is implicitly contained 
within mankind as human potential. To this point 
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Hegel's concept of the flow of being into integration 
of consciousness is used to show parallel understanding 
between Freud and Hegel of the nature of consciousness 
and its development. 
Chapter III continues a study of consciousness 
development but turns frcm oppression to liberation and 
from limitation to development. This chapter focuses 
on Hegel's concept of the dialectic as the source of 
all movement into higher forms of being. Hegel 
maintains in his Phenomenology of Mind that "the goal 
to be reached is the mind's insight into what knowing 
is" (1807/1831, p. 90). Hegelreveals that Spirit or mind is the 
only reality and that separation of subject and object 
does not exist in this reality. Hegel reveals the 
stages by which consciousness can educate itself into 
a higher form of being beginning with the birth of 
consciousness, moving to the development of self-
consciousness, and arriving at universal self-
consciousness. The emphasis in this chapter is on 
the progression of Spirit or Mind from self-
consciousness to universal self-consciousness where 
freedom and consciousness are one, where Reason is 
truth and reality, where the inner consciousness and 
the outer form are one. The purpose of this chapter 
is to reveal that the act of knowing can lead to 
liberation into Absolute Knowing. 
Chapter IV has two areas of concern: Freire1s 
pedagogy of liberation and an application of that 
pedagogy in a free society. Chapter IV examines 
Freire's pedagogy for liberation for an understanding 
of the nature of a true dialogue , of the force of the 
dialectic, and for the growth of critical 
consciousness in reflective thought. 
Chapter V is not proposing a detailed blueprint 
for a curriculum of liberation, for such a process is 
always ongoing as education is ongoing. What this 
concluding chapter does propose is that an understanding 
and application of Freire's method and curriculum 
generates a movement toward critical consciousness that 
is at the basis for a liberation of consciousness into 
being more fully human. 
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CHAPTER I 
OPPRESSIVE REALITY, CONSCIOUSNESS,AND PEDAGOGY 
Oppressive Reality 
This chapter draws heavily on Freire's insights into the rise of 
oppressive reality as a social phenomenon, the cultural effects of this 
reality on the shaping of consciousness, and the methods and curriculum 
employed by this reality to preserve its power. Freire concentrates on 
revealing the existing reality obscured by cultural hegemony in all of 
his works. Freire's Pedagogy of the Oppressed focuses on the power of the 
oppressive reality to shape consciousness and reveals that the pedagogy 
of the oppressor is often used as an instrument by which this shaping of 
consciousness occurs. Freire's Cultural Action for Freedom offers 
insight into the structure of oppressive reality as a social phenomenon. 
Freire's work is central to this study, for he does not offer his 
concept of oppressive reality and its subsequent effects as a theory 
alone; he speaks with authority gained frcm his early experiences of this 
reality and of his later action to alter this oppressiveness. Freire has 
insight into this oppressiveness frcm his young encounter with what he 
calls the "culture of silence" in which the oppressed or underprivileged 
are overwhelmed by the power of the dominant elite. He moreover learns 
during his educational experiences that occurred within the "culture of 
silence"that education serves the interest of those in power, that the 
oppressed have no instrument by which to lift themselves from this 
oppression, and that it is inpossible for the oppressed to develop an 
instrument of critical thought from their position of being submerged 
within this oppressive reality. Thus Freire's authority rests on his 
reflection on his personal encounter with and later studies of 
oppression and on his action of forging the pedagogical instrument by 
which the oppressed can be liberated. In one sense Freire perceives 
with double vision the causes of oppression and the means for 
liberation; consequently his vision gains the force of praxis as it 
beccmes a combination of personal experience, later studies and 
reflection, and subsequent action to create the instrument of 
liberation by which mankind can become more fully human. 
Freire's work concerns the victims of the Third World, 
illiterate peasants who are born into oppression; his philosophy and 
practice of education, however, are universal in application and 
serve to unveil an oppressive reality of a world dichotomized into 
two classes of oppressors and oppressed. To those living in a free 
society, Freire's concept of oppressive reality might appear 
irrelevant and hence be dismissed as pertaining to a less civilized 
culture. It is in this civilized culture, however, that Freire's 
concept of oppressive reality is relevant, for it serves to unveil 
the myths, assumptions, and traditions that constitute the cultural 
ideological hegemony obscuring the existing oppressive reality. 
It is, however, easier to discern oppressive reality in the skeletal 
form of the Third World than it is to detect this oppressiveness 
through the conplexities of a technological society with an attending 
complexity of sophisticated cultural hegemony. Whereas in the 
sophisticated culture of a free society violence would be defined 
as bloodshed, Freire1 s exaitiination of the Third World reveals violence 
as synonymous with oppression, for "an act is oppressive.. .when it 
prevents men from being more fully human" (1970/1984, p. 42). Freire 
furthermore extends violence to include any situation in which one 
group or individual exploits another or "hinders his pursuit of self-
affirmation as a responsible person" (1970/1984, p. 40). It is thus 
violence extending beyond the customary definition of bloodshed that 
creates the "culture of silence." 
In Cultural Action for Freedom, Freire analyzes the social 
structure that creates the "culture of silence" and hence explains 
what "silence" means as a form of oppression. Joao da Veiga 
Coutinho's introduction to this work provides insight into Freire's 
main concern, that of "divergent iroages of man, or more correctly, an 
already established image which its keepers are attempting to 
prescribe for others and a new image which is struggling to be 
(1970, p. vi). Freire's concept of human potential has at its center 
a faith that "no matter how 'ignorant' or 'submerged' in a 'culture 
of silence,'" every human being "is capable of looking critically at 
his world in a dialogical encounter with others" (1970, p. 13). 
Thus Coutinho's terms of "keepers" and "struggling to be" denote 
dehumanized beings who have the right to be more. Coutinho adds that 
Ereire's philosophy has as its foundation the individual's right to be 
more fully human: 
The cardinal, principle of that philosophy is man's 
vocation to be more- more, that is, than what he is 
at any given tine or place. There are thus no 
developed men except in a biological sense. The 
essence of the human is to be in continual non-
natural process. In other words, the 
characteristic of the human species is its 
repeatedly demonstrated capacity for transcending 
what is merely given, what is purely determined. 
(p. vi) 
In Cultural Action for Freedom (1970) Freire examines the 
marginal person as conveying an "already established image which its 
keepers are attempting to prescribe for others" within the social 
structure that seemingly denies the individual's "struggling to be" 
as an ontological vocation of mankind. In analyzing the irrational 
concept of marginal beings, Freire maintains that "illiterates have 
to be recognized as beings 'outside of,1 'marginal to' sane thing, 
since it is impossible to be marginal to nothing" (p. 10). There 
must be a reality to which this person is marginal: 
Those who consider them marginal must, nevertheless, 
recognize the existence of a reality to which they 
are marginal - not only the physical space, but 
historical, social, cultural, and economic realities -
i.e., the structural dimensions of reality, (p. 10) 
Freire furthermore contends that being marginal implies "move­
ment of the one said to be marginal frcm the center, where he was, 
to the periphery," and therefore this movement has a presupposition 
of "not only an agent but also his reasons " (p. 10) • In searching 
for the author of this movement, Freire reveals the illogic of its 
being the decision of the illiterates: 
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Admitting the existence of men "outside of" or 
"marginal to" structural reality, it seems 
legitimate to ask: Who is the author of this 
movement from the center of the structure to its 
margin? Do so-called marginal men, among them the 
illiterates, make the decision to move out to the 
periphery of society? If so, marginality is an 
option with all that it involves: hunger, 
sickness, rickets, pain, mental deficiencies, 
living death, crime, promiscuity, despair, the 
impossibility of being. (1970, p. 10) 
If the choice is not to be marginal, then "marginal man has been 
expelled from and kept outside of the social system and is therefore 
the objeci:. of violence" (p. 10). It becomes clear in Freire's 
examination of marginality that the violence is not that of expelling 
the marginal being but the violence of keeping the marginal being as 
oppressed within the social structure: 
In fact, however, the social structure as a whole 
does not "expel," nor is marginal man a "being 
outside of." He is, on the contrary, a "being 
inside of," within the social structure, and in a 
dependent relationship to those whan we call 
falsely autonomous beings, inauthentic beings-
f or-themselves. (1970, p. 11) 
What the social structure accomplishes as a "keeper" of this 
being is the violence of dehumanizing the marginal person. Freire's 
further analysis of the marginal person indicates how the term 
dehumanization be cones vital to Freire's concept of oppression. 
These marginal beings exist in the world but are prevented from 
being with the world. Freire clarifies what "in" and "with" the 
world means: 
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It is as conscious beings that men are not only 
in the world, but with the world, together with 
other men . Men can fulfill the necessary 
condition of being with the world because they are 
able to gain objective distance from it. Without 
this objectification, whereby man also objectifies 
himself, man would be limited to being in the 
world, lacking both self-knowledge and knowledge 
of the world. (1970, pp. 27-28) 
Freire emphasizes his point with a comparison of human beings 
and animals, contending that "unlike men, animals are simply in the 
world, incapable of objectifying either themselves or the world." 
Furthermore, animals "live a life without time, properly speaking, 
submerged in a life with no possibility of emerging from it, adjusted 
and adhering to reality" (p. 28). Yet the description of the 
oppressed submerged within the culture of silence without an 
instrument by which to emerge frcm it and taught through education to 
adapt or adjust to it parallels the description of animals in the 
world and conveys the degree of dehumanization to which the oppressed 
have been subjected. It is through their reflective thought and 
action that humans have the capacity to humanise or dehumanize their 
world. It is "because they impregnate the world with their 
reflective presence," that only humans "can humanize or dehumanize" 
(1970, p. 31) 
To understand the social phenomenon of how dehumanization 
occurs, Freire reveals the relationship of the superstructure to 
infrastructure in cultural-historical reality. Freire takes the 
"historical-cultural configuration" of the "culture of silence" 
and reveals that it is not artificially and deliberately 
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constructed by "keepers" but is a result of relationships: 
We do not mean that the culture of silence is an 
entity created by the metropolis in specialized 
laboratories and transported to the Third World. 
Neither is it true, however, that the culture of 
silence emerges by spontaneous generation. The 
fact is that the culture of silence is born in the 
relationship between the Third World and the 
metropolis... . Thus understanding the culture of 
silence presupposes an analysis of dependence as a 
relational phenomenon which gives rise to different 
forms of being, of thinking, of expression, those 
of the culture of silence and those of the culture 
which "has no voice." (1970, pp. 32-33) 
Freire explains that the "social structure is not an abstraction" 
but "exists in a dialectic between super and infra-structures" (p. 
33). This dialectic produces a special form of consciousness: 
This mode of culture is a superstructural 
expression which conditions a special form of 
consciousness. The culture of silence 
"overdeteTmines" the infrastructure in which 
it originates. (1970, p. 32) 
Part of this rise of the social structure cones frcm what Freire 
calls the "introjection of myths": 
It is true that infrastructure, created in the 
relations by which the work of man transforms 
the world, gives rise to superstructure. But it 
is also true that the latter, mediated by men, 
who introject its myths, turns upon the 
infrastructure and "overdetermines" it. If it 
were not for the dynamic of these precarious 
relationships in which men exist and work in 
the world, we could speak neither of social 
structure, or of men, nor of a human world. 
(1970, p. 33) 
Freire also explains the consciousnesses arising frcm the 
relationship between the metropolitan society of the powerful and 
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the dependent society of the oppressed: 
Both the metropolitan society and the dependent 
society, totalities in themselves, are part of a 
greater whole, the economic, historical, cultural, 
and political context in which their mutual 
relationships evolve. Though the context in which 
these societies relate to each other is the same, 
the quality of the relationship is obviously 
different in each case, being determined by the 
role which each plays in the total context of their 
interaction. The action of the metropolitan society 
upon the dependent society has a directive 
character, whereas the object society's action, 
whether it be response or initiative, has a 
dependent character. (1970, p. 33) 
What occurs in this relationship is the "introjection by the 
dominated of the cultural myths of the dcaninator" (p. 33). Moreover, 
the "dependent society introjects the values of the life style of the 
metropolitan society" (p. 333 - The resulting effect on the 
consciousness of the dependent or dominated society of this 
dialectical relationship with the superstructure is a duality: 
This results in the duality of the dependent 
society, its ambiguity, its being and not 
being itself, and the ambivalence 
characteristic of its long experience of 
dependency, both attracted by land rejecting 
the metropolitan society. (1970, p. 34) 
Freire's analysis of the social phenomenon of the oppressed 
consciousness is further aided by his explanation of the silence 
this consciousness denotes. Since the will of the director society 
shapes the "infrastructure of the dependent society," the 
"resultant superstructure, therefore reflects the inauthenticity of 
the infrastructure" (p. 34). The voice of the dependent society, 
which by definition is a "silent society" or a "culture of silence," 
is "not an authentic voice but merely the echo of the voice of the 
metropolis" (p. 34). 
Freire's discussion of the social structures reveals the depth 
of submergence so that the oppressed internalize the consciousness of 
the oppressor and beccme locked into this oppressive reality. 
Freire's analysis of the effects of the social structure in which the 
oppressed are submerged ccmes into greater focus with the details of 
the consciousness of both the oppressor and the oppressed in his 
Pedagogy of the Oppressed. 
Oppressor and Oppressed Consciousnesses 
Freire takes a more direct approach in Pedagogy of the 
Oppressed by revealing the oppressive reality as consisting of two 
classes: oppressors and oppressed. Freire describes the oppressors 
as the dominant class, the ones in power, comparable to the director 
society or metropolitan areas described in Cultural Action for 
Freedom. The oppressors have one interest, that of maintaining their 
power and central to the maintenance of power is wealth. Freire notes 
that to the oppressor "money is the measure of all things, and profit the 
primary goal" (1970/1984, p. 44). Freire cites the consciousness of the 
oppressor is "to have and to be the class of the haves" (p. 44). In 
the oppressor consciousness only the oppressors are human; the others 
are reduced to the status of "things." The oppressors dehumanize the 
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others by treating them as possessions and hence reducing them to 
objects. This treatment need not be an overt act of dehisnanizing the 
oppressed. Such treatment becanes an accepted and normal way of life, 
one naturally belonging to those in power whose merit as ruler of the 
dominant class is accepted by oppressor and oppressed alike. The rise 
of the oppressor class as the established ruling class discloses a 
pattern of dominance that becomes embedded in cultural hegemony of 
tradition, myths, and assumptions and evolves into a hegemonic ideology 
that endows this ruling class with the right to rule as the natural 
rulers. Freire examines how accepted is the oppressor's way of life 
as naturally belonging to those in power: 
Their behavior, this way of understanding the world 
and men, is explained-by their experience as a 
dominant class. Once a situation of violence and 
oppression has been established, it engenders an 
entire way of life and behavior for those caught up 
in it - oppressor and oppressed alike. Both are 
submerged in this situation and both bear the marks 
of oppression. Analysis of existential situations 
of oppression reveals that their inception lay in an 
act of violence-initiated by those in power. This 
violence as a process, is perpetuated from generation 
to generation of oppressors who become its heirs and 
are shaped in its climate. This climate creates in 
the oppressor a strongly possessive consciousness-
possessive of the world and of men. (1970/1984, p. 44) 
The "strongly possessive consciousness" of the oppressor "tends 
to transform everything surrounding it into an object of domination" 
so that the "earth, property, production, the creations of men, 
men themselves, time - everything is reduced to the status of objects 
at its disposal" (p. 44). In revealing how extensive is the 
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possessive exploitation of the oppressors, Freire also reveals the 
different aspects of the social and cultural structure affected by 
this treatment. It becomes apparent that the ideology of the 
oppressor is truly pervasive, present in all structures and dominant 
in all institutions. Freire also reveals the violence of prohibiting 
an individual from becoming fully human that is disguised under myths, 
humanitarian images, and abstract ideological offerings. "Thus in 
treating people as objects, the oppressors have inflicted the greatest 
of all violence: they have dehumanized them. 
The oppressed respond to this ideology of domination and to this 
treatment of dehumanization by developing a consciousness of objects: 
"Within their unauthentic view of the world and of themselves, the 
oppressed feel like 'things' owned by the oppressor™ (Freire, 1970/1984, 
p. 51). The oppressed thus exhibit a "colonized mentality" of being 
possessions. Bereft of belief in self or trust in others and filled 
with self-depreciation, the oppressed exert a horizontal violence on 
their own. The oppressed have so internalized the oppressor in their 
consciousness that the oppressed may exert violence on the internalized 
oppressor contained within them but they never inflict overt violence 
on the oppressor. The only model available to them of humanity is 
that of the oppressor so that "to be" is "to be lite the oppressor" 
(Freire, 1970/1984, p. 51). Freire notes that "it is impossible for the 
oppressed to participate in their liberation as long as they live in the 
'duality' in which 'to be' is 'to be like' " the oppressor (1970/1984, 
p. 33). 
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Thus freedom to the oppressed is limited to their moving into the power 
position held by the oppressor. Their submersion in the "reality of 
oppression" distorts their perception of themselves: 
But their perception of themselves as oppressed is impaired by 
their subversion in the reality of oppression. At this level, 
their perception of themselves as opposites of the oppressor 
does not yet signify engagement in a struggle to overcome the 
contradiction; the one pole aspires not to liberation, but to 
identification with its opposite pole. (Freire, 1970/1984, p. 
30) 
Freire moreover reveals that the internalization of the oppressor 
within the oppressed determines the oppressed1s view of freedom: 
In this situation the oppressed do not see the "new man" as the 
man to be born frcati the resolution of this contradiction, as 
. oppression gives way to liberation. For them, the new man is 
themselves become oppressors. Their vision of the new man is 
individualistic; because of their identification with the 
oppressor, they have no consciousness of themselves as persons 
or as members of an oppressed class. It is not to become free 
men that they want agrarian reform, but in order to acquire 
land and thus become landowners—or, more precisely, bosses over 
other workers. It is a rare peasant who, once "promoted" to 
overseer, does not become more of a tyrant towards his former 
comrades than the owner himself. This is because the context of 
the peasant's situation, that is, oppression, remains unchanged. 
(Freire, 1970/1984, p. 30) 
The oppressed, "having internalized the image of the oppressor and 
adopted his guidelines, are fearful of freedom" (Freire, 1970/1984, p. 
31). Freire makes clear that "freedom would require them to eject this 
image" of the oppressor and "replace it with autonomy and 
responsibility" (p. 31). Freire's examination of this fear of freedom 
that requires autonomy reveals that the "behavior of the oppressed is a 
prescribed behavior" (1970/1984, p. 31) that follows the "guidelines of 
the oppressor": 
The "fear of freedom" which afflicts the oppressed, a fear 
which may equally well lead them to desire the role of 
oppressor or bind them to the role of oppressed, should be 
examined. One of the basic elements of the relationship between 
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oppressor and oppressed is prescription. Every prescription 
represents the imposition of one man's choice upon another, 
transforming the consciousness of the man prescribed to into one 
that conforms with the prescriber's consciousness. Thus, the 
behavior of the oppressed is a prescribed behavior, following as 
it does the guidelines of the oppressor. (Freire, 1970/1984, 
p. 31) 
Freire notes that individuals "who have adapted to the structure 
of domination in which they are iranersed and have been resigned to it, 
are inhibited from waging a struggle for freedom so long as they feel 
incapable of running the risk it requires" (p. 32) and "are apt to react 
in a passive and alienated manner when confronted with the necessity to 
struggle for their freedcm and self-affirmation" (Freire, 1970/1984, p. 
51). Since the oppressor is "housed" within the oppressed, the 
"resulting ambiguity makes them fearful of freedcm": 
They resort (stimulated by the oppressor) to magical explanations 
or a false view of God, to whan they fatalistically transfer the 
responsibility for their oppressed state. It is extremely 
unlikely that these self-mistrustful, downtrodden, hopeless people 
will seek their own liberation—an act of rebellion which they may 
view as a confrontation with destiny. (Freire, 1970/1984, p. 163) 
Part of the difficulty of the oppressed's acquiring a critical awareness 
of oppressive reality, of a reality that contains the "contradistinction 
of men as oppressors and oppressed" (p. 36) is that the oppressed 
'fatalistically 'accept* their exploitation" because they are "unaware of 
the causes of their condition" (Freire, 1970/1984, p. 51). A further 
explanation is that "their ideal is to be men; but for them, to be men, 
is to be oppressors" (Freire, 1970/1984, p. 30). Thus the oppressed are 
submerged within this oppressive reality with freedcm extending only to 
becoming oppressor. Myths, assumptions, and tradition of cultural 
hegemony convey a move into the power position of oppressor as a goal to 
be desired. Freire makes clear there is no liberation in such a move 
but only a continuation of the dehumanization suffered by the 
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oppressor and the oppressed. Only the oppressed can liberate both 
oppressed and oppressor. It is not in the interest of the oppressor 
to change or alter a power position. In order to insure the 
continuance of the domination the oppressors maintain, the methods and 
curriculum they employ in their pedagogy become the instrument of 
continued dehumanization. 
Pedagogy of the Oppressor 
Freire's insight into the creation of oppressive reality and its 
effect on consciousness extends to the very instrument by which such 
shaping of consciousness occurs, the pedagogy of the oppressor. 
Freire perceives the oppressor education as any education in which the 
methodology of narration and the curriculum of ideology are used. 
This education/in which students are shaped in consciousness to accept 
and not to question whatever the teacher deposits in them as knowledge, 
is particularly evident in public education. Freire knows from his 
subjection to a pedagogy of the oppressor and from his subsequent 
creation of a liberating pedagogy that "there is no such thing as a 
neutral educational process" (Freire, 1970/1984, p. 15). It is Freire's 
belief that schools serve to support and reproduce the ideology of the 
social and cultural structure for which they were created, in which 
they operate, and whose interests they serve. Freire makes a central 
point in his Pedagogy of the Oppressed in revealing how education is 
linked to the preservation of the dominant ideology so that all 
students and most educators participate in this oppressive atmosphere 
without being aware of the social and cultural purpose they serve: 
Education as the exercise of domination stimulates 
the credulity of students, with the ideological 
intent (often not perceived by educators) of 
indoctrinating them to adapt to the world of 
oppression. (1370/1984, p. 65) 
Social and cultural critics of American education canprebend 
what is happening and try to create a public awareness by selecting 
particular manifestations of this ideological oppression in order to 
magnify a particular symptom of the deeper malaise. These critics 
seek the why and hew of oppressive education, but Freire determines 
the oppressive reality that constitutes the hegemonic ideology the 
public accepts as normal and the schools serve as traditional. 
Daniel Rossides, for example, in his article, "What is the Purpose of 
Education," represents in his thoughts what most social critics 
perceive as the underlying reality of the purpose of education: 
History's diverse educational systems have one 
all-important similarity - they serve the 
interests of the powerful first and foremost. 
No understanding of American education is 
possible unless one first understands that the 
main outcome of education (in both agrarian and 
industrial societies) is the establishment and 
maintenance of class differences quite 
independently of any functional purpose. (1984, p. 16) 
How education serves "the interests of the powerful first and 
foremost" is through the preservation of the dominant ideology of 
the moling class of wealth. This ideology permeates the very 
structure of society so that it saturates the public consciousness 
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and hence makes individuals impervious to the reality of the situation 
in which they are placed. This pervasive way of viewing the world in 
turn obscures the true issues of society and the true purposes of 
education as supporting the ideology of society. Clarence J. Karier 
reveals in his research on the rise of the corporate liberal state and 
its increasing control of education how the resulting domination 
becomes one of such long standing and of such magnitude that 
individuals accept this domination as a normal condition that requires 
a normal manner of responding. In tracing the growth of the corporate 
liberal state and its corresponding growth of educational control, 
Karier notes an "array of bureaucratic regulatory agencies which 
cooperatively worked with business and labor to achieve that optimal 
balance of interests for all concerned" (1972, p. 129). Among the 
sectors that constituted the emerging corporate liberal state was a 
private sector of wealth that wielded great influence: 
On the other hand, in the private sector 
relatively new organizations were created which 
effectively channeled corporate wealth toward 
the support of liberal progressive reform. 
Philanthropic foundations became a major stimulus 
for political as well as educational reform. 
(Karier, 1972, p. 129) 
That ideology serves "the interests of the powerful first and forearost" 
becomes in Karier's following analysis the powerful influence wealth 
can achieve: 
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The practices of foundations initiating various 
kinds of activity and then allowing the public 
sector to assume control became common practice 
of the major foundations dealing with policy 
formation in America. The profound influence 
of foundations issues frcm their ability to 
flexibly employ large blocks of wealth for 
research, initiate new activities, and facilitate 
existing programs. .(1972, p. 129) 
The point Karier makes is that "for the most part, the philosophy 
behind the policy makers for the foundations appears to have teen 
that of a liberal pragmatist who appreciated the need for survival" 
(p. 129)- Thus the liberal corporate state originated in the interest 
of society, but its modest inception turned into a "development and 
creation of large corporate foundations" that were "very much a 
twentieth century phenomenon" that carried in this gigantic growth an 
equal influence over education. Karier gives empirical data as 
evidence of the gigantic growth and indicates a concomitant growth in 
power over educational policy: 
Foundations of varied sorts grew rapidly in 
numbers frcm 21 in 1900 to a total of 4,685 in 
1959. To the chagrin of many congressmen and 
taxpayers, the tax-exempt foundations in the 
United States also grew frcm 12,295 at the close 
of 1952 to 42,124 by the end of 1960. Frcm the 
beginning of the century, the new philanthropic 
endeavors of corporate wealth were directed at 
influencing the course of educational policy. 
(1972, p. 120) 
It is of interest that seme resistance to this growth, especially in 
the influence over education, appeared in 1913 when "a concerned 62nd 
Congress directed the Industrial Relations Commission to investigate 
the role of foundations" and that after a year of testimony, the 
conclusion of the Catmission was not in favor of the control over 
education: 
Nevertheless, after a year of testimony, the majority 
of the Commission concluded that, "The domination of 
men in whose hands the final control of a large part 
of American industry rests is not limited to their 
employees, but is being rapidly extended to control 
the education and social service of the nation." 
(p. 130) 
Even though the findings of the Catmission "cut very close to the 
heart of the problem of power in the corporate liberal state," 
America's entry into World War I detracted frcm this issue of power 
with the result that "the corporate liberal state emerged frcm the 
war stronger than ever" (p. 130). It was not only that the 
corporate liberal state continued after the war but rather that it 
"became institutionalized" so that "henceforth, most social change 
would be institutionally controlled and the interest of government, 
corporate wealth, and labor more securely managed" (p. 130). The 
direct relationship of this corporate state to the purpose of 
public schools becomes evident in Karier's assessment: 
The state which thus emerged included a mass system 
of public schools which served the manpower needs of 
that state. One of the most important ways that 
system served the needs of the state was through the 
process of rationalizing and standardizing manpower 
for both production and consumption of goods and 
services. (1972, p. 130) 
Karier's research supports Rossides' detection of the power behind 
the formation and shaping of schools: 
Ideology aside, it is clear that American education 
serves the needs of America's power groups. To 
protect and further interests, the middle and upper 
classes have created the myth that success in school 
is related to performance outside of school to the 
benefit of both individual and society. (-1984, p. 18) 
Detected in Karier's "process of rationalizing and standardizing 
manpower" and Rossides1 reference to the "myths" that "protect and 
further interests," is the perversion of rationality as the "process 
of rationalizing" to justify the management of education to produce 
needed workers and consumers. Thus it is not "ideology aside" but 
ideology inside the methods and curriculum and ideology inside the 
myths to appease and make passive that emerge from the insights of 
both Karier and Rossides. Ideology finds in education the. very 
material it needs to shape the culture that serves it needs and 
preserves its power. This ideology reproduces itself in myths and 
traditions within the classroom. Consequently the schools must in 
turn reproduce the values and demands of the social and cultural 
structure of society. Rossides suggests one myth, the correlation of 
academic success with later success in work. Freire's analysis of 
oppressive pedagogy reveals the depth of oppressive reality and the 
projection of myths that appease those in education who might grow 
restive and question. Thus the myth Rossides mentions, of success 
in school and success in life, becomes one of the myths utilized by 
the oppressors, the myth that all students can succeed if they stay 
in school and work hard. Here it becomes obvious how very much the 
oppressed have internalized the oppressor's consciousness to the 
extent that "to be is to be like" those in power. What Freire is 
saying and what Rossides is noting as myth explain the tendency of 
the oppressed in American society to uphold the rights of the wealthy. 
It is in the interest of the oppressor class that their position of 
power and wealth be insured. Thus in the ideology they project the 
myths that shape consciousness to believe in these myths. Students do 
believe the myths that academic success conditions later success and 
do believe that staying in school results in the rewards of becoming 
successful, a term denoting acquiring the position of power and wealth. 
The myths are upheld by all in society so that students are powerless to 
question. Students accept the hegemony in which they are born and 
which rules their lives. They therefore accept the responsibility for 
any failure to succeed. Implicit in most educational myths is the 
assumption that working hard or doing what one is told will insure power 
and wealth. Students accept this myth and accept responsibility for any 
failure to succeed. Rothstein picks up this myth and indicates how 
unquestioned is the acceptance of the poor for their failure and 
subsequent poverty, a legacy given by schools and preserved in the 
structure of society: 
If the poor believe that their poverty and 
alienation are the result of their own stupidity, 
their own failure to achieve, and their own 
unwillingness to stick it out in school, they will 
be less likely to squawk about their condition and 
less likely to question the occupational structure 
which assigns poverty and alienation to those who 
do the majority of the country's necessary work. 
(1974, p. 63) 
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Rothstein makes clear the necessity of myths to produce the manpower 
the economic structure needs: 
The economic structure of our society requires a system 
of vastly differentiated educational opportunities for 
those destined for different jobs; combined with the 
myth that the top educational opportunities are open to 
all who try to make it. (1974, p. 63) 
The inability to succeed creates guilt for failure. In what amounts 
to ideological manipulation, the student never doubts who is 
responsible. This internalization of the oppressor's consciousness 
especially surfaces in the attitude of those who have failed toward 
those who have succeeded or have power. Slater (1983) in his 
"Democratization of Greed," reveals how attitudes internalized in 
school persist in later life and offer support to the dominant ideology: 
"Nothing, in fact, seems easier to manipulate than public sentiment, 
about the rich." What occurs in the acceptance of this myth is an aura 
of merit surrounding those who have succeeded so that the poor rarely 
"question motives and behaviors of those wealthier than they" (p. 132). 
It is the oppressors who shape, education to support the dominant 
ideology and the oppressor who thus oppress the poor with this ideology. 
It is the oppressed poor, however, who in their domesticated 
consciousness accept the ideology so well that they look upon the wealthy 
oppressor with awe: 
And given a choice between blaming the rich for their 
problems or blaming the poor, the mass of the 
population will blame the poor every time. (Slater, 
1983, p. 140) 
Freire relates this same attitude toward the oppressor exists in the 
Third World where peasants reveal "a diffuse magical belief in the 
invulnerability and power of the oppressor" (Freire, 1970/1984, p. 51). 
Freire reveals that part of this attitude stems from the lack of 
belief in self and the inability to trust others. The oppressed are 
told so many tines how undeserving they are that they are filled with 
self-depreciation. The same method is used by the corporate liberal 
state in projecting myths of education and in supporting these myths 
through a testing program that is culturally biased to insure low 
scores among the oppressed classes and that is used to inform the 
student of his or her merit. Karier verifies that not only is this 
testing an attempt to structure education to fulfill the needs of 
society but it is the means by which a myth of merit is conveyed that 
the oppressed accept as reality. Of interest in Karier"s analysis is 
the obvious perversion of reason to justify a social class system. 
Lewis Terman, for example, structured the Stanford-Binet intelligence 
test with questions related to the "hierarchical occupational 
structure" (Karier, 1972, p. 134). Karier notes "it was little wonder 
that IQ reflected social class bias" (p. 134). What truly reveals the 
extent to which the oppressed internalize the oppressor is seen in the 
oppressed's ability to internalize and make Terman's system work: 
Terman's tests were based on an occupational hierarchy 
which was, in fact, the social class system of the 
corporate liberal state which was then emerging. The 
many varied tests, all the way frcm IQ to personality 
and scholastic achievement, periodically brought up-
to-date, would serve a vital part in rationalizing 
the social class system. The tests also created the 
illusion of objectivity which on the one side 
served the needs of the "professional" educators 
to be "scientific," and on the other side served 
the need of the system for a myth which could 
convince the lower classes that their station in 
life was part of the natural order of things. 
(Karier, 1972, p. 136) 
Karier affirms the internalization of the oppressor so noted by 
Freire. The myth was so incorporated into the belief of the 
oppressed that it became a reality. As Karier states, "for many the 
myth had apparently worked" (p. 136): Karier reveals the extent of 
such educational control: 
The lower class American adult was, indeed, a 
product of fifty years of testing. He had been 
channeled through an intricate bureaucratic 
educational system which, in the name of meeting 
individual needs, classified and tracked him into 
an occupation appropriate to his socio-econemic 
class status. The tragic character of this was 
not only that the lower class learned to believe 
in the system, but worse, through internalizing 
that set of beliefs, made it work. It worked 
because the lowered self-image which the school 
and society reinforced on the lower class child 
did result in lower achievement. (1972, 136) 
Testing employs a rationality that is perverted to justify social 
selection. Testing also serves to direct students into different 
curricular in elementary schools and into different tracks in 
secondary schools. Jean Anyon in "Social Class and the Hidden 
Curriculum" notes the different curricular offered to different social 
classes and the hidden purposes contained within each curriculum. The 
working-class schools reveal the strict control exercised by the 
teacher and the emphasis on the conformity of students to directions 
and obedience to catmands. Anyon observes that in the working-class 
schools "work is often evaluated not according to whether it is right 
or wrong but according to whether the children followed the right 
steps" (1983, p. 149). The middle class school includes following 
"directions to get the right answers, but the directions often call for 
seme figuring, sane choice, seme decision making" (p. 153). Behavior 
is controlled through rules and consequences. The affluent professional 
school carries out negotiations with the student in regard to behavior 
and stresses analyses of correct answers rather that just finding the 
correct response. In this school, Anyon notes, "work involves 
individual thought and expressiveness, expansion and illustration of 
ideas, and choice of appropriate method and material" (p. 155). Use 
of critical powers of thought for development of minds accelerates as 
the social class is elevated. Thus in the executive elite school the 
emphasis is on "developing one's analytical intellectual powers" and 
on reasoning "through a problem, to produce intellectual products 
that are both logically sound and of top academic quality" (p. 159). 
These children in the elite school are not controlled by bells or rules; 
they learn to control. These are the children of the dominant elites 
who are being prepared for their leadership roles in the socio­
economic world. Anyon notes how different is the curriculum offered 
to this elite group: 
The executive elite school gives its children 
something that none of the other schools does: 
knowledge of and practice in manipulating the 
socially legitimated tools of analysis of 
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systems. The children are given the opportunity to 
utilize the intellectually and socially prestigious 
grammatical, mathematical, "and other vocabularies 
and rules by which elements are arranged. They are 
given the opportunity to use these skills in the 
analysis of society and in control situations. Such 
knowledge and skills are a most important kind of 
symbolic capital. These are necessary for control of 
a production system... . Their schooling is helping 
them to develop the abilities necessary for ownership 
and control of physical capital and the means of 
production in society. (1983, p. 165) 
The same differentiation of curriculum occurs on the secondary 
level in the form of tracking. Richard Rothstein reveals that tracking 
in the high school is an integral pari: of secondary education in that 
it serves the interest of the wealthy. The differentiation of 
curricular occurs on the secondary level for the same econcmic purpose. 
Richard Rothstein (1974) in "How Tracing Works" maintains that 
"tracking is not unique," for it is "similar to other systems whose 
purpose is to manipulate people to adjust to national economic 
policies" (p. 64). Tracking then becomes a manipulation of the school 
systems: "Tracking is the 'American or indirect' way of assigning 
occupational roles through manipulation of the school systems of the 
country" (p. 64). Furthermore, "the fundamental principle of the 
tracking system" is economically based/ for "educational opportunities 
adjust to the needs of the occupation structure and not vice versa" 
(pp. 64-65). Students have internalized the myth of merit conveyed 
by hegemonic ideology to the extent that they believe they are 
assigned to the appropriate track that reflects their ability. In 
reality, however, these students are assigned to what the dominant 
class perceives as necessary for the econcstty, for "track sizes are 
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proportional to the job openings in the occupation to which these 
tracks lead" (1974, p. 64). Rothstein links the work opportunities 
to the different social classes in track assignments- Thus "students 
are assigned to reading groups, special classes, and special schools 
on the basis of income, race, and sex" (p. 64). Merit as projected 
in the myth of education has no influence in this tracking. Rothstein 
clarifies the illusion of meritocracy in the different curricular 
offerings for different classes: 
The tracking system in American elementary and 
secondary education is not, however, meritocratic. 
In addition to the rational occupation channeling 
function of a meritocratic system, American 
educational tracking also serves a second function: 
the maintenance of rigidities in the social class, 
race and sex role divisions of American society. 
It is an essential purpose of the tracking system to 
prevent significant nobility between the rich and the 
poor, white and black, male and female. Tracks do 
insure that schools certify students for occupational 
openings in the required proportion, but they do this 
by insuring that the "upper" tracks leading to more 
prestigious occupations have proportionally more 
white, men, and rich students; and that the "lower" 
tracks leading to blue collar jobs include 
proportionally more blacks, women and poor or 
working class students. (1974, pp. 69-70) 
The acceptance of the tracking program and of the testing that 
supports it as a rational act carries with it a "mystification of 
power" or a belief that those in power have a "higher knowledge" 
about the ability of a person than that person can have. 
Fred Pincus1 observations concerning the practice of tracking 
corresponds to Anyon's findings concerning the different curricular 
in lower-class and elite schools, that is the lower class is easier 
to control and the elite conceptualize and make decisions. Pincus 
illuminates the purpose of channeling students into community 
colleges as one that serves the work force and hence serve the 
dominant elite in preservation of the ideology. Pincus notes that "an 
important role of the state in an advanced capitalist society is to 
promote profit-taking by large corporations through such means as 
lower labor costs by subsidizing job training through public 
vocational education." The purpose in shaping social and cultural 
forces of capitalistic society through education becanes clear in 
Pincus' assessment that a division of labor will in turn "increase 
the profits and control workers" (1980, p. 110). In Pincus* research, 
schools serve to reproduce the social and cultural structure and in 
doing so they serve the interest of capitalism: 
In addition to receiving lower salaries, workers with 
less knowledge of the production process are easier 
to control: they are more dependent on others those 
who conceptualize and direct tasks to make 
decisions (1980, p. 110) 
Although it is a public concept or myth that education serves to 
shape the future leaders of America, in reality education serves to 
shape the workers who can adapt to the society and who can serve 
those in control. Karier in "Business Values and the Educational 
State" notes that this use of education as an instrument by which the 
dominant ideology is served: 
The school, as a formal vehicle of education, exists 
as an instrument of social and economic power for the 
most influential elite groups as much as for the 
political and social organization through which the 
school is managed. (1973, p. 21) 
These critics of education have in Freire's sense brought forth 
educational practices in order to "objectify" them. Only in achieving 
seme distance frcan a situation can it be seen as a situation that is 
historical and cultural and hence capable of being changed. Karier 
moves frcm position of critic to take a visionary stance of 
perceiving "dileircna and promise in the present age" that demands a 
transformation to a "more humane age" in which the "dignity of man" 
occurs: 
American society may yet move frcm the materialistic 
spirit of capitalism to a transformation of values. 
There might still be time and the possibility in the 
affluent cybernated age of the future to usher in a 
humane age that will enhance the dignity of man. 
(Karier, 1973, p. 21) 
Pedagogy of Oppression; Banking Concept 
It is just such an age that Freire proposes in his pedagogical 
efforts to provide the means by which mankind can become more fully 
human. It is toward Karier's perception of "a humane age that will 
enhance the dignity of man" (p. 30) that Freire devotes his energy 
and work. Freire gives the totality of the interconnection of 
education with the social and cultural forces and thus covers the 
particulars that American critics of education magnify. His insight 
into the depths of this oppressive reality enables him to focus on 
the pedagogical methods and curriculum in Pedagogy of the Oppressed in 
order to "objectify" that which is regarded as traditional but which 
is oppressive. To "objectify" in Freire's understanding of liberation 
is to acquire a distance from a situation so that it can be perceived 
as a cultural-historical situation and not as a given reality 
incapable of change. 
Freire unveils the nature of the pedagogy of the oppressor as the 
instrument or the means by which the oppressor class exerts control 
through a perpetuation of the ideology of domination. All that the 
oppressor does involves violence, but violence is particularly evident 
as the basis for a dehumanizing pedagogy. The school is a place where 
critical inquiry is neglected. Freire maintains that "any situation 
in which seme prevent others frcm engaging in the process of inquiry 
is one of violence" (1970/1984, p. 73). The oppressor's 
pedagogy prohibits inquiry or any experiment in education that concerns 
critical thought. It is a systematic, narrative education in which the 
teacher deposits knowledge of his or her choosing into the students. 
In what Freire calls a "banking concept" of education, the students 
exist for the teacher. The students are ignorant and justify the 
existence of the teacher, for only the teacher possesses knowledge. 
In this method and curriculum, the students are made passive and hence 
become receptive to their oppressive reality: 
In the banking concept of education, knowledge 
is a gift bestowed by those who consider them­
selves knowledgeable upon those whan they 
consider to know nothing. Projecting an 
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absolute ignorance onto others, a characteristic of 
the ideology of oppression, negates education arid 
knowledge as processes of inquiry. The teacher 
presents himself to his students as their necessary 
opposite; by considering their ignorance absolute, 
he justifies his own existence. (Freire, 1970/1984, 
p. 60) 
In this oppressor education the more the teacher "fills the 
receptacles (students), the better a teacher he is"; furthermore, 
"the more meekly the receptacles permit themselves to be filled, the 
better students they are" (p. 58). In this banking concept, "the 
scope of action allowed to the students extends only as far as 
receiving, filing, and storing the deposits." Employing a method of 
narration which involves a "narrating subject (teacher) and patient, 
listening objects (students)," the banking concept insures that 
students become "adaptable, manageable beings" (p. 60). Eventually 
these students are submerged within the pedagogy and consequently 
within a "culture of silence" in that they are denied the development 
of critical thought in order to have an authentic voice. Thus they 
"echo" the meaningless and irrelevant facts given to them each day. 
Freire notes how the pedagogy of the oppressor renders the students 
passive: 
The more students work at storing the deposits 
entrusted to them, the less they develop critical 
consciousness which would result frcm their 
intervention in the world as transformers of the 
world. The more completely they accept the passive 
role imposed upon them the more they tend simply to 
adapt to the world as it is and to the fragmented 
view of reality deposited in them. (1970/1984, p. 60) 
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Freire reveals that the pedagogy of the oppressor must of necessity 
stifle inquiry or the development of critical thought. It is not in 
the oppressors' interest to have their world revealed: 
The capability for banking education to minimize 
or annul the students' creative power and to 
stimulate their credulity serves the interests of 
the oppressors, who care neither to have the world 
revealed nor to see it transformed. The 
oppressors use their "humanitarianism" to preserve a 
profitable situation. Thus they react almost 
instinctively against any experiment in education 
which stimulates critical faculties and is not 
content with a partial view of reality but always 
seeks out the ties which link one point, to 
another and one problem to another. (1970/1984, p. 60) 
Freire expresses what is actually meant by an "educated" person who 
has been oppressed in development of critical thought. In Freire's 
view the "educated man is the adapted man" because the individual is 
"better 'fit' for the world"; furthermore, the concept of banking 
education suits the "purposes of the oppressors," whose "tranquility 
rests on how well men fit the world the oppressors have created and 
how little they question it" (1970/1984, p. 63). 
Being passive in this manner results in estrangement fron self 
and frcm others. It is necessary to note that "violence is initiated 
by those who oppress, who exploit, who fail to recognize others as 
persons" (p. 41). The oppressed are passive; they are also alienated 
and it is in the interest of the oppressors that this alienation 
occurs. Freire makes clear that it is not in alienation but in 
solidarity that humans are truly subjects and not objects. That 
alienation is a part of the classrocm is illustrated in an analysis 
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that corresponds to what Freire detects in the Third World in the 
violence the oppressed, inflict on each other and never on the 
oppressor: 
Anger is always reactive. However, because the 
teacher is in a politically inaccessible position and 
because the teacher has formed a dependency relationship 
against the child, the child cannot risk very easily the 
teacher's rejection, for to do so would be tantamount to 
self-rejection, since in a parasitic relationship one's 
sense of self is unusually contingent upon the other's 
sense of oneself. Since the child cannot react to the 
violence of the teacher, i.e. vertical violence, he 
"displaces" his anger and aggression horizontally. 
(Pinar, 1975, p. 173) 
The pedagogy of the oppressor not only manipulates, alienates, 
fragments, and dehumanizes students through its transmission of the 
cultural ideology that serves the interests of the oppressor, but it 
uses a perverted reason and ideological myths of education to justify, 
rationalize, and appease. The parallel between Freire's observation 
of the Third World and the schooling of a free society serves to 
"objectify" the pedagogy of the oppressor so that it can be perceived 
as a situation amenable to change. Since both oppressor and 
oppressed live in the culture which in turn contains oppressive 
reality, the oppressor cannot liberate. The oppressor who attempts 
liberation of the oppressed will at best move into a humanitarian 
approach of false generosity. The oppressed can only literate 
themselves. Freire recognizes the difficulty of the oppressed to 
liberate themselves without the instrument or pedagogy by which 
they can objectify oppression and emerge frcm it. 
It is to that end that Freire focuses on the traditional 
practices of the classroom of employing the banking concept of 
pedagogy as examples of the pedagogy of the oppressor. It is clear 
that Freire is attempting an objectification process in an universal 
sense. It cannot be an objectification process in the Third World 
sense, for Freire is working in a situation where peasants are 
illiterate and therefore have not been exposed to any pedagogy in the 
formal context of schooling. Thus in enabling these illiterates to 
emerge from their situation of limitation, through their recognition of 
the situation in which they are oppressed as one capable of being 
transformed and through their recognition of themselves as capable of 
effecting such transformation, Freire reveals the power of critical 
thought to objectify the situation and hence enable an individual to 
gain a recognition that leads to liberation. Freire therefore reveals 
that the traditional pedagogy of narration that prohibits or 
discourages the development of critical and reflective thought cannot 
be used for liberation. In offering what cannot be employed as an 
instrument by which the oppressed can liberate themselves, Freire at 
the same time reveals what is the instrument by which oppression is 
perpetuated. Thus Freire's concerns and messages of a pedagogy for 
liberation extend beyond the Third World to objectify the pedagogy of 
the oppressor that limits human development and to foster a 
recognition that liberation into being more fully human must employ a 
new pedagogy, one enabling all individuals to become more fully human. 
It is to this end that Freire creates a pedagogy for liberation. 
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The universality of oppressive reality must be considered before 
moving into the philosophical tenets that support Freire's pedagogy 
for liberation. In Pedagogy of the Oppressed Freire perceives a world 
of oppressive reality consisting of two classes, that of the oppressor 
and that of the oppressed. Freire's division of oppressive reality 
into two classes appears as stark division with deterministic 
overtones. It immediately formulates the question of how such 
liberation from this oppressive reality can occur if, as Freire affirms, 
liberation must arise from the oppressed for the liberation of both 
oppressor and oppressed but that the oppressed cannot lift themselves 
frcra their limited situation because they lack the instrument of 
critical thought obtainable within the pedagogy of liberation. 
Moreover, the oppressor cannot liberate the oppressed and has no desire 
to attempt what is detrimental to a power position. There is further 
acknowledgement that any attempt of the oppressor to liberate the 
oppressed degenerates into false humanitarianism. Hew then is 
critical thought to develop for liberation? It must be realized that 
Freire does not offer his division of oppressor and oppressed as an 
all-inclusive one; he also introduces a third segment of society in 
his dichotomized world, that of a classless segment of emancipators-
educators who teach/learn with others to foster liberation for the 
oppressed and in this liberation restore to the oppressors the lost 
humanity they suffer. The emancipator-educator serves as the 
catalyst, as one who enables the oppressed to recognize oppression in 
a situation, emerge from it, recognize the changeable quality of 
oppressive reality, and recognize human potential within to overcome 
and transform the limiting situation. Moreover, in Pedagogy in 
Process, Freire extends the role of emancipator-educator to the 
oppressors as well. What is of significance here is that the 
oppressors can be emancipators-educators if the oppressors can "die as 
a class" and "be reborn in consciousness" so that they are "learning 
always even while they teach" (Freire, 1978, p. 3). Freire explains 
how the oppressors can move into a new role of emancipators-educators: 
Among these teachers, and especially among those who have 
taught before, there will always be those who perceive 
themselves to be "captured" by the old ideology and who 
will consciously continue to embrace it? they will fall 
into the practice of undermining, either in a hidden or 
an open way the new practice. From such persons one 
cannot hope for any positive action toward the 
reconstruction of society. But there will be others who, 
also perceiving themselves to he captive to the old 
ideology, will nonetheless attempt to free themselves 
frcm it through the new practice to which they will 
adhere. It is possible to work with these persons. They 
are the ones who "carrmit class suicide." (Freire, 1978, 
p. 15) 
What is being suggested here is that there must be a new birth into 
becoming more fully human, of exercising critical thought that 
transcends class to create and recreate a classless society, one in 
which there is no oppressed and therefore one in which there can be 
no oppressor. Freire's vision of mutual recognition and solidarity 
stems from the power of critical thought. 
The development of critical thought fosters ontological 
development into a "radical form of being" that reflects "beings that 
not only know but know that they know" (Freire, 1978, p. 24). Knowing 
focuses not only on the development of critical thought in order to 
question accepted practices and traditions but also on the role of 
recognition in engendering liberation. A consideration of the 
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universality of oppressive reality reveals that in one sense all who 
exist within this oppressive reality or culture without critical 
reflection on it and hence without critical recognition of it must 
therefore participate in it. In other words, not to question but to 
accept uncritically the hegemonic ideology of existing culture as what 
is normal and right is to participate in either the oppressor class, the 
oppressed class, or in both classes. Sharon Welch reveals a 
participation in both classes in her Cormunities of Resistance and 
Solidarity. Welch's critical reflection on her faith and on her 
situation in terms of that faith leads her to perceive and consequently 
state, "I am oppressor and oppressed" (Welch, 1985, p. ix). Moreover, 
Welch's elaboration of this statement reveals how an individual, not 
a marginal being of the Third World, but one living within a free 
society without econanic oppression, can still participate in an 
oppressive reality involving both classes of oppression without knowing 
it until critical reflection objectifies this situation and hence 
brings recognition to the individual of such participation: 
There is another aspect, however, to my experience of 
faith, one identified by the terms white, middle-
class , and American. For me, to be a Christian is to 
become aware of the degree to which I am a participant 
in the structures of oppression, structures of race, 
class, and national identity. As a woman, I am 
oppressed by the structures of patriarchy. Yet as a 
white, I benefit from the oppression of people of 
other races. As a person whose econanic level is 
middle-class, I am both victim and victimizer of 
others. As an American, I live within a nation whose 
policies are economically, politically, and 
environmentally disastrous for far too many of the 
world's peoples. (Welch, 1985, p. ix) 
Freire's purpose in objectifying the pedagogy of the oppressor is 
to evoke a similar recognition of participating in oppressive reality 
in educators and within all of those who share a concern for the 
liberation of the individual into being more fully human but who have 
not examined the existing pedagogy for its contents of narration and 
its methods of banking or imparting facts as prohibiting the 
development of liberating critical thought. Welch furthermore 
supports Freire's xvork by affirming that recognition of a situation 
carries with it a resistance to that situation which in turn generates 
a movement into emancipation frcm the oppressive reality of the 
situation. Welch maintains that "even to resist implies a modicum of 
liberation and success" and that "dcmination is not absolute as long 
as there is protest against it" (1985, p. 39). It is to be 
remembered that Freire's own recognition of the oppressor's pedagogy 
as denying the development of critical thought arises frcm his being 
placed within the culture of silence and hence exemplifies the power 
of resistance to such limitation to engender liberation frcm such a 
situation. The recognition of what constitutes oppression, that of 
prohibiting humanity from developing critical thought by which 
liberation frcm oppression can occur, stems frcm a dialectic of 
Freire' s own experience but becomes the impetus far him to extend his 
understanding of oppression in order to kindle universal recognition 
of the need for development of critical thought for liberation into 
beccming more fully human. In other words, when an educator who 
seeks the best for others and who has a faith in the capability of 
others to be more than they are, becomes aware or recognizes through 
Freire's objectification of oppressor pedagogy of just what occurs when 
the banking concept of education is employed or the development of 
critical thought is emitted, then the educator of any culture is in the 
Freirean sense able to emerge from an unquestioned acceptance and 
utilization of traditional educational practices to become an 
emancipator-educator as well. 
Thus both Welch and Freire, in their questioning of existing 
reality that brings recognition of the situation, resistance to its 
continuance, and liberation frcm its influence, indicate the powerful 
effects of critical thought to liberate self and others from 
oppression. In this respect, critical thought enables all who 
participate in such examination of a situation and of the self's 
limitation in that situation to emerge frcm that existing reality as 
one capable of effecting change in both situation and self. Freire is 
thus correct in projecting two classes of oppressive reality and in 
offering critical thought as the instrument of the pedagogy for 
liberation, for in the concept of critical thought lies the promise 
that there can arise another segment of society, that of those who 
belong to no class but who perceive that reality is, as Freire 
expresses it, "an ongoing process" and that education is "an ongoing 
process" as well. Education then extends for Freire beyond the 
classroom of the Third World to that in a free society; moreover, it 
extends beyond a formal classrocm to be a universal part of the 
creative and recreative efforts of humankind to move into a more just 
and more ethical society and into the ontological vocation of "being 
more fully human." 
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When Freire moves from his general analysis of marginality 
submerged within a director society in Cultural Reform for Freedom 
(1970) to a more personal but yet more universal expansion of oppression 
in Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1973), and furthermore into an even more 
inclusive definition of emancipator in Pedagogy in Process (1978), Freire 
moves into a universal concern with ontological development of humanity 
that is connected with the act of knowing. In this movement, he joins 
others who share a similar concern for the individual's "ontological 
vocation to be more fully human" (1973, p. 13) aid with those who equally 
perceive the development into fullness of being as contingent on the act 
of knowing. Thus for an understanding of what the implications are for 
Freire's pedagogy of liberation for ontological development through 
liberation of consciousness or knowing, it is necessary to turn to 
Freud's understanding of the act of knowing in terms of the unconscious 
and the oppression occurring within it and to Hegel's understanding of 
the act of knowing in terms of what educating the consciousness for 
liberation involves for both individual and for society. Freud and 
Hegel not only share a kinship in their ontological and epistemological 
concerns but both lend substance and depth to philosophical tenets 
of Freire's liberation pedagogy. 
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INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTERS II AND III 
Chapters II and III expand Freire's ontological concern for 
liberation of the individual into fuller being by providing Hegelian and 
Freudian insights into the facets of liberation that in turn illuminate 
the philosophical basis for Freire's praxis. Freire's own account of 
his praxis reveals in full how he initiates his pedagogy for liberation 
so that the individual sutmerged within the oppressive reality can emerge 
frcm this existing reality through a recognition of it as a limiting 
situation that can be changed and of the potential within the self to 
bring about such transformation for self and society or reality. 
Chapters II and III, however, provide additional support for Freire's 
praxis through an elaboration on what is involved in the act of knowing 
on conscious and unconscious levels, what is the true nature of the 
dialectic, and what the praxis holds for creation and recreation of 
both self and situation. Chapters II and III thus address concerns 
that perhaps arise in examining Freire's praxis, questions indicated 
by the following: how can the dialectic, revealed by Freire as an 
interaction between the individual and the limiting situation, 
create a new awareness of the self as capable of effecting change 
in both self and society; how is it assumed that such creation or 
change will result in a more ethical, more just, and more 
emancipated self and society; how is it that such transformation 
necessitates that the pedagogy of liberation be an ongoing process; 
and furthermore, how can the depth of oppressive reality that has 
garnered strength and endurance through eons of existing 
ideological beliefs and cultural practices be dissipated by praxis. It 
is in the next two chapters of this study that these concerns are 
developed, but it is the purpose of this introduction to provide an 
overview of tow Chapters II and III are related to this development. 
Chapter II turns to Freud, a scholar, scientist, and humanist of 
the twentieth century, placed within the context of psychoanalysis, 
who conveys the depths to which oppressive reality extends and the 
limiting effect on the development of being that it inflicts. Freud 
recognizes the conflicting forces within the soul of an individual and 
the oppressive consequences of civilization on the individual that 
must be considered when speaking of enabling an individual to liberate 
himself or herself into fuller being. Freud clarifies the nature of 
oppression inflicted by civilization as an unconscious force that 
limits full expression of being without the individual's awareness of 
its existence. Freud thus contributes to an understanding of the 
nature of oppression; at the same time Freud reveals that by bringing 
into recognition these unknown forces, the individual is enabled to 
begin an emergence frcm these inner oppressive forces into a 
liberation of a fuller and hence more integrated being. 
Chapter III turns to Hegel, a philosopher of the nineteenth 
century, placed within the context of German Idealism, who conveys the 
creative power and force of the dialectic and thus lends significance 
to Freire's dialectic that enables individuals interacting with their 
environments in dialectic to create and recreate self and society. 
That a better self and situation must emerge frcm this dialectic, as 
Freire proposes, becomes clearer through Hegel's concept of the 
spiritual force of truth and reason inherent in the very nature of 
the dialectic. 
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CHAPTER II 
LTREUD: OPPRESSION MID LIBERATION OF THE SOUL 
This chapter focuses on Freud's perception of the soul as 
consisting of the rational processes of the conscious, the dark 
passions and impulses of the unconscious, and the oppressive authority 
of the super-ego. A section is devoted to Hegel, for there is a 
kindred insight concerning the unconscious dimensions of the soul that 
Freud and Hegel share. Hegel's analysis of the soul's formation and 
of its contents lends support and insight to Freud's understanding of 
the primal energy residing within the unconscious that seeks expression 
but is repressed by the rational ego. Freud's work is directed toward 
the repression that exists within the unconscious of the id when the 
ego repulses it and thus limits and often distorts the individual's 
development of being. Psychoanalytical examination of inner forces 
beccmes for Freud the critical thinking that makes what is unknown in 
the unconscious and hence uncontrollable become known and thus 
integrated into the rational processes. While Hegel perceives in the 
Feeling Soul the nature and possibilities of the contents within the 
unconscious, it is Freud who perceives the seething passions of the id 
that, if repressed or diverted from expression, turn upon the 
individual and prevent the individual's becoming more fully human. It 
beocmes clear that the inner and often dark forces must be brought 
forth, examined, and liberated into integration with the rational 
processes, tiiat the pedagogy for liberation or for enabling an 
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individual to become more fully human, must take into consideration this 
deeper oppression within the individual. Critical thought must turn to 
the self and examine what is dark and unknown because if this force is 
denied integration into being, it will seek its expression in 
irrational acts and fears and physical symptoms that limit the 
individual from becoming more fully human. When, however, this primal 
energy is integrated and the flow of being is unimpeded, the 
individual finds in this primal force the passions and energy to evolve 
into the fullest expression of being human. There can be no movement 
into this realm if the individual is alienated frcm the inner world and 
fragmented in being by powerful conflicts within. Thus Freud's 
insights are necessary for this study to gain a full understanding of 
what is involved in speaking of the pedagogy of liberation. To 
understand what Freud knows concerning the structure and nature of the 
soul, it is necessary to turn to Bruno Bettelheim. Bettelheim's reading 
of Freud is not only accomplished by knowing the nuances and subtleties 
of the original language but is also a reading of one who shares the 
same culture as Freud. Thus when Bettleheim illumines Freud's allusion, 
word choices, and metaphors, he also illumines the compassion arising 
from Freud and permeating his works. 
Freudian Concepts; Bettelheim's Translation 
Freud's great compassion for humankind, his concern for the 
ontological development of humanity into fuller being, and his stress 
on knowing the self on both conscious and unconscious levels are 
conveyed in Bruno Bettelheim's Freud and Man's Soul. Bettelheim 
reveals the meaning Freud intends to convey in his concepts but which 
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are not contained through translations frcm another language and another 
culture. Bettelheim, however, shares both language and culture and can 
therefore restore to Freud's metaphors the potency they have in the 
original writing. Bettelheim reveals that Freud carefully chooses 
metaphors and words to evoke responses within the reader on 
intellectual and emotional levels, thus stirring both conscious and 
unconscious memories. Moreover, Bettelheim conveys the personal nature 
of Freud's insights by revealing that Freud shares with his readers the 
journey of the soul he himself undergoes so that the readers may find 
a similar courage to make a spiritual journey within, a journey of 
self-discovery that holds as its destination a freedom frcm the 
controlling or oppressive forces within. Bettelheim observes how 
Freud's personal approach is a compassionate effort, becoming in one 
sense that of a soul sharing with other souls: 
In the Interpretation of Dreams (1900), which opened to our 
understanding not just the meaning of dreams but also the 
nature and power of the unconscious, Freud told about his 
arduous struggle to achieve ever greater self-awareness. 
In other books, he told why he felt it necessary for the rest 
of us to do the same. In a way, all his writings are gentle, 
persuasive, often brilliantly worded intimations that we, his 
readers, would benefit from a similar spiritual journey of 
self-discovery. (1983, p. 4) 
Bettleheim illuminates as well how deeply Freud's ontological 
concerns resonate with those of Freire and Hegel, for in Freud's concern 
for "the individual's becoming more human in emerging from the dark, 
unknown forces" (1983, p. 4), Freud seeks to enable the individual 
through psychoanalytical thinking to liberate the self from limitations 
deeply rooted within the unconscious: 
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Freud showed us how the soul could becone aware of itself. To 
be COTE acquainted with the lowest depth of the soul—to explore 
whatever personal hell we may suffer from—is not an easy 
undertaking. Freud1s findings and, even more, the way he 
presents them to us give us the confidence that this demanding 
and potentially dangerous voyage of self-discovery will result 
in our becoming more fully human, so that we may no longer be 
enslaved without knowing it to the dark forces that reside in 
us. (1983, p. 4) 
Bettelheim proffers a rare gift of Freudian insight to those of 
humanity who seek to understand the energies of the soul in order to 
integrate primal and rational energy for fullness of being. Bettelheim1s 
presentation of Freud's insights into the workings of the soul refute 
the scientific, detached, and often mechanical aspects of a 
psychoanalysis that leans toward behavior adjustment and ignores the 
conflicts of the soul. Bettelheim's reference to a meeting of the 
American Psychological Association reveals the emphasis of adjustment 
American psychoanalysts uphold. According to Bettelheim, "one of 
America's foremost psychologists" affirmed that "of all the features of 
Freudian theory, the mechanisms of adjustment had becone the most 
widely accepted in the United States" (1983, p. 40). Bettelheim's 
assessment that this statement reveals the "nature of American 
acceptance of psychoanalysis" because "Freud cared little about 
'adjustment' and did not consider it valuable" (1983, p. 40) is also an 
assessment of the American culture. In all that Freire charges about 
the pedagogy of the oppressor, there is always the emphasis on the 
adjusted or adapted individual that has been shaped by the oppressor 
pedagogy. Bettelheim is thus correct in noting that a tendency toward 
adjustment reflects the values of the culture: 
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What is true, and what this American spokesman for 
psychoanalysis should have said is that the concept of 
adjustment was injected into the Freudian system because it 
was of primary importance in the American psychoanalysts' 
scheme of values, and that this alteration explains the 
widespread acceptance of psychoanalysis in America. If 
American psychoanalysts had shared Freud's concern for the 
soul and his disregard for adaptation or adjustment to the 
requirements of society, then the history of psychoanalysis 
in the United States would be entirely different, since 
psychoanalysis would have had to transcend the narrow 
confines of medicine. (1983, p. 40) 
Not only does Bettelheim discern misconceptions of Freud's work in 
psychoanalysis but he also perceives misinterpretations of Freud's 
words and concepts in the English translations. Bettelheim therefore 
feels an urgency to break his silence of forty years to speak the truth 
concerning Freudian concepts and practices because there is very little 
time left to those who are both capable, in that they have the same 
nourishment of culture and language, and desirous, in that they feel 
the pronptings of the soul to rectify what often becomes grave errors in 
translation: 
Most of the people who lived in Freud's Vienna, and became 
familiar with his thoughts in that place and time, either 
have died or are now in their seventies or eighties, 
approaching the end of their lives. If, therefore, the 
mistranslations with which the Standard Edition unfortunately 
abounds are ever to be corrected by someone who shared Freud's 
cultural background and is closely acquainted with the 
language as Freud himself used it, it must be done now. That 
is why I have at last overcome the reluctance I have felt for 
so long. (1983, p. ix) 
Bettelheim's work contributes to the focus of this study, for in 
clarifying and often redefining Freudian terms and the concepts they 
convey, Bettelheim reveals at the sane time Freud's "deeply humane" 
nature that perceives the "guiding principle" of psychoanalysis as 
that of knowing the soul: 
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The guiding principle of psychoanalysis is that knowing oneself 
requires knowing also one's unconscious and dealing with it, so 
that its unrecognized pressures will not lead one to act in a 
way detrimental to oneself and others. (1983, p. 24) 
Freud, like Hegel and Freire, perceives freedom of being as arising 
frcni the individual's own efforts and not as a quality or state that can 
be given to an individual. It must be understood that Freud perceives 
psychoanalytical thinking as the instrument of pedagogy by which the 
individual is able to liberate himself or herself fran inner oppression. 
In this sense of enabling the individual to win liberation, psycho­
analysis functions as a midwife: 
To characterize the function of the analyst—scmeone who could 
greatly facilitate the emergence of a new personality, making 
the process of the change a safe one—Freud often used the 
simile of the midwife. As the midwife neither creates the child 
nor decides what he will be but only helps the mother to give 
birth to him safely, so the psychoanalyst can neither bring the 
new personality into being nor determine what it ought to be; 
only the person who is analyzing himself can make himself over. 
(Bettelheim, 1983, p. 36) 
Freud facilitates the liberation of the individual from the inner 
oppression by seeking to communicate with the soul on both the 
unconscious and conscious levels. To this end he chooses his words with 
care. Bettelheim reveals that Freud's "use of the German language was 
not only masterly but often poetic" (1983, p. 4) and that in seeking 
the "mot juste," Freud's communication affects emotional and 
intellectual levels. Consequently, mistranslations or "clumsy 
substitutions and inexact use of language" become "all the more 
damaging to his ideas": 
Deprived of the right word or the appropriate phrasing, 
Freud's thoughts become not merely coarse or 
oversimplified but seriously distorted. Slipshod 
translations deprive his words of seme or most of the 
subtle sensory tones and allusion that he deliberately 
evoked to permit the reader to understand what he had in 
mind, and to respond not only on an intellectual level but 
on an emotional one—not merely with the conscious mind 
but also with the unconscious mind. Only by comprehending 
his writings on both levels is it possible to grasp Freud's 
full meaning, all its subtlety and richness, and this is 
crucial for a correct understanding of psychoanalysis. 
(1983, p. 9) 
It is in using metaphors that Freud conveys his concepts of 
psychoanalysis. As Bettelheim explains, Freud's metaphors connect 
"the hard facts to which psychoanalysis refers and the imaginative 
manner in which it explains them," for metaphors speak in symbols, 
the language of the unconscious: 
Because of repression, or the influence of censorship, the 
unconscious reveals itself in symbols or metaphors, and 
psychoanalysis, in its concern with the unconscious, tries 
to speak about it in its own metaphoric language. (1983, pp. 
37-38) 
Moreover, metaphors provoke a depth of response: 
Finally, metaphors are more likely than a purely 
intellectual statement to touch a human chord and 
arouse our emotions, and thus give us a feeling for 
what is meant. A true comprehension of psychoanalysis 
requires not only an intellectual realization but a 
simultaneous emotional response; neither alone will do. 
A well-chosen metaphor will permit both. (Bettelheim, 
1983, p. 38) 
Bettelheim affirms the necessity of the metaphor "soul" to denote 
Freud's deep ontological concerns for humankind: 
His greatest concern was with man's.innermost being, to which 
he most frequently referred through the use of a metaphor— 
man's soul—because the word "soul" evokes so many 
emotional connotations. It is the greatest shortcoming of 
the current English version of his works that they give no 
hint of this. (1983, p. xi) 
Bettelheim furthermore reveals that the emission of the metaphor 
"soul" in English translations impoverishes the students of Freud who 
study his works in translation: 
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In his work and in his writings, Freud often spoke of 
the soul—of its nature and structure, its development, 
its attributes, how it reveals itself in all we do and 
dream. Unfortunately, nobody who reads him in English 
could guess this, because nearly all of his many 
references to the soul and to matters pertaining to the 
soul, have been excised in translation. (1983, p. 4) 
Bettelheim also observes that the amission of the central metaphor 
"soul" and the "erroneous or inadequate translation of many of the 
nost important original concepts of psychoanalysis" (1983, p. 5) make 
"Freud's direct and always deeply personal appeals" to "common 
humanity" appear "to readers of English as abstract, depersonalized, 
highly theoretical, erudite, and mechanized—in short, 'scientific'— 
statements about the strange and very complex workings" of the mind: 
Instead of instilling a deep feeling for what is nost 
human in all of us, the translations attempt to lure 
the reader into developing a "scientific" attitude toward 
man and his actions, a "scientific" understanding of the 
unconscious and how it conditions much of our behavior. 
(1983, p. 5) 
Bettelheim does not base his observation on his reading of Freud 
exclusively, but also he refers to his experiences as director of the 
University of Chicago's Orthogenic School, for disturbed children, 
where he notes the staff members "were well read in Freud" and "were 
convinced they had made his ideas their own"; yet, their work was 
based on readings of Freud in translation that had not included the 
metaphor of soul and all it implies. Bettelheim observes that this 
translation without the metaphor of soul reduces psychoanalysis to an 
impersonal and scientific theory: 
The considerable theoretical understanding of unconscious 
processes which they had acquired frcm studying Freud 
remained exactly that: theoretical. It was of little 
use in helping children afflicted by severe psychiatric 
disorders; often it was even an impediment. It was a 
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reasoned-out, emotionally distant understanding. (1983, p. 5) 
Bettelheim makes clear that what was needed in this work was an 
understanding of the soul, an understanding not conveyed in the English 
translation: 
What was needed was emotional closeness based on immediate 
sympathetic comprehension of all aspects of the child's 
soul—of what afflicted it, and why. What was needed was 
what Freud occasionally spoke of explicitly but much more 
implicitly: a spontaneous sympathy of our unconscious with 
that of others, a feeling response of our soul to theirs. 
(1983, p. 5) 
Bettelheim can therefore declare that the metaphor "soul" and not its 
usual translation of mind or mental apparatus is central to an 
understanding of psychoanalysis and of Freud1s humanism: 
Of all the mistranslations of Freud's phraseology, none 
has hampered our understanding of his humanistic views 
more than the elimination of his references to the 
soul (die Seele). (1983, p. 70) 
Freud uses the metaphor of soul to indicate all aspects of knowing, 
as conveyed in the following passage in which Bettelheim observes that 
Freud's use of soul not only denotes different dimensions of knowing 
but also reveals what contains the essence of humanity: 
And in The Question of Lay Analysis, where he is 
conceptualizing the workings of the unconscious, and 
distinguishing the functions of the it, the I, and the 
above-I, he uses the tern "soul" to describe what he 
regards as the overarching concept that takes in all the 
others. It seems natural to Freud to speak of man's 
soul. By evoking the image of the soul and all its 
associations, Freud is emphasizing our common humanity. 
Unfortunately, even in these crucial passages the 
translations make us believe that he is talking about 
our mind, our intellect. This is particularly 
misleading because we often view our intellectual life as 
set apart from—and even opposed to—our emotional life, 
the life of our fantasies and dreams. (1983, p. 71) 
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It is necessary to include at least one example of Bettelheim's 
comparison of words used by Freud and words used in an English 
translation. The passage is a crucial one in that the translation 
seriously distorts the connotation of soul and the original conveys 
Freud's important explanation of psychoanalysis as "treatment 
originating in the soul" and not treatment of the inanifestation of the 
soul. The following is Bettelheim1s translation that reveals Freud's 
intention in the original passage: 
As early as 1905, in the opening passage of an article entitled 
"Psychical Treatment (Treatment of the Soul)," he wrote: 
"Psyche" is a Greek word and its German translation is "soul." 
One could thus think that what is meant is: treatment of the 
morbid phenomena in the life of the soul. But this is not the 
meaning of the term. Psychical treatment wishes to signify, rather, 
treatment originating in the soul, treatment—of psychic or bodily 
disorders—by measures which influence above all and immediately 
the soul of man. (1983, pp. 73-74) 
Bettelheim then presents the English translation of this passage which 
substitutes "mind" for "soul" and thereby renders impersonal what is 
personal in the original: 
In the Standard Edition, the title of the paper is given as 
"Psychical (or Mental) Treatment," and the passage is translated: 
"Psyche" is a Greek word which may be translated "mind." Thus 
"psychical treatment" means "mental treatment." The term might 
accordingly be supposed to signify "treatment" of the pathological 
phenomena of mental life. This, however, is not its meaning. 
"Psychical treatment" denotes, i-ather, treatment taking its start 
in the mind, treatment (whether of mental or physical disorders) 
by measures which operate in the first instance and immediately 
upon the human mind. (1983, p. 74) 
Bettelheim's objection to the substitution of "mind" for "soul" 
becomes even clearer in his revelation that "soul" in German conveys 
spiritual richness that is in no way connected to the religious 
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annotation present "in canton American usage" where the word "soul" is 
"more or less restricted to the sphere of religion" (1983, p. 76). 
Bettelheim reveals that "in German the word Seele has retained its full 
meaning as man's essence, as that which is most spiritual and worthy in 
man" (1983, p. 76). 
Since Freud chooses words with care for the meanings or symbols 
they convey, his choice of the Greek term "psyche" becomes significant 
in rendering the full meaning of soul. Bettelheim's observations reveal 
another aspect of the soul, that of fragility: 
He knew that Psyche was depicted as young and beautiful, and 
as having the wings of a bird or a butterfly. Birds and 
butterflies are symbols of the soul in many cultures, and 
serve to emphasize its transcendental nature. These symbols 
invested the word "psyche" with connotations of beauty, 
fragility, and insubstantiality—ideas we still connect with 
the soul—and they suggest the great respect, care, and 
consideration with which Psyche had to be approached, because 
any other approach would violate, even destroy her. Respect, 
care and consideration are attitudes that psychoanalysis, 
too, requires. (1983, pp. 14-15) 
These insights that Bettelheim provides into the meaning of soul as 
Freud uses the term make clear that Freud speaks of more than the 
reasoning part of the mind and that to accept this limitation of 
essence is to disregard, as Bettelheim maintains, "the nonthinking it, 
the irrational world of the unconscious and of the emotions" 
(1983, p. 76). Moreover, as Bettelheim further explains, the word 
"soul" includes depths beyond what is consciously known: 
The idea of the soul, by contrast, definitely includes much 
of which we are not consciously aware. Freud wanted to make 
clear that psychoanalysis was concerned not just with man's 
body and his intellect, as his medical colleagues were, but— 
and most of all—with the dark world of the unconscious which 
forms such a large part of the soul of living man—or, to 
put it in classical terms, with that unknown netherworld in 
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which, according to ancient myths, the souls of men dwell. 
(1983, p. 77) 
Bettelheim notes that "nowhere in his writings does Freud give us a 
precise definition of the term 'soul'" because to provide a clinical 
definition would rob "it of its value as an expression of Freud's 
thinking" (1983, p. 77). Bettelheim perceives that the many 
connotations emanating frcm the term "soul" reflect its complexity and 
ambiguity: 
I suspect that he chose the term because of its 
inexactitude, its emotional resonance. Its ambiguity 
speaks for the ambiguity of the psyche itself, which 
reflects many different, warring levels of consciousness 
simultaneously. (1983, p. 77) 
In noting the complexity of the soul, Bettelheim observes that "by 
'soul' or 'psyche' Freud meaas that which is most valuable" in an 
individual for the "soul is the seat both of the mind and of the 
passions" (1983, p. 77). An individual remains "largely unconscious 
of the soul"; yet it is the essence of what makes an individual human: 
In important respects, it is intangible, but it nevertheless 
exercises a powerful influence on our lives. It is what 
makes us human; in fact, it is what is so essentially human 
about us that no other term could equally convey what Freud 
had in mind. (1983, pp. 77-78) 
Bettelheim records the goal of psychoanalysis as one of integrating 
"the emotional life into the intellectual life" (1983, p. 71). 
Bettelheim also includes a passage in which he translates what Freud 
himself declares as the goal of psychoanalysis, a goal that reveals 
Freud's emphasis on making the unconscious conscious or the unknown 
known for integration of soul with resulting fuller development of 
being: 
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As he wrote in a famous passage in the New Introductory 
Lectures, the purpose of psychonalysis is "to strengthen the 
I, to make it more independent of the above-I, to widen its 
field of perception and to extend its organization so that 
it can appropriate to itself new portions of the it," and 
he added, "Where it was, there should became I" (1983, p. 106). 
Freud especially reveals a kinship with Hegel in this last statement, 
for the "I" is the rational aspect of soul and the "it" the unconscious 
or emotional or unknown aspect. When Hegel's education of consciousness 
enables the soul to move to the level of Reason, of Absolute Knowing, 
the "it" is completely integrated into the "I." Freud is therefore 
concerned with knowing in the sense that the soul can "become aware of 
itself" (1983, p. 4) and thus "no longer be enslaved without knowing it 
to the dark forces that reside within" but can make the "it" beccme the 
"I." It is this knowing that can result in integration of the "it" with 
the "I" and further result in the individual1 s "beccndng more fully 
human" (1983, p. 4). Bettelheim observes that fullness of being 
develops frcm making the unknown known: 
Freud's statement in the New Introductory Lectures was 
meant to indicate that in same instances, with respect to 
certain aspects of life that have been previously 
dominated entirely or largely by the it, the I ought to 
exercise its constructive influence and successfully 
control the undesirable outcrqppings of the it. (1983, p. 62) 
The significance for this study is that Freud works to liberate the 
soul frcm oppression and to integrate the unconscious and conscious so 
that development of being results. Hegel confirms what Freud does but 
moves frcm the initial integration to reveal how the rich primal 
energy of life and the spiritual essence can beccme a force for 
fullness of being when expanded and developed through the education 
of consciousness. 
Before moving into the development of the id or it, the ego or I, and 
the super-ego or above-I, it must be stated that Bettelheim does not 
translate works of Freud; he only translates passages that contain key 
concepts and offers definitions nearer the meaning Freud originally 
intends. It is therefore necessary in this study to rely on English 
translations and to include Bettelheim1s insights concerning Freud's 
intention when such references are available. 
Freudian Id 
Freud discovers the unconscious through working with what is 
repressed within the unconscious. His theory of "dynamic unconscious" 
evolves when he moves from the inadequacies of hypnosis in freeing 
unconscious thought to the method of using association of ideas or what 
is usually called "free association." In this method Freud discovers 
the processes of the unconscious that explain the formidable power of 
the canplex to influence conduct. Freud creates three divisions of id, 
ego, and super-ego. In essence, however, there is only the id and the 
ego and super-ego are differentiations of the id. The id is the primal 
energy that accompanies the child at birth and is perceived by Freud 
as an unorganized chaotic mentality that seeks gratification of all 
needs but primarily those of hunger, self-preservation, and love. 
Freud1 s naming of the unconscious as the "id" needs to be included here 
in that Freud's explanation of his choice indicates to seme measure his 
regard for this force and his understanding of its nature. Freud 
announces in The Ego and the Id that he is "following the suggestion of 
a writer who, from personal motives, vainly asserts that he has nothing 
to do with the rigours of pure science" (1923, p. 123). Freud is here 
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referring to George Groddeck, an author with whan Freud shares 
sympathetic views. The following explanation reveals the interpretation 
Freud places on the id: 
I am here speaking of George Groddeck, who is never tired of 
insisting that what we call our ego behaves essentially 
passively in life, and that, as he expresses it, we are 
"lived" by unknown and uncontrollable forces. We have all 
had the impressions of the same kind, even though they nay 
not have overwhelmed us to the inclusion of all others, and 
we need feel no hesitation in finding a place for Groddeck's 
discovery in the nature of science. I propose to take it 
into account by calling the entity which starts out from the 
system Pcpt. (perceptual system) and begins by being Pes. 
(preconscious) the "ego," and by following Groddeck in 
calling the other part of the mind into which this entity 
extends and which behaves as though it were Ucs. (unconscious), 
the "id." (1923/1962, p. 13) 
Bettelheim's explanation of what Freud intends by calling the 
unconscious the "id" is vital at this point for clarifying the personal 
aspects of the unconscious: 
In naming two of the concepts, Freud chose words that are 
among the first words used by every German child. To 
refer to the unknown, unconscious contents of the mind, he 
chose the personal pronoun "it" (es) and used it as a noun 
(das Es). (1983, p. 53) 
Bettelheim notes that the Latin equivalent of "id" in English 
translations does not connote what "it" does in German. The "it" is 
filled with emotional significance: 
Still, even "the it" does not have the full emotional inpact 
that das Es has in the original German. In German, the word 
"child" (das Kind) is of neuter gender. During their early 
years, all Germans have the experience of being referred to 
by means of the neuter pronoun es. This fact gives the 
phrase das Es a special feeling, reminding the German reader 
that this is how he was referred to before he learned to 
repress many of his sexual, aggressive, and otherwise 
asocial impulses, before he felt guilty or ashamed because of 
them, before he felt an obligation to resolve contradictions 
and bring logical order into his thoughts; in short, it 
reminds him of a time when his entire existence was daninated 
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by the it. These memories, even when he is not conscious of 
them permit a much more immediate empathy with what Freud 
meant when he used this term for the unconscious. (1983, p. 57) 
Moreover, the force of this "it" often renders the individual incapable 
of controlling what is occurring so that the individual is, as 
Groddeck observes, "passively lived." Bettelheim1s explanation of the 
nature of this force upon actions of the individual makes clear why 
Freud refers to Groddeck's observation of "unknown and uncontrollable 
forces" in naming this force the "it": 
For example, when we say, "I went there," we know exactly 
what we were doing and why we did it. But when we say, 
"It pulled me in that direction," we express the feeling 
that something in us—we don't know what—forced us to 
behave in a certain way. When a person suffering from 
depression says "It got me again" or "It makes life 
unbearable!" he gives clear expression to his feeling that 
neither his intellect nor his conscious mind nor his will 
accounts for what is happening to him—that he has been 
overcame by forces within him which are beyond his ken and 
his control. (1983, p. 57) 
Freud's description of the id, as contained in the English 
translation of The Ego and the Id, does not convey this personal or 
emotional connotation , but Bettelheim's insight into what Freud 
intends in naming the unconscious the "it" enables the reader of an 
English translation to keep in awareness what Freud means. Freud 
proposes a topographical description of the id in which the individual 
is regarded as a "psychical id, unknown and unconscious" (Freud, 
1923/1962, p. 14). Upon the surface of this id "rests the ego, 
developed from its nucleus the Pcpt. system" (p. 14) .Freud makes very 
clear that the ego does not cover the id but rests upon it as "the 
germinal disc rests upon the ovum" (p. 14). The ego has emerged frcm 
the id but remains a part of it: "The ego is not sharply separated 
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from the id; its lower portion merges into it" (1923/1962, p. 14). The 
material which the ego suppresses or represses as threatening becanes, 
then, a part of the id. The id is not therefore the repressed, for the 
"repressed merges into the id... and is merely a part of it" (p. 14). 
Although the repressed is a part of the id, it is separated from the 
ego: "The repressed is only cut off sharply from the ego by the 
resistance of repression; it can cormunicate with the ego through the 
id" (1923/1962, p. 14). 
It becanes clear that the initial belief in the unconscious as 
that which is repressed must be expanded to include much of what 
controls the individual's life. Freud discovers that not only is 
there the unconscious that encloses the repressed as a small part but 
that the ego itself also has an unconscious: 
We recognize that the Ucs. does not coincide with the 
repressed; it is still true that all that is repressed is 
Ucs., but not all that is Ucs. is repressed. A part of the 
ego, too—Heaven knows how important a part—may be Ucs., 
undoubtedly is Ucs. And this Ucs. belonging to the ego is 
not latent like the Pes.; for if it were, it could not be 
activated without becoming Cs., and the process of making 
it conscious would not encounter such great difficulties. 
When we find ourselves thus confronted by the necessity of 
postulating a third Ucs., which is not repressed, we must 
admit that the characteristic of being unconscious begins 
to 3.ose significance for us. It becanes a quality which 
can have many meanings....(1923/1962, p. 8) 
Ego Development 
Freud makes clear in The Ego and the Id (1923) that all libido or 
sexual energy is initially located in the id: "At the very beginning, 
all the libido is accumulated in the id, while the ego is still in the 
process of formation or is still feeble" (1923/1962, p. 36). It is 
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to be remembered that the id, composed of primal energy, seeks 
expression through the pleasure principle of gratifying desires of 
hunger, love, and self-preservation. As the child grows physically 
and becomes aware of the environment through a development of the 
senses and at the same time fceccmes aware of the inexorable reality of 
the environment, this part of the awareness of the id is modified into 
the ego. Bettelheim indicates the personal element of the ego and its 
intricate relationship with the id. Bettelheim reveals that Freud's 
"it" gains its "full impact" when it is understood that Freud defines 
"these two concepts for the first time, as counterparts of each other" 
(1983, p. 53). Moreover, Bettelheim cites the removal of the personal 
element inherent in the pronoun "I" when this pronoun is replaced by 
the term "ego": 
No word lias greater and more intimate connotations than 
the pronoun "I." It is one of the most frequently used words 
in spoken language—and, more important, it is the most 
personal word. To mistranslate Ich as "ego" is to transform 
it into jargon that no longer conveys the personal carrmitment 
we make when we say "I" or "me"—not to mention our 
subconscious memories of the deep emotional experience we had 
when, in infancy, we discovered ourselves as we learned to say 
"I." (1983, pp. 53-54) 
Moreover, in addition to this distancing of the "I," there is also the 
"pejorative" connotation of the usage of ego in present-day language: 
The word "ego" was used in the English language in a 
number of ways long before Freud's translators 
introduced it as a psychoanalytic concept. These vises, 
which are still part of the living language, are all 
perjorative, such as "egoism," "egoistic," and "egotism." 
(A slang expression of more recent origin—"ego trip" is 
also pejorative.) This is likewise true of their German 
cognates—the noun Egoist and the adjective egoistisch. 
Freud, like all German-speaking people, was, of course, 
familiar with the derogatory connotation of selfishness 
that the root "ego" evokes. (Bettelheim, 1983, p. 54) 
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As has already been stated, Freud uses words with care, seeking those 
that will evoke an intellectual and an emotional response within the 
reader. Thus Bettelheim1s explanation that the German "Ich" is invested 
with stronger and deeper personal meaning than the English 11'" conveys 
how deep is the personal expression of Ich: 
When a speaker of English wishes to emphasize personal 
ccmrdtment, he is apt to use "me" rather than "I." For 
example, he'll say, "That is me," whereas in German one would 
use "I," as in "Ich bin es, der spricht" ("That's ire talking"). 
(1983, p. 55) 
Moreover, assertiveness of the "I" is not conveyed by the term "ego," 
as Bettelheim reveals in noting that the "I" speaks of a "total 
personality": 
The assertiveness we often feel when we say "I" is an 
image of how the person's I tries to assert its will over 
what in the translations are called the "id" and "superego" 
and over the external world. This image gets lost when we 
talk about an ego. When I say "I," I mean my entire self, 
ray total personality. Freud, it is true, made an important 
distinction here. What he called the "I" refers primarily 
to the conscious, rational aspects of oneself. In a way, 
we know that we are not always reasonable and do not always 
act rationally; psychoanalysis, more than any other 
discipline, makes us aware of the irrational, unconscious 
aspects of our mind. So, when Freud names the reasonable, 
conscious aspects of our mind the I, we feel subtly 
flattered that our real I is what we value most highly in 
ourselves. It gives us the intuitive feeling that Freud is 
right to name the I what we feel to be our true self, even 
though we know that we do not always act in line with that 
self. (1983, p. 56) 
Bettelheim also notes that the "I" as a choice of words to depict the 
rational aspect of the mind tends to win the determination of the 
individual over to the conquering of irrational forces, thus the 
choice of "I" promotes integration: 
In a subtle way, this choice of name for the conscious 
aspects of our mind strengthens our determination to win 
the battle against the chaos caused by the irrational in 
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us. During psychoanalytic treatment, that determination— 
that siding of the patient's I with the efforts of the 
therapist—alone can lead to success in dealing with, the 
dark forces within us. The I, more than any other term of 
psychoanalysis, encourages us to make the unconscious 
become conscious and to think psychoanalytically. (1983, 
p. 56) 
Moreover, Bettelheim demonstrates his point about Freud's choice 
of "I" with examples of how the "whole being" is conveyed in the "I": 
We find it easy to say, "I won't any longer be run by my 
irrational anxieties" and when we say it after becoming 
acquainted with psychoanalytic thinking we knew that this 
I about which we speak is essentially only our conscious 
mind, which tries to control the anxious outcroppings of 
our unconscious. Nobody can say, "My ego won't any longer 
be run by irrational anxieties," and mean it. When we say, 
"I'm trying to understand why I did this," our whole being 
is involved in the effort, although we know that it is our 
rational mind alone that is trying to understand why seme 
•unconscious pressure made us do sate thing. (1983, p. 56) 
It is with this understanding of hew the I struggles with the 
irrational and inpulsive actions of the it that this study turns to the 
struggle between ego (I) and the it (id) that Freud describes in his 
The Ego and the Id. Freud stresses that the ego mediates between the 
inner world of the organism and the outer world of civilization so 
that "no external vicissitudes can be experienced or undergone by the 
id, except by way of the ego, which is the representative of the outer 
world to the id" (1923/1962, p. 29). Immediately there is a struggle 
between the pleasure principle of the id and the reality principle of 
the ego: 
Moreover the ego seeks to bring the influence of the 
external world to bear upon the id and its tendencies, 
and endeavours to substitute the reality principle for 
the pleasure principle which reigns unrestrictedly in 
the id. (Freud, 1923/1962, p. 15) 
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Freud's explanation that the "ego represents what may be called 
reason and camion sense, in contrast to the id, which contains the 
passions" (1923/1962, p. 15), needs at this point a fuller treatment. 
What Freud means by passions or the pleasure principle is conveyed 
in his Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920/1961) as a matter of 
lowering tension: 
In the theory of psycho-analysis we have no hesitation in 
assuming that the course taken by mental events is 
automatically regulated by the pleasure principle. We 
believe, that is to say, that the course of those events 
is invariably set in motion by an unpleasurable tension, 
and that it takes a direction such that its final outccme 
coincides with a lowering of that tension—that is, with 
an avoidance of unpleasure or production of pleasure, (p. 1) 
This pursuit of the id for pleasure becomes more involved when it is 
understood that the complexity of the mental processes supports only 
an inclination toward pleasure that is opposed by other factors: 
It must be pointed out, however, that strictly speaking it 
is incorrect to talk of the dominance of the pleasure 
principle over the course of mental processes. If such a 
dominance existed, the irmrtense majority of our mental 
processes would have to be accompanied by pleasure or to 
lead to pleasure, whereas universal experience completely 
contradicts any such conclusion. At the most that can be 
said, therefore, is that there exists in the mind a strong 
tendency toward the pleasure principle, but that the 
tendency is opposed by certain other forces or circumstances, 
so that the final outcone cannot always be in harmony with 
the tendency toward pleasure. (Freud, 1920/1961, p. 4) 
When the ego uses "reason and common sense81 against the id, the 
ego is seeking self-preservation by employing the reality principle. 
The reality principle does not seek to eradicate pleasure but rather 
seeks an indirect route for its expression: 
This latter principle does not abandon the intention of 
ultimately obtaining pleasure, but it nevertheless demands 
and carries into effect the postponement of satisfaction, 
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the abandonment of a number of possibilities of gaining 
satisfaction and the temporary toleration of unpleasure as 
a step on the long indirect road to pleasure. (Freud, 
1920/1961, p. 4) 
The ego curbs any impulse of the id that is in conflict with the 
dictates of the environment as the ego perceives it. In this struggle 
the flow of being from the primal energy of the id is repressed; when 
the ego feels those drives or impulses that are in agreement with the 
ego's concept of reality, then those drives are permitted to "ccmbine 
into the inclusive unity of the ego" in its development: 
Almost all the energy with which the apparatus is filled arises 
from its innate instinctual impulses. But these are not allowed 
to reach the same phases of development. In the course of things 
it happens again and again that the individual instincts or parts 
of instincts turn out to be incompatible in their aim or demands 
with the remaining ones, which are able to combine into the 
inclusive unity of the ego. The former are then split off from 
this unity by the process of repression, held back at lower levels 
of psychical development and cut off, to begin with, frcm the 
possibility of satisfaction. (Freud, 1920/1961, pp. 4-5) 
It is to be noted that the reality principle of delaying pleasure is 
not one of perceiving pleasure when the repressed instincts do appear. 
They are then perceived by the ego as unpleasure: 
If they succeed subsequently, as can so easily happen with 
repressed sexual instincts, in struggling through, by roundabout 
paths, to a direct or to a substitutive satisfaction, that event, 
which would in other cases have been an opportunity for pleasure, 
is felt by the ego as unpleasure. (1920/1961, p. 5) 
Although there is a struggle of the ego to preserve the self by 
repressing the impulses of the id, Freud cautions that "one must not 
take the difference between ego and id in too hard-and-fast a sense" 
because it must be remembered that the ego is not a separate entity 
but "is a specially differentiated part of the id" (1923/1962, p. 28). 
Freud further maintains that the "ego is first and foremost a bodily 
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ego; it is not merely a surface entity, but is itself the projection of 
a surface" (1923/1960, p. 16). This concept of a "bodily ego" becanes 
clearer when Freud explains how sensations or stimuli "have played a 
part in bringing about the formation of the ego and its differentiation 
frcm the id": 
A person's own body, arid above all its surface, is a place 
frcm which external and internal perceptions may spring. It 
is seen like any other object, but to the touch it yields two 
kinds of sensations, one of which may be equivalent to an 
internal perception. (1923/1962, p. 15) 
This concept of internal perception is essential to an understanding 
of the internal oppression that must be liberated for an individual to 
become more fully human. Freud reveals that frcm "examining unconscious 
processes," it is possible to state that "consciousness may be, not the 
most universal attribute of mental processes, but only a particular 
function of them" (1920/1961, p. 18). Freud reveals that the ego serves 
as a mediator between the outer and the inner worlds and in this 
capacity serves to govern or regulate stimuli: 
What consciousness yields consists essentially of perceptions 
of excitations coming from the external world and of feelings 
of pleasure and unpleasure which can only rise frcm the mental 
apparatus; it is therefore possible to assign to the system 
Pcpt. Cs. a position in space. It must lie on the borderline 
between the outside and the inside; it must be turned towards 
the external world and must envelop the other psychical 
systems. (1920/1961, p. 18) 
Freud then reveals how there can be memory-traces that are in other 
systems but not in consciousness, constituting a condition comparable 
to internal perception : 
On the basis of impressions derived frcm our psychoanalytic 
experience, we assume that all excitatory processes that 
occur in the other systems leave permanent traces behind in 
them which form the foundation of memory. Such memory-
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traces, then, have nothing to do with the fact of becoming 
conscious; indeed they are often most powerful and most 
enduring when the process which left them behind was one 
which never entered consciousness.... Though this 
consideration is not absolutely conclusive, it nevertheless 
leads vis to suspect that becoming conscious and leaving 
behind a memory-trace are processes incompatible with each 
other within one and the same system. Thus we should be 
able to say that the excitatory process becomes conscious 
in the system Cs. but leaves no permanent trace behind 
there; but that the excitation is transmitted to the systems 
lying next within and that it is in them that its traces 
are left. (1920/1961, p. 19) 
Thus tlie ego receives stimuli frcm the outside world and protects the 
organism by not allowing it to be overwhelmed by the tremendous force 
of stimuli coming frcm the outer world. Against the inner stimuli of 
equally tremendous pressure, the ego has no shield: 
The situation of the system between the outside and the 
inside and the difference between the conditions governing 
the reception of excitations in the two cases have a 
decisive effect on the fmotioning of the system and of 
the whole mental apparatus. Towards the outside it is 
shielded against stimuli, and the amounts of excitation 
impinging on it have only a reduced effect. Towards the 
inside there can be no such shield; the excitations in 
the deeper layers, extend into the system directly and in 
undiminished amount, in so far as certain of their 
characteristics give rise to feelings in the pleasure-
unpleasure series. (1920/1961, p. 23) 
These inner impulses produce within the ego "a tendency to treat them 
as though they were acting, not from the inside, but from the outside, 
so that it may be possible to bring the shield against stimuli into 
operation as a means for defence against them" (1920/1961, p. 23). 
Freud reveals that this shield mechanism of the ego is the "origin of 
projection which is destined to play such a large part in the 
causation of pathological processes" (1920/1961, p. 23). Freud thus 
clarifies how the battle between the ego and the impulses of the id 
results in limiting the individual. Whereas Freud is explicit in his 
explanation of how oppression results from this inner conflict, it is 
Hegel who clarifies Freud's concept of the "bodily ego" and of the 
memory-traces that are not conscious but yet are powerful influences on 
the development of an individual. 
Freud's perception of the soul starts with the ego that arises 
frcan but is still a part of the primal energy of the id. Hegel reveals 
an earlier unity of the soul with its natural surroundings and with the 
universal substance of which it was a part. Moreover Hegel reveals in 
his discussion of the evolvement of the soul that in one stage of 
development, that of the Feeling Soul, the feelings, emotions, and 
interconnections of the universal substance with the natural world and 
psychic impressions all constitute the inner perceptions of the 
individual's world. 
Hegel perceives then an earlier stage in which the natural world or 
nature is created as the "other" of the absolute Idea. It is at that 
time Spirit but when it emerges from nature it becomes universal soul or 
what Hegel perceives as a Natural Soul. At this point Natural Soul 
differentiates among the beings of the natural world and reduces the 
natural environment to something qualitative. These qualitative 
differences correspond to geographical climates and psychical moods of 
regions. When the Natural Soul can feel itself at one in nature and 
can reduce its multiplicity of parts to a single unity of self-feeling, 
it becomes differentiated into individual souls: 
The soul is further de-universalized into the individualized 
subject. But this subjectivity is here only considered as 
a differentiation and singling out of the modes which nature 
gives: we find it as the special temperament, talent, 
character, physiognomy, or other disposition and idiosyncrasy, 
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of families of single individuals.(Hegel, 1827/1894, pp. 172-
173) 
Hegel's description of the early unity the soul experiences reveals 
something of the nature of memories contained within the unconscious. 
It is Hegel's "Feeling Soul" that relates to the emotions and to the 
memory-traces preserved within an individual's inner world. Hegel's 
definition of sensibility in general as the "healthy fellowship of 
the individual mind in the life of its bodily parts" (1827/1894, p. 
177) reveals two spheres of feeling in which the internalization of 
the soul's corporeity occurs: 
One, where what at first a corporeal affection (e.g. of 
the eye or of any bodily part whatever) is made feeling 
(sensation) by being driven inward, memorised in the soul's 
self-centered part. Another, where affections originating 
in the mind and belong to it, are in order to be felt, and 
to be as if found, invested with corporeity. Thus the mode 
or affection gets a place in the subject: it is felt in the 
soul. (1827/1894, p. 177) 
Hegel moreover states there is a "bodily form adopted by certain 
mental modifications, especially the passions or emotions": 
We should have, e.g. to explain the line of connexion 
by which anger and courage are felt in the breast, the 
blood, the "irritable" system, just as thinking and mental 
occupations are felt in the head, the center of the 
"sensible" system. (1827/1894, p. 178) 
What Hegel is describing here in sensibility is the dual means of 
feeling or of receiving stimuli, the outer and the inner. These are 
reminiscent of the stimuli Freud mentions occurring within the ego. 
Hegel's ego is still in rudimentary development although he concedes 
the "sensation, just because they are inmediate and are found existing, 
are single and transient aspects of psychic life" (1827/1894, p. 178). 
They are "alternations in the substantiality of the soul" (p. 178) : 
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But this self-centered being is not merely a formal factor of 
sensation: the soul is virtually a reflected totality of 
sensations—it feels in itself the total substantiality which 
it virtually is—it is a soul that feels. (1827/1894, p. 178) 
When the Feeling Soul develops from the sensations that are 
amassed, Hegel1s understanding of this soul becomes necessary to an 
understanding of Freud's inner perceptions and memory-traces. Feelings 
represent the obscure psychic connection to innumerable relationships 
to things and-happenings, to the whole of an individual's personal 
world. Hegel suggests that there is a memory unknown to the conscious 
aspect of the mind that belongs only to the "implicit self": 
Every individual is an infinite treasury of sensations, ideas, 
acquired lore, thoughts, etc.; and yet the ego is one and 
uncampounded, a deep featureless characterless mine, in which 
all this is stored up, without existing. It is only when I 
call to mind an idea, that I bring it out of interior to 
existence before consciousness. Sometimes, in sickness, ideas 
and information, supposed to have been forgotten years ago, 
because for so long they had not been brought into consciousness, 
once more ccine to light. They were not in our possession, nor 
by such reproduction as occurs in sickness do they for the 
future came into our possession; yet they were in us and continue 
to be in us still. Thus a person can never know how much of 
things he once learned he really has in him, should he have once 
forgotten them: they belong not to his actuality or subjectivity 
as such, but only to his implicit self. (1827/1894, pp. 179-180) 
Hegel's concluding statement to this passage concerning ideas stored 
within the Feeling Soul reveals how this inner world remains the 
individual's private universe: 
And under all the superstructure of specialised and 
instrumental consciousness that may be subsequently added 
to it, the individuality always remains this single-souled 
inner life. (1827/1894, p. 180) 
Much of what Hegel is here noting pertains to the unconscious 
that is not repressed but is very active and influential in the 
individual's development into fullness of being or into the limitation 
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of oppression. Hegel's description suggests Groddeck's belief that the 
"ego behaves essentially passively in life" and that individuals are 
"'lived' by unknown and uncontrollable forces" (Freud, 1923/1962, p. 
13). Furthermore, Hegel's discernment that feelings, inner perceptions, 
and psychical interconnections that remain in the individual's "single-
souled" life suggests as well the memory-traces that are unconscious 
but present within the unconscious. There is equally suggested a 
potentially creative force in the unconscious, as contained in Hegel's 
reference to the "infinite treasury" within the ego and the observation 
that the "ego is one and uncanpounded" (Hegel, 1826/1894, p. 179). It 
is in this suggestion of creative force of the unconscious that Freud's 
observation of the ability of the unconscious mind to create answers to 
problems encountered by the conscious mind becomes revealing: 
On the one hand, we have evidence that even subtle and difficult 
intellectual operations which ordinarily require strenuous 
reflection can equally be carried out preconsciously and without 
ccming into consciousness. Instances of this are quite 
incontestable; they may occur, for example, during the stage of 
sleep, as is shown when someone finds, immediately after waking, 
that he knows the solution to a difficult mathematical or other 
problem with which he had been wrestling in vain the day before. 
(Freud, 1923/1962, p. 16) 
Freud's speaking of the soul and "how it reveals itself in all we 
do and dream" (Bettelheim, 1983, p. 4) becomes clearer. Freud is also 
aware that the unconscious makes up most of the soul. As has been 
stated, the repressed must not be confused with the unconscious. When 
Freud notes that it is "the dark world of the unconscious which forms 
such a large part of the soul of living man (Bettleheim, 1983, p. 77), 
he suggests as well the sensitivity of the Feeling Soul, and thus lends 
even greater significanse to his observation tliat the unconscious "can 
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have many meanings" (1923/1962, p. 3). Frcm Freud's observation in The 
Ego and the Id (1923/1962) the unconscious does have many meanings in 
that it cannot be successfully produced unless it is repressed. He 
furthermore reveals that it is creative, as in the solutions to the 
problems. Thus Hegel's affirmation that the soul is the "totality of 
an individual" becomes even more significant in noting the power of 
the unconscious: 
The soul is virtually the totality of its nature; as an 
individual soul it is a monad; it is itself the explicitly 
put totality of its particular world—that world being 
included in it and filling it up; and to that world it 
stands but as to itself" (1827/1894, p. 180) 
Hegel's definition of the nucleus of sensitivity as being the "whole 
mental life" of the soul indicates that this life is distinct frcm 
the conscious: furthermore, this "sensitive nucleus" contains the 
genius "whose decision is ultimate" regardless of conscious 
intentions, suggestive of Groddeck's reference to the unconscious that 
controls actions. It is of significance that Hegel's definition of 
this nucleus be included: 
But this sensitive nucleus includes not merely the purely 
unconscious, congenital disposition, but within its 
enveloping simplicity it acquires and retains also all 
further ties and essential relationships, fortunes, 
principles—everything in short belonging to the character, 
and in whose elaboration self-conscious activity has not 
effectively participated. The sensitivity is thus a soul 
in which the whole mental life is condensed. The total 
individual under this concentrated aspect is distinct frcm 
the existing and actual play of his consciousness, his 
secular ideas, developed interests, inclinations, etc. As 
contrasted with those looser aggregates of means and methods, 
the irore intensive form of individuality is termed the genius, 
whose decision is ultimate whatever may be the show of reasons, 
intentions, means, of which the more public consciousness is 
so liberal. (Hegel, 1827/1894, p. 183) 
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Id and Soul 
Although the nucleus of sensitivity remains in the soul, the soul 
reduces feelings so that it "has them and moves in them, without 
feeling or consciousness of the fact." (Hegel, 1827/1894, p. 191). 
What results is that "when its corporeity has been moulded and made 
thoroughly its own," the soul finds itself there "a single Subject" so 
that the body does not represent itself "but the soul, of which it is 
the sign"; 
In this identity of interior and exterior, the latter subject 
to the former, the soul is actual: in its corporeity it has 
its free shape, in which it feels itself and makes itself felt, 
which as the Soul's work of art has human pathognomic and 
physiognomic expression. (Hegel, 1827/1894, p. 194) 
Hegel's concept of the soul as the total individual with the body as the 
sign of the soul corresponds to Freud's regarding the soul as the total 
personality. There is, moreover, an interesting parallel between the 
emergence of the ego from the id and that of the soul from its natural 
life. Hegel records that when the "iranediate identity of the natural 
soul has been raised to this pure 'ideal' self-identity," then "what 
the former contained is for this self-subsistent reflection set forth 
as an object" (1827/1894, p. 196). Furthermore, this separation from 
"its specific qualities—the soul's natural life--to an equal freedom 
as an independent object" is iiow the "ego is in the first instance 
aware (conscious) and as such it is Consciousness" (Hegel, 1827/1894, 
p. 196). 
What happens in this separation applies to the perceptions of both 
Freud and Hegel concerning the separation of consciousness from that 
realm in which it finds its natural life but which with the development 
of consciousness of the ego becomes unconscious. Consciousness could 
not arise until the ego distinguishes itself as separate and apart from 
its inner life. Yet the memory of having once been irrmersed in this 
environment, be it id or natural substance of the soul, is sacrificed 
in this separation. Just as the ego arises from the id and then 
regards it as hostile and threatening in Freud1s concept, the ego in 
Hegel's analysis regards "the soul's natural life" as alien. For 
Hegel's ego the content of nature or the natural life of the soul 
becomes the "other" and seems to the ego to have risen from "something 
dark and beyond it" (Hegel, 1827/1894, p. 196). Thus Freud focuses 
on making the unconscious known so that the unity permits being to 
flow in its natural course. Hegel in turn seeks to educate 
consciousness to the force of the dialectic that reveals that subject 
and object are one. Hegel's ccanment applies to all stages of 
consciousness that have moved into unity with the object: "Hence 
consciousness, like reciprocal dependence in general, is the 
contradiction between the independence of the two sides and their 
identity in which they are merged into one" (1827/1894, p. 196). 
What is needed is the recognition of the separated parts that 
they have the same identity: "Ego, as this absolute negativity, is 
implicitly the identity in the otherness; the ego is itself that 
other and stretches over the object" so that "it is one side of the 
relationship and the whole relationship" (Hegel, 1827/1894, p. 196). 
In other words, the separation of the id and the ego or of natural 
environment and consciousness must not remain such that one part 
regards its other as hostile and foreign to it. The dialectic can 
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bring about such unity so that ego recognizes itself in its object, in 
its other. In this manner, there would be the unity that Freud 
perceives as an integration of primal energy with rational processes; 
there would also be unity of self with its other, either object or 
person. When the unity occurs within and without, then the individual 
is liberated into being more fully human. In this unity would occur 
the flow of being that both Hegel and Freud perceive as resulting into 
the individual's development into becoming more fully human, into that 
of self-becoming. 
In Hegel's insight, Spirit is the only reality but it is evolving 
and needs to have the experience by which Spirit can know itself in its 
object. This movement of Spirit from position of subject to object and 
back to subject releases potential for fuller being through the 
dialectic. Thus the seeming opposition or contradiction is overcome 
but not without the individual' s moving into a higher mode of 
consciousness through its integration of subject and object. Such 
movement into fuller being involves using the unconscious of the Id in 
connection with the thrust of the Spirit that seeks expression and 
becomes actual through the dialectic. As long as the ego regards its 
other as hostile the dialectic is immobilized in the sense it is not 
involved in making Spirit actual within the consciousness of the 
individual. As long as the ego accepts in passive state the dictates 
of society, civilization, or authority without subjecting such 
dictates to the dialectical thought processes, the individual remains 
in what Hegel calls "uncanprehended irrmediacy" (Hegel, 1807/1931, 
p. 91). Freud's ego is so involved in suppressing the impulses of the 
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id that it in turn is oppressed by an unconscious force within it of 
which it is unaware, a force serving to oppress the ego with the 
authority of eons of history and the authority of important figures. 
This internal oppressor of which Freire is very much aware is the 
super-ego. 
Super-Eqo 
The ideal ego is unknown to the ego; consequently Freud maintains 
this part of the psyche is the most difficult of all oppositions to 
remove. He adds that it is unconscious but not repressed, for if it 
were repressed the unconscious which seeks expression would respond to 
therapy: 
The unconscious—that is to say, the "repressed"—offers no 
resistence whatever to the efforts of the treatment. Indeed, 
it itself has no other endeavour than to break through the 
pressure weighing down on it and force its way either to 
consciousness or to a discharge through seme real action. 
Resistance during treatment arises from the same higher strata 
and systems of the mind which originally carried out 
repression. (Freud, 1920/1961, p. 13) 
In The Ego and the Id Freud explains the powerful influence of 
this unconscious part of the psyche: 
We have came upon something in the ego itself which is also 
unconscious, which behaves exactly like the repressed—that 
it, which produces powerful effects without itself being 
conscious and which requires special work before it can be 
made conscious. (1923/1962, p. 7) 
Freud reveals in The Ego and the Id as well the origin of the super­
ego as stemming frcm biological and historical sources: 
If we consider once more the origin of the super-ego 
as we have described it, we shall recognize that it is 
the outcome of two highly important factors, one of a 
biological and the other of a historical nature: namely, 
the lengthy duration in man of his childhood helplessness 
and dependence, and the fact of his Oedipus complex, the 
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repression of which we have shown to be connected with the 
interruption of libidinal development.... We see, then, that 
the differentiation of the super-ego frcm the ego is no 
matter of chance; it represents the most important 
characteristics of the development both of the individual and 
of the species; indeed, by giving permanent egression to the 
influence of the parents it perpetuates the existence of the 
factors to which it owes its origin. (1923/1962, p. 25) 
The power of the super-ego is related to the impulses of the id: 
The ego ideal is therefore the heir of the Oedipus carp lex, and 
thus it is also the expression of the most powerful impulses 
and most important libidinal vicissitudes of the id. By setting 
up the ego ideal, the ego has mastered the Oedipus complex and 
at the same tine placed itself in subjection to the id. 
Whereas the ego is essentially the representative of the external 
world, of reality, the super-ego stands in contrast to it as the 
representative of the internal world, of the id. Conflicts 
between the ego and the id will, as we are now prepared to find, 
ultimately reflect the contrast between what is real and what is 
psychical, between the external world and the internal world. 
(1923/1962, p. 26) 
Freud reveals there are "two paths by which the contents of the id 
can penetrate the ego": 
The one is direct, the other leads by way of the ego-ideal; 
which of these two paths they take may, for seine mental 
activities, be of decisive importance. The ego develops frcm 
perceiving instincts to controlling them, frcm obeying 
instincts to inhibiting them. In this achievement a large 
share is taken by the ego ideal, which indeed is partly a 
reaction-formation against the instinctual processes of the 
id. Psychoanalysis is an instrument to enable the ego to 
achieve a progressive conquest of the id. (1923/1962, pp. 
45-46) 
The ego then owes "service to three masters" and is "menaced by three 
dangers: frcm the external world, from the libido of the id, and .frcm 
the severity of the super-ego" (1923/1962, p. 46). It is of 
significance to observe Freud's explanation of these dangers, for they 
affect the ego's development into becoming more fully human. Freud 
maintains that "the ego is the actual seat of anxiety": 
Threatened by dangers frcm three directions, it develops the 
flight-reflex by withdrawing its own cathexis frcm the 
menacing perception or from the similarly regarded process 
in the id, and emitting it as anxiety. This primitive 
reaction is later replaced by the carrying-out of protective 
cathexes (the mechanism of the phobias). What it is the 
ego fears from the external and from the libidinal danger 
cannot be specified; we know that the fear is of being 
overwhelmed or annihilated, but it cannot be grasped 
analytically. The ego is simply obeying the warning of the 
pleasure principle. (1923/1962, p. 47) 
What can be specified is the fear of the ego concerning the super-ego 
It is important to realize the powerful influence through fear and 
conscience this ideal ego holds for the ego: 
On the other hand, we can tell what is hidden behind the 
ego's dread of the super-ego, the fear of conscience. The 
superior being, which turned into the ego ideal, once 
threatened castration, and this dread of castration is 
probably the nucleus round which the subsequent fear of 
conscience has gathered; it is this dread that persists as 
the fear of conscience. (Freud, 1923/1962, p. 47) 
Freud states that the super-ego is representative of that "higher 
nature" that is excluded from research into "what is repressed in 
mental life" (1923/1962, p. 26). Thus the super-ego "answers to 
everything that is expected of the higher nature of man": 
As a substitute for a longing for the father, it contains the 
germ from which all religions have evolved. The self-judgement 
(sic) which declares that the ego falls short of its ideal 
procTuces the religious sense of humility to which the believer 
appeals in his longing. (1923/1962, p. 27) 
The super-ego thus carries with it the power of authority as well as 
that of conscience: 
As a child grows up, the role of father is carried on by 
teachers and others in authority; their injunctions and 
prohibitions remain powerful in the ego ideal and continue, 
in the form of conscience, to exercise moral censorship. 
The tension between the demands of conscience and the 
actual performances of the ego is experienced as a sense of 
guilt. Social feelings rest on identifications with other 
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people, on the basis of having the same ego ideal. (Freud, 
1923/1962, p. 27) 
Freud also reveals that "through the forming of the ideal, what biology 
and the vicissitudes of the human species have created in the id and 
left behind in it is taken over by the ego and re-experienced" (1923/ 
1962, p. 26) as the ego- ideal. Thus this formation of the ego ideal 
"has the most abundant links" with an individual's "archaic heritage": 
What has belonged to the lowest part of the mental life of 
each of us is changed, through the formation of the ideal, 
into what is highest in the human mind by our scale of 
values. (1923/1962, p. 26) 
In reference to the "phylogenetic acquisition" of each individual, 
Freud indicates that the super-ego "actually originated frcm the 
experiences that led to totemism" and that although it is not "possible 
to speak of direct inheritance in the ego," it must be remembered that 
the "ego is a specially differentiated part of the id" (1923/1962, p. 28) 
Freud therefore can affirm that "the question whether' it was the ego or 
the id that experienced and acquired these things soon cores to 
nothing," for the id experiences the outer world "by way of the ego, 
which is the representative of the external world to the id" (1923/ 
1962, p. 28). It thus becomes clear to Freud that the super-ego is an 
archaic inheritance: 
The experiences of the ego seem at first to be lost for 
inheritance; but, when they have teen repeated of ten enough 
and with sufficient strength in many individuals in 
successive generations, they transform themselves, so to 
say, into experiences of the id, the impressions of which 
are preserved by heredity. Thus in the id, which is capable 
of being inherited, are harboured residues of the existence 
of countless egos; and when the ego forms its super-ego out 
of the id, it may perhaps only be reviving shapes of former 
egos and be bringing them to resurrection. (1923,1962, p. 28) 
Freud's work with the super-ego, in determining its origin and its 
influence, lends insight into the nature of oppression and helps 
explain how the power of authority—in institutions or people—is often 
unquestioned by the ego that is born with a predisposition to accept 
this power. It also becomes clear for a study of Freire's pedagogy of 
liberation that being born into an oppressive reality brings with it 
the "residues of the existences of countless egos" that have suffered 
oppression "in successive generations" so that the impressions of 
being oppressed and of being possessed as objects "are preserved by 
heredity" as well. Freud's work illumines the difficulty with which 
Freire is faced in enabling individuals to emerge frcm the dictates of 
the internal oppressor and illumines the power of critical and 
psychoanalytical thought to enable an individual to surface for 
recognition of an oppressive situation that is amenable to the 
individual1s creative efforts to transform that situation. 
Flow of Being and Repression 
The nature of oppression, however, is not confined to the oppressor 
as conveyed in the super-ego; it is a part of an individual's life in 
that the principles of pleasure-reality are in operation daily as the 
ego seeks to repress the impulses of the id toward pleasure by 
imposing the principles of reality. Although the "pleasure principle 
is proper to a primary method of working on the part of the mental 
apparatus," frcm the viewpoint of the ego, involved in its "self-
preservation among the difficulties of the external world," the 
impulses toward pleasure arising from the id are regarded "frcm the 
very outset inefficient and even highly dangerous" (1920/1961, p. 4). 
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It becores then not an encounter of wills but a true battle between an 
ever-encroaching force in the id and a never-relenting resistance in 
the ego to that force; it is a battle involving intense energy in 
what be cones a life-death struggle. It is to be expected that the 
effects of this struggle upon the individual serve to limit the 
individual's flow of being into integration. One effect of a limit 
upon the flow of being, a result of the opposition between two 
dynamic forces of impulse and resistance, is that of a neurosis, 
a means by which the ego preserves itself by withdrawing frcm the 
threatening impulse. A result of this withdrawal is to keep the id 
from access to consciousness as well as to keep it from physical 
expression. The id, however, retains its impulsive energy and seeks 
constantly for expression. Despite the vigilence of the ego, the 
repressed impulse of the id finds an outlet in irrational speech or 
action; its usual release for expression, however, is in sore part of 
the body. The response of the body frcm this attack of the id is to 
manifest a symptom of this attack; and, once the symptcm is 
established, the victim then engages in a struggle against the 
symptcm, much in the same manner the ego initially struggles with the 
id impulse. In such constant engagement and diversion of energy, the 
flow of being is impeded. 
Hegel's insight concerning the effects of blocking the fluid 
nature of being notes physical and mental effects: 
But the main point in derangement is the contradiction which 
as feeling with a fixed corporeal embodiment sets 15) against 
the whole mass of adjustments forming the concrete 
consciousness. The mind which is in a condition of mere being. 
and where such being is not rendered fluid in its 
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consciousness, is diseased. (1827/1894, p. 189) 
Hegel further notes how physical effects are manifested in the body 
frcm this impeded flow of being: 
In considering insanity we must, as in other cases, anticipate 
the full-grown and intelligent conscious subject which is at 
the same time the natural self of self-feeling. In such a 
phase the self can be liable to the contradiction between its 
now free subjectivity and particularly which, instead of 
being "idealized" in the former, remains as a fixed element 
in self-feeling... .Insanity is therefore a psychical disease, 
i.e., a disease of body and mind alike: the canmencement may 
appear to start from one more than the other, and so also may 
be the cure. (1827/1894, pp. 188-189) 
Dreaming, Sleeping, and Awaking 
Freud acknowledges that the unconscious is made known through what 
is repressed within it, but he also states that "the study of dreams 
my be considered the most trustworthy method of investigating deep 
mental processes" (1920/1961, p. 7). It must be remembered that the 
ego serves as a censor over the impulses of the id during the day; 
there is, however, a censorship still functioning at night in that the 
id must disguise itself in memories of the day or of immediate past to 
move by the relaxed but still watchful ego. Thus to the consciousness 
of the ego, the id is a separate and hostile entity that threatens the 
ego with impulses during the day and with dreams during the night. 
Furthermore, the id has no end in that it reaches back to the primeval 
memories of humankind. Freud maintains that "dreaming is on the whole 
an act of regression to the earliest relationships of the dreamer, a 
resuscitation of his childhood, of the impulses that were then 
dominant and the modes of expression which were then available (Freud, 
1900/1950, p. 404). Freud then reveals how extensive is the dream in 
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regard to the past: 
Behind this childhood of the individual we are then premised 
an insight into the phylogenetic childhood, into the 
evolution of the human race, of which the development of the 
individual is only an abridged repetition influenced by the 
fortuitous circumstances of life. (Freud, 1900/1950, p. 404) 
Freud's concept of the id and of the dream material issuing 
frcm the id is clarified in his observation that "we are encouraged to 
expect, from the analysis of dreams, a knowledge of the archaic 
inheritance of man, a knowledge of psychical things in him that are 
innate" (1900/1950, p. 404). Bettelheim lends an insight to what 
Freud's work with the unconscious, especially in dreams, indicates for 
liberation frcm the oppressor within: 
By inviting us to follow him into the seeming chaos of the 
world of darkness, of the unconscious and its irrationality, 
Freud intended to change our view of man; but this could be 
done only if we changed our view of ourselves and reached an 
understanding also, of the darkest aspects of our minds. If 
we did, we would discover that what went on there could be 
understood and would, in its own way, make good sense, 
teaching us a great deal about ourselves. Freud tried to 
correct and enlarge our ideas about our dreams and to instruct 
us about their meaning, hoping that familiarity with the 
hidden aspects of our souls would permit us a deeper, more 
complete understanding of ourselves. (1983, p. 69) 
Freud notes the force of the id to find expression, its constant efforts 
to flow unimpeded, through disguising the iitpulses that stem from a 
primitive anarchic world with the memories of the day or of childhood. 
The disguise is often that of a hallucinatory state conveyed in the 
dream. There also issues from the id a healing state. From Freud's 
study of traumatic neuroses that are repeated through the dream 
process and carry with these repetitions the sane fright the 
individual originally feels, he recognizes that they are not wish-
fulfillment dreams. As Freud notes, dreams would be "more in harmony 
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with their nature if they showed the patient pictures from his healthy 
past, or of the cure for which he hopes" (1920/1961, p. 7). Freud 
suggests that "the function of dreaming, like so much else, is upset 
in this condition and diverted frcm its purpose" (p. 7): 
It is necessary to examine this dream that repeats a traumatic 
event and thus continues to frighten the individual. Freud defines 
anxiety as preparation for flight. His definition of trauma indicates 
there is no preparation for this event: 
We describe as "traumatic" any excitations frcm outside which 
are powerful enough to break through the protective shield. 
It seems to me that the concept of trauma necessarily implies 
a connection of this kind with a breach in an otherwise 
efficacious barrier against stimuli. Such an event as an 
external trauma is bound to provoke a disturbance on a large 
scale in the functioning of the organism's energy and to set 
in motion every possible defensive measure. At the same time, 
the pleasure principle is for the moment put out of action. 
There is no longer any possiblity of preventing the mental 
apparatus from being flooded with large amounts of stimulus, 
and another problem arises instead—the problem of mastering 
the amounts of stimulus which have broken in and of binding 
them, in the psychical sense, so that they can then be 
disposed of. (Freud, 1920/1961, p. 23-24) 
It then becomes clear that the unconscious, the inner feeling self, the 
inner world of the individual functions to bring about healing through 
allowing the individual through the repetitive dreams to experience 
the anxiety and hence make preparation that was absent when the 
trauma occurred. Freud explains the healing aspect and its relation to 
the pleasure principle: 
The fulfillment of wishes is, as we know, brought about in 
a hallucinatory manner by dreams, and under the dominance 
of the pleasure principle this has became their function. 
But it is not in the service of that principle that the 
dreams of patients suffering from traumatic neuroses lead 
them back with such regularity to the situation in which 
the trauma occurred. We may assume, rather, that dreams 
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are here helping to carry out another task, which must be 
accomplished before the dominance of the pleasure principle 
can even begin. The dreams are endeavouring to master the 
stimulus retrospectively, by developing the anxiety whose 
emission was the cause of the traumatic neurosis. They 
thus afford us a view of a function of the mental apparatus 
which, though it does not contradict the pleasure principle, 
is nevertheless independent of it and seems to be more 
primitive than the purpose of gaining pleasure and avoiding 
unpleasure. (1920/1961, p. 26) 
Hegel's discussion of the sleeping state parallels in seme respects 
the dynamics of dreaming that Freud reveals. Hegel, however, integrates 
sleeping with waking and thus the images or pictures of the id become a 
vehicle of expression on a higher level of consciousness. In one 
sense, the therapeutic mission of the dreams in the trauma neuroses 
corresponds to the integration that occurs on an unconscious level 
within Hegel's stage of sleeping. It is necessary to refer to an earlier 
discussion of Freud's observation concerning the unconscious, that of 
the answers for problems too difficult to be solved without great effort 
during the day by the conscious mind but which are forthcoming during 
the sleeping period without the individual's awareness that this process 
was occurring. Hegel makes a similar observation that needs to be 
included, for it lends insight and support to what Freud says is "quite 
incontestable" (Freud, 1923/62, p. 16). It is thus of interest that 
Hegel too finds that the conscious mind is refreshed and strengthened 
by an encounter with the forces found within the sleeping state; thus 
Hegel lends insight to this process during the time the conscious mind 
sleeps. Hegel maintains that the "waking stage" includes "generally 
all self-conscious and rational activity in which the mind realises 
its own distinctive self" (1827/1894, p. 174). Moreover, "sleep is 
an invigoration of this activity—not a merely negative rest from it, 
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but as a return back frcm the world of specialisation, from dispersion 
into phases where it has grown hard and still" (1827/1894, p. 174). 
Hegel clarifies that the waking results in becoming "hard and stiff" 
but in sleeping, there is a "return into the general nature of 
subjectivity, which is the substance of those specialised energies and 
their absolute master" (1827/1894, p. 174). Hegel can thus affirm that 
sleeping and waking are not "mere alterations, but alternating 
conditions": 
This is their formal and negative relationship but in it 
the affirmative relationship is involved. In the self-certified 
existence of waking soul its mere existence is implicit as an 
"ideal" factor: the features which make up its sleeping nature, 
where they are implicitly as in their substance, are found by the 
waking soul, in its own self, and, be it noted, for itself. 
(1827/1894, p. 176) 
Life and Death Drives 
It is necessary to examine Freud's understanding of the death 
impulse and of the life impulse in that sexual energy is connected and 
it is with the ego with its object that both Freud and Hegel perceive a 
release of being. Freud also perceives a movement toward prolonging 
life. Hegel sees in the union of the ego with its other the concept 
of infinity occurring. Freud affirms at the offset of his discussion 
that the psychoanalytical view of the direction of mental events is 
"invariably set in motion by an unpleasurable tension" and the mental 
process takes a direction that will bring about a "lowering of that 
tension—that is with an avoidance of unpleasure" (1920/1961, p. 1). 
Involved here is an endeavor to "keep the quantity of excitation as 
low as possible or at least keep it constant" (p. 1). In connection 
with the constancy theory, Freud illuminates the nature of drives 
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within the id. Freud finds a conservative drive, that of a drive 
"toward the restoration of an earlier state of things" (1920/1961, p. 
31). It follows that all life emanates from inanimate states so that 
the earliest state is death. It also follows that attempts at 
preserving life have a different function: 
The hypothesis of self-preservative instincts, such as we 
attribute to all living beings, stands in marked 
opposition to the idea that instinctual life as a whole serves 
to bring about death. Seen in this light, the theoretical 
importance of the instincts of self-preservation, of self-
assertion and of mastery greatly diminishes. They are 
component instincts whose function it is to assure that the 
organism shall follow its own path to death, and to ward 
off any possible ways of returning to inorganic existence other 
than those which are immanent in the organism itself. We have 
no longer to reckon with the organism's puzzling determination 
to maintain its own existence in the face of every obstacle. 
What we are left with is the fact that the organism wishes to 
die only in its own fashion. (Freud, 1920/1961, p. 32) 
Freud then uses a biological reference frame to suggest that sexual 
impulses or drives are life-giving. Freud here refers to biological 
experiments that revealed a prolongation of life for organisms if the 
infusion of fresh stimulants occurred: 
If two of the animalculae, at the moment before they show 
signs of senescence, are able to coalesce with each other, 
that is to "conjugate," they are saved frcm growing old 
and became "rejuvenated." Conjugation is no doubt the 
fore-runner of the sexual reproduction of higher creatures; 
it is as yet unconnected with propagation and is limited to 
the mixing of the substances of two individuals. The 
recuperative effects of conjugation can, however, be replaced 
by certain stimulating agents, by alterations in the 
composition of the fluid which provides their nourishment, by 
raising their temperature or by shaking them. (1920/1961, p. 
42) 
Frcm various biological experiments Freud is able to perceive that the 
sexual drive within humankind is life-giving as well: 
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Let us, however, return to the self-preservative sexual 
instincts. Hie experiment upon protista have already shown 
us that conjugation—that is, the coalescence of two 
individuals which separate soon afterwards without any 
subsequent cell-division occurring—has a strengthening and 
rejuvenating effect upon both of them. In later generations 
they show no signs of degenerating and seem able to put up 
a longer resistance to the injurious effects of their own 
metabolism. This single observation may, I think, be taken 
as typical of the effect produced by sexual union as well. 
(Freud, 1920/1961, p. 49) 
Freud can also perceive the conservative nature of the sexual impulses: 
They are conservative in the same sense as the other instincts 
in that they bring back earlier states of living substance; 
but they are conservative to a higher degree in that they are 
peculiarly resistant to external influences; and they are 
conservative too in another sense in that they preserve life 
itself for a comparatively long period. They are the true life 
instincts. They operate against the purpose of the other 
instincts, which leads, by reason of their function, to death; 
and this fact indicates that there is an opposition between them 
and the other instincts, an opposition whose importance was 
long ago recognized by the theory of neuroses. (1920/1961, p. 34) 
Freud compares the libido theory to the mutual relationship of cells: 
One cell helps to preserve the life of another, and the 
community of cells can survive even if individual cells have 
to die. We have already heard that conjugation, too, the 
temporary coalescence of two unicellular organisms, has a 
life-preserving and rejuvenating effect on both of them. 
Accordingly, we might attempt to apply the libido theory which 
has been arrived at in psycho-analysis to the mutual relation­
ship of cells. We might suppose that the life instincts or 
sexual instincts which are active in each cell take the other 
cells as their object, that they partly neutralize the death 
instincts (that is, the processes set up by them) in those 
cells and thus preserve their life; while the other cells do 
the same for them....(1920/1961, p. 44) 
Freud has here merged the sexual drive with the life-giving qualities 
evident in the coalescence of organism. He furthermore contends that 
Eros and sexual energy are one:" In this way the libido or our 
sexual instincts would coincide with the Eros of the poets and 
philosophers which holds all living things together" (1920/1961, p. 44). 
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Freud confirms that the opposition is "not between ego-instincts and 
sexual instincts but between life instincts and death instincts" 
(1920/1961, p. 47). With this distinction now made, it is necessary 
to turn to Bettelheim to see what Freud intends in using Eros in 
defining the sexual drive. 
Eros 
Bettelheim records Freud's statement in a preface to Three Essays 
on the Theory of Sexuality that stresses "how closely the enlarged 
concept of sexuality of psychoanalysis coincides with the Eros of 
divine Plato" (Bettelheim, 1983, p. 11). Bettelheim1s explanation of 
what Freud intends expands the sexual drive to the force of love: 
For readers who, like Freud, were steeped in the classic 
tradition, words such as "Eros" and "erotic" called up Eros's 
charm and cunning and—perhaps more important—his deep love 
for Psyche, the soul, to whan Eros is wedded in everlasting 
love and devotion. (1983, p. 11) 
Bettelheim then clarifies that such love involves beauty and "longings 
of the soul": 
For those familiar with this myth, it is impossible to think 
of Eros without being reminded at the same time of Psyche, 
and how she had at first been tricked into believing that Eros 
was disgusting, with the most tragic consequences. To view 
Eros or anything connected with him as grossly sexual or 
monstrous is an error that, according to the myth, can lead to 
catastrophe....In order for sexual love to be an experience of 
true erotic pleasure, it must be imbued with beauty 
(symbolized by Eros) and ejqpress the longings of the soul 
(symbolized by Psyche). These were sane of the connotations 
that Freud had in mind when he used words like "Eros" and 
"erotic." (1983, p. 11) 
Love becomes more than sexual union with another; it becones the union 
of the subject with its object in a wider sense. It beccraes the union 
of which Hegel speaks, the union in which Spirit manifests itself in 
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concrete actuality. Bettelheim reveals how encompassing this love is 
and how it is imbued with a drive for life: 
The sexual drive presses for irrmediate satisfaction; it 
neither knows nor cares for the future. Eros and Psyche do. 
Being aware of the tragic limits placed on our existence by 
our mortality and our destructiveness induces vis to wish to 
see life continue after us. Awareness of the dark aspects of 
life makes us keenly conscious of the need to secure a better 
life for those we love, and for those who come after us—not 
only our children but the next generation as a whole. It 
was our love for others, and our concern for the future of 
those we love, that Freud had in mind when he spoke of 
"eternal Eros." The love for others—the working of eternal 
Eros—finds its expression in the relations we form with those 
who are important to us and in what we do to make a better 
life. (1983, pp. 109-110) 
What is suggested here is the unity of libido with ego in 
concentrated energy to preserve and enrich life. In a conflict, better 
described as a battle, there are life-defeating tendencies. Energy is 
wasted in constant efforts of the id to express itself and of the ego 
to repress the id. In a conflict of this nature, there is no victory. 
There is only the depletion of energy in ever-demanding assaults and 
never-ending defenses in order to maintain scire stability in battle. 
The repression not only dissipates the energy of the ego but diverts 
and detracts the creative power of the id. All that is contained within 
the unconscious is unknown, but what Freud lias uncovered indicates 
intelligence and creativity. 
Freud speaks of the solving of problems when the conscious sleeps, 
of the power of healing in the trauma victims, and of the connection 
suggesting universal unconscious that reaches back to the beginning of 
humankind and contains the "infinite treasury" of which Hegel speaks. 
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These tendencies that are known are creative and life-giving. Even the 
wish-fulfillment moves in support of life. There is an indication of 
vision within Freud that perceives power and creativity of being in 
the integration of the id with the rational processes of the ego. In 
the following speculative question, Freud reveals a philosophic 
kinship with Hegel, especially in Hegel's perception of unity with one's 
other, that of being "at home in one's other" (Hegel, 1817/1975, p. 137). 
Freud's question is not that of a psychoanalyst but that of a 
philosopher-poet who holds a vision within of the flow of being into 
fullness of being and who only questions for others what he already 
perceives: 
Shall we follow the hint given us by the poet-philosopher, 
and venture upon the hypothesis that living substance at 
the time of its ccming to life was torn apart into small 
particles, which have ever since endeavoured to reunite 
through sexual instincts? (1920/1961, p. 52) 
Bettelheim's statement concerning the need to understand the dark 
impulses so they will not draw the individual "into their chaotic and 
often destructive orbit" is made in reference to his perception of what 
Freud means by the good life: 
The good life, in Freud's view, is one that is full of 
meaning through the lasting, sustaining, mutually gratifying 
relations we are able to establish with those we love, and 
through the satisfaction we derive from knowing that we are 
engaged in work that helps us and others to have a better 
life. (1983, p. 110) 
Thus the "ascendancy" of Eros is Freud's means by which the individual 
becomes more fully human for the fruition of what is described as a 
"good life": 
Through recognizing the true nature of our unconscious, and 
the role it plays in our psyche, we may achieve an existence 
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in which Eros, the life drive, maintains its ascendancy over 
everything within us that is chaotic, irrational, and 
destructive—in short, over the consequences of what Freud 
called the death drive, to which we are also heir. (Bettelheim, 
1983, p. 220) 
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CHAPTER III 
HEGEL: EDUCATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
The purpose of this chapter is to reveal that the act of knowing 
can lead to liberation of consciousness into Absolute Knowing. The 
focus of this chapter is on Hegel's dialectical method of movement 
into higher forms of being and on the education of stages by which 
Spirit has evolved as those series that constitute education for all 
consciousnesses. Although the primary purpose of this chapter is on 
Hegel's insight into education of consciousness for liberation, there 
is included for emphasis relevant points that correspond in both 
Hegel's and Freire's thoughts on the act of knowing. Freire shares 
basic tenets with Hegel but translates Hegel's theory into 
educational practices. It is hoped that an examination of Hegel's 
thought will illuminate the education of consciousness that is not 
only contained in Hegelian thought but is demonstrated by Freire. 
Hegel reveals an affinity with Freire over what knowing is and 
over the limitations of mind the individual passively accepts. Both 
Hegel and Freire seek the means by which humanity can liberate 
consciousness into being more fully human, into self-becoming. Both 
propose a revolutionary concept of consciousness. Freire (1970/1984) 
affirms that the act of knowing should result in a "radical form of 
being" and designates this being as "being human" (p. 24). Hegel 
proposes a revolutionary perception of consciousness that annuls, 
preserves, and transcends limitations by transforming self and 
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object. It is moreover interesting that Hegel perceives as limiting to 
the development of consciousness those factors that constitute what 
Freire cites as the myths, assumptions, and traditions conveyed by 
cultural hegemony that are too familiar to be questioned. Hegel 
(1807/1931) cites the reliance on the familiar as limiting because the 
familiar is familiar: 
It is the corrmonest form of self-deception, and a 
deception of other people as well, to assume something 
to be familiar and give assent to it on that very 
account, (p. 92) 
Hegel (1807/1931) further reveals that the individual who thus relies 
on the familiar can question it only to the extent that the individual 
seeks the opinion of others to make certain they agree that this is 
the right thing to believe or do: 
Apprehending and proving consist similarly in seeking 
whether every one finds what is said corresponding to 
his idea, too, whether it is familiar and seems to him 
so and so or not. (p. 92) 
Hegemony fosters assumptions about life that become deeply embedded 
within an individual's consciousness to the extent that an individual 
upholds these assorptions through what appears to be a natural 
philosophy or canmon sense and through deep feelings surrounding and 
defending these assumptions. Hegel (1807/1931) maintains that a 
reliance on ccranon sense is no more than relying on how an individual 
feels or on an inner author, "an oracle" with "the breast" (p. 126). 
The result is that the individual closes the mind to any other concept 
and "has just to explain that he has no more to say to anyone who 
does not find and feel the same as himself" (p. 127). 
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Hegel (1807/1931) clarifies the extent of such limitations on the 
development of consciousness into self-becoming, into becoming more 
fully human, for such a person "tramples the roots of humanity 
underfoot," revealing in adherence to feelings "the conditions of mere 
animals" that "communicate only by way of feeling-states" (p. 127). 
In contrast, humanity exists in a "community of conscious life": 
For the nature of humanity is to impel men to agree 
with one another, and its very existence lies simply in 
the explicit realization of a community of conscious life, 
(p. 127) 
Hegel does not perceive accepting dictates, creeds, or 
propositions emanating from external institutions or ideologies as 
constituting the act of knowing. Even the universals that Hegel 
concedes are probably true ccme under his scrutiny, for the truth 
they contain has not been made actual within the individual1 s 
consciousness. In a discussion on the rise of universals and the need 
to break down determinate thoughts held about them, Hegel indicates 
the nature of his purpose. He (1807/1931) reveals how necessary this 
"acquiring of universal principles" is to the development of mankind: 
Immediacy or naive psychical life has always to be made 
by acquiring knowledge of universal principles and 
points of view, by striving, in the first instance, to 
work up to the thought of the subject-matter in general, 
not forgetting at the sane time to give reasons for 
supporting it or refuting it, to apprehend the concrete 
riches and fullness contained in its various determinate 
qualities, and to know how to furnish a coherent account 
of it and a responsible judgment upon it. (Hegel, p. 70) 
What occurred in this method of "cultivating and perfecting the 
natural mind" was that by "testing carefully at all points, 
philosophizing about everything it came across," the ancient or 
early method created an "experience permeated through and through 
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by universals" (Hegel, (1807/1931, p. 94). Thus, this earlier stage, 
necessary in enabling natural consciousness to make the world 
intelligible, is but "merely one aspect of mental development.11 Hegel 
affirms the need to go beyond this development to a spiritual 
development. Hegel then illuminates the problem issuing from this 
early development of universals that now limits consciousness as one 
existing in his time and existing now, that of passive acceptance: 
In modern time, however, an individual finds the abstract 
form ready made. In striving to qrasp it and make it 
his own, he rather strives to bring forward the 
inner meaning alone, without any process of mediation; 
the production of the universal is abridged instead of 
the universal arising out of the manifold detail of 
concrete experience, (p. 94) 
Hegel (1807/1931) then clarifies his own purpose in citing the 
task for modern philosophy as one of "actualizing the universal and 
giving it spiritual vitality by the process of breaking down and 
superseding fixed and determinate thoughts" (p. 94). This task is 
the one Hegel undertakes in his speculative philosophy. The 
individual undergoing the education of consciousness in this philosophy 
ceases to be one of "passive indifference" and becomes a being of 
"purposive activity" (p. 83), gaining "insight into what knowing is" 
(p. 90) and emerging into fullness of being through development of 
consciousness. Such insight and development of consciousness cannot be 
external to the individual, given in the form of authoritative dictates 
or institutional creeds; such development exists as a possibility 
within an individual's own consciousness. Both Hegel and Freire 
concur that freedom of consciousness cannot be given or bestowed; it 
must be won by the individual through consciousness. 
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Hegel envisions a new age for humanity, one of creativity and 
oorinunity, that corresponds to Freire's perception of a new age for 
liberated mankind. What Hegel is proposing is an education for 
consciousness for such an age. Whereas Hegel perceives the new age 
already in transition, Freire's concept of educating mankind for 
liberation is for the creation of a new age of humanization for all. 
Hegel (1807/1931) perceives as occuring within his own time a 
movement into such a new age: 
... it is not difficult to see that our epoch is a birth-
time, and a period of transition. The spirit of man 
has broken with the old order of things hitherto 
prevailing, and with the old ways of thinking, and is in 
the mind to let them all sink into the depths of the past 
and to set about its own transformation, (p. 75) 
Hegel (1807/1931) perceives "the form and structure of the new 
world" as a qualitative change, comparable to the birth of a child: 
But it is here as in the case of the birth of a child; 
after a long period of nutrition in silence, the 
continuity of the gradual growth in size, of 
quantitative change, is suddenly cut short by the first 
breath drawn—there is a break in the process, a 
qualitative change—and the child is born. In like 
manner the spirit of the time, growing slowly and 
quietly ripe for the new form it is to assume, 
disintegrates one fragment after another of the 
structure of its previous world, (p. 75) 
Hegel's (1807/1931) conclusion to this metaphor is significant for the 
educating of consciousness for liberation: 
But this new world is perfectly realised just as little 
as the new-born child; and it is essential to bear this 
in mind. It comes on the stage to begin with in its 
innvsdiacy, in its bare generality, (p. 75) 
Thus the old world of "mental cultivation" will "soon make way for the 
earnestness of actual life in all its fullness, which leads to a 
living experience of the subject matter itself" (p. 70). 
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Moreover, the "beginning of the new spirit" results from a "widespread 
revolution" in spiritual culture: 
The beginning of the new spirit is the outccnie of a 
widespread revolution in manifold forms of a spiritual 
culture; it is the reward which cones after a chequered 
and devious course of development, and after much struggle 
and effort. It is a whole which, after running its course 
and laying bare all its content, returns again to itself; 
it is the resultant abstract notion of the whole. (Hegel, 
1807/1931, p. 76) 
It is this "abstract notion of the whole" that must be experienced 
through the education of consciousness: 
But the actual realization of this abstract whole is only 
found when these previous shapes and forms, which are now 
reduced to ideal moments of the whole, are developed anew 
again, but developed and shaped with this new medium, and 
with the meaning they have thereby acquired, (p. 76) 
Hegel is here referring to a process of educating consciousness that 
will liberate consciousness to undergo "living experience of the 
subject-matter" by breaking down "fixed and determinate thoughts" and 
by undertaking the education of consciousness Spirit has experienced 
so that the abstract can became actual for the individual 
consciousness. This education for liberation constitutes a series of 
stages and has the goal of the "mind's insight into what knowing is" 
(Bagel, 1807/1931, p. 90). This new age is however "in its iirmediacy, 
in its bare generality" and Hegel proposes that "consciousness misses 
in the new form the detailed expanse of content" that was available 
in the old. Moreover consciousness needs "still more the developed 
expression of form by which distinctions are definitely determined and 
arranged in their precise relations" (p. 76). It is to the end of 
making education for consciousness in the new age accessible to everyone 
that Hegel undertakes his system of consciousness development for 
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liberation. Hegel further maintains that without this exposition 
"science has no general intelligibility" and "has the appearance of 
being an esoteric possession of a few individuals." He (1807/1931) 
observes that the spiritual cultivation of the new age must be one 
of community of consciousness, of accessibility to everyone, and of 
being exoteric in comprehension: 
Only what is perfectly determinate in form is at the 
same time exoteric, comprehensible, and capable of being 
learned and possessed by everybody. Intelligibility is 
the form in which science is offered to everyone, and is 
the open road to it made plain for all.... For 
intelligence, understanding, is thinking, pure activity 
of the self in general; and what is intelligible is 
something from the first familiar and common to the 
scientific and unscientific mind alike, enabling the 
unscientific mind to enter the domain of science. (PP- 76-77) 
Hegel (1807/1931) then affirms that the "systematic development of 
truth in scientific form can alone be the true shape in which truth 
exists" (p. 70). Since Hegel himself admits "the term system is often 
misunderstood" and since his usage of this term is central to his 
education of consciousness, it is appropriate at this point to refer 
to Hegel's Logic for an explanation of what he intends by this term: 
The same evolution of thought which is exhibited in the 
history of philosophy is presented in the System of 
Philosophy itself. Here, instead of surveying the 
process, as we do in history frcm the outside, we see 
the movement of thought clearly defined in its native 
medium. The thought, which is genuine and self-
supporting, must be intrinsically concrete; it must be 
an Idea; and when it is viewed in the whole of its 
universality, it is the Idea, or the Absolute. The 
science of this Idea must form a system. For the truth 
is concrete; that is, while it gives a bond and principle 
of unity, it also possesses an internal source of 
development. Truth, then, is only possible as a universe 
or totality of thought; and the freedom of the whole as 
well as the necessity of the several subdivisions, which 
it implies, are only possible when these are discriminated 
and defined. (1827/1973, p. 20) 
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Hegel (1827/1973) confirms the necessity of a system by indicating that 
"'unsystematic philosophizing can only be expected to give expression to 
personal peculiarities of mind, and has no principle for the regulation 
of its contents" (p. 20). Hegel adds that unless the "interdependence 
and organic union" are given for truth, the "truths of philosophy are 
valueless, and must then be treated as baseless hypotheses, or personal 
convictions" (p. 20). Hegel's purpose then in "providing a systematic 
exposition of philosophy" is to make knowledge actual: 
Ob help bring philosophy nearer to the form of science—that 
goal where it can lay aside the name of love of knowledge and 
the actual knowledge—that is what I have set before me. The 
inner necessity that knowledge should be science lies in its 
very nature? and the adequate and sufficient explanation for 
this lies simply and solely in the systematic exposition of 
philosophy. (1807/1931, p. 70) 
Efegel (1807/1931) elaborates on the concept of truth as being the whole: 
The truth is the whole. The whole, however, is merely the 
essential nature reaching its completeness through the process 
of its own development. Of the Absolute it must be said that 
it is essentially a result, that only at the end is it what it 
is in very truth; and just in that consists its nature, which is 
to be actual, subject, or self-becoming, self-development, 
(pp., 81-82) 
Hegel cautions that "we misconceive therefore the nature of reason if 
we exclude the reflection or mediation frcm ultimate truth" (p. 82), 
fox "reason is purposive activity" (p. 83). Hegel's purpose 
therefore centers on the activity of consciousness in experience, of 
working out the purpose of Spirit: 
For the real subject-matter is not exhausted in its purpose, 
but in working the matter out; nor is the mere result attained 
in the concrete whole itself, but the result along with the 
process of arriving at it. ((1807/1931, p. 69) 
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Thus "reason is purposive activity" and the "realized purpose, or 
concrete actuality, is movement and development unfolded" (p. 83). 
The unity of inner and outer, of subject and object, of essence and 
form, connotes an organic unity contained within truth and presented 
in Speculative Philosophy: 
What mind prepares for itself in the course of its 
phenomenology is the element of true knowledge. In this 
element the itonents of mind are new set out in the form 
of thought pure and simple, which knows its object to be 
itself. They no longer involve the opposition between 
being and knowing; they remain within the undivided 
simplicity of the knowing function; they are the truth in 
the form of truth, and their diversity is merely diversity 
of the contents of truth. The process by which they are 
developed into an organic connected whole is Logic or 
Speculative Philosophy. (1807/1931, p. 97) 
Hegel's purpose becomes one in this new age of spiritual cultivation 
of assisting consciousness in its liberation so that what is implicit 
as spirit is explicit as concrete actuality. Hegel's concern is 
centered on the individual's act of knowing, for it is his conviction 
that what is implicit for humanity within the ertibryo will not beccme 
explicit until there is development of purposive activity or reason 
within mankind: 
While the embryo is certainly, in itself, implicitly a 
human being, it is not so explicitly, it is not by 
itself a human being? man is explicitly man 
only in the form of developed and cultivated reason, 
which has made itself to be what it is implicitly. 
(1807/1931, p. 83) 
Hegel's observation becomes profound in its implications. It suggests 
that having the form of a human does not insure the attainment of 
being human, as noted in Freire's assessment of dehumanization in both 
oppressor and oppressed alike. Hegel makes clear that the embryo "is 
not by itself a human being" and suggests further that education is 
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needed for this phenomenon of being ftally human. Freire notes that 
the oppressed cannot liberate themselves because they have not been 
allowed to develop critical thought. The narrative education in 
operation within schools as a traditional procedure fails to foster 
the development of the critical or reflective thought that in turn 
inspires action to transform. Yet when Hegel speaks of the birth of 
the new spiritual age that has broken "with the old ways of thinking" 
(p. 75), he does so within the context of change, of letting these old 
ways "sink into the depths of the past" and of allowing the mind to 
"set about its own transformation" (p. 75). Hegel (1807/1931) also 
notes that the individual is not fully human until that which is 
implicit is made explicit "in the form of developed and cultivated 
reason, which has made itself to be what it is implicitly" (p. 83). 
Hegel is clearly conveying liberation from limitations, for his reason 
is "purposive activity" or critical and reflective thought on what is 
perceived as reality. Hegel's purpose is then akin to Freire's 
purpose concerning the act of knowing, an observation that is further 
substantiated by Hegel's (1807/1931) acknowledgement of the mind's 
potential to create its own kingdom: 
Mind, which, when thus developed, knows itself to be 
mind, is science. Science is its realization and the 
kingdom it sets up for itself is its own native 
element, (p. 86) 
Hegel thus sets forth in his science or system of philosophy to 
realize his goal of making knowledge actual by revealing the many 
stages of consciousness that.lead the mind into full development, 
into self-becoming. Hegel's assertion that "the kingdom it sets up 
for itself is its own native element" speaks of empowerment, of 
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control, and of fullness of being as only a kingdom can; at the same 
time, Hegel reveals that this kingdom is mind's "native element," thus 
making clear that the potentiality for such a kingdom can be developed 
into explicit form through the "developed and cultivated reason" 
(p. 83) or through educating consciousness to gain insight into the act 
of knowing. Hegel's education of consciousness for liberation into 
fullness of being speaks of a new birth of humanity. The nature of 
this reality is Spirit and the means of working out the purpose is the 
dialectic. 
Spirit as Reality 
Any understanding of what Hegel means by the concept of Spirit is 
better attempted in the context of the following explanation Hegel 
(1807/1931) offers of Spirit: 
Spirit is alone Reality. It is the inner being of the world, 
that which essentially is and is per se; it assumes objective, 
determinate form, and enters into relations with itself—it is 
externality (otherness), and exists for self; yet, in this 
determination, and in its otherness, it is still one with itself— 
it is self-contained and self-complete in itself and for itself at 
once. This self-containedness, however, is first something known 
by us, it is implicit in its nature; it is Substance spiritual . 
It has to became self-contained for itself, on its own account; it 
must be knowledge of spirit, and must be conscious of itself as 
spirit, This means, it must straightway annul and transcend this 
objective form; it must be its own object in which it finds 
itself reflected, (p. 86) 
Spirit as "reality" and the "inner being of the world" becomes 
clear in noting briefly the evolvement of Spirit within the world and 
within minds of humanity. At first Spirit is implicit and exists as 
the Universal Soul which contains the latent ideality of nature. 
The Soul is not at this point individual but transccmpasses all of 
nature. It reflects back into itself. The whole sense of the 
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material or extended body of nature is to be the "other" of the Natural 
Soul. When natural or Universal Soul "bestirs itself" and reduces the 
natural environrrent of nature into qualitative difference, these 
differences reflect the difference existing in geographical climates 
and modes of a people; these differences eventually permeate 
individuals so that from these specific characteristics, Natural Soul 
eventually divides into individual souls. Within the individual souls 
is a sensibility in which feelings or emotions are felt within the 
individual and without. Sensations are experienced within, as rage 
in the breast or as a pain within the head, as well as the physical 
sensations are felt on the surface of the body. This stage is the 
Feeling Soul that feels. The significant development is that the 
Feeling Soul through habit reduces these sensations within and without 
so that the tody is no longer a material that houses the soul; the 
body becomes a "sign" of the soul (Hegel, 1827/1894, p. 194) . It is 
at this point that the ego can move into consciousness and distinguish 
itself from its environment in which it has been irrmersed. It is only 
by distinguishing itself from its natural life that the ego gains 
consciousness of itself; at the same time, however, the ego no longer 
perceives its natural life as being part of it. It consequently looks 
upon the environnent or the natural substance as a foreign or alien 
opposition, as its other. When the ego moves into awareness of self 
and gains self-consciousness, Spirit can enter into a dialectical 
relationship for fuller expression. The dialectic then provides for 
Spirit to became actual in both object and subject, to become concrete 
through experiences of humankind. It is in this manner, then that 
Spirit is the "inner being" of the world but assumes "objective, 
determinate form" and becaties actual. (Hegel, 1827/1894, pp. 167-195). 
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Hegel gives an explanation in the History of Philosophy that is 
helpful in determining the nature of Spirit: 
The nature of spirit may be understood by a glance at its 
direct opposite, matter. As the essence of matter is 
gravity, so on the other hand we may affirm that the 
substance, the essence of spirit is freedom. All will 
readily assent to the doctrine that spirit, among other 
properties, is also endowed with freedom; but philosophy 
teaches that all the qualities of spirit exist only 
through freedom; that all are but means for attaining 
freedom; that all seek and produce this and this alone. 
It is a result of speculative philosophy, that freedom. 
(1952, p. 160) 
Spirit then tends toward freedom as naturally as matter moves toward 
gravity. The evolvement of humankind in the purposive activity of 
spirit also suggests a corresponding evolvement of freedom to be 
human: 
Matter possesses gravity in virtue of its tendency toward 
a central point. It is essentially composite; consisting 
of parts that exclude each other. It seeks its unity; and 
therefore exhibits itself as self-destructive, as verging 
toward its opposite. If it could attain this, it would 
be matter no longer, it would have perished. It strives 
after the realization of its idea; for in unity it exists— 
ideally. Spirit on the contrary may be defined as that 
which has its center in itself. It has not a unity outside 
itself, but has already found it; it exists in and with 
itself. Matter has its essence out of itself; spirit is 
self-contained existence. Now this is freedom, exactly. 
(1952, p. 160) 
Hegel then relates this freedom to the individual in freedom of 
independence, of not relying on others or of not being placed in a 
dependent position: 
For if I am dependent, my being is referred to something 
else which I am not; I cannot exist independently of 
something external. I am free, on the contrary, when my 
existence depends upon myself. This self-contained 
existence of spirit is none other than self-consciousness, 
consciousness of one's own being. (1952, p. 160) 
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Hegel then refers this freedcm made explicit in self-consciousness to 
the act of knowing: 
Two things must be distinguished in consciousness: first 
the fact that I know; secondly, what I know. In self-
consciousness , these are merged in one; for spirit knows 
itself. It involves an appreciation of its own nature, as 
also an energy enabling it to realize itself; to make 
itself actually that which it is potentially. (1952, p. 161) 
Thus Spirit makes itself concrete through the experiences of 
consciousness. Through its movement frcm subject to object and back 
to subject, it releases its potential and consciousness transcends to 
higher modes of thought. A reference to Hegel's thoughts on freedcm 
contained in his Logic adds support to this act of knowing and 
reveals consciousness as unified in thought and in freedom: 
The mind is then in its own hcme-element and therefore 
free; for freedcm means that the other thing with 
which you deal is a second self—so that you never leave 
your own ground but give the law to yourself. In the 
impulses or appetites the beginning is from something 
else, frcm something else which is not ourselves. The 
natural man, whose motions follow the male only of his 
appetites, is not his own master. Be he as self-
willed as he may, the constituents of his will and 
opinion are not his own, and his freedom is merely formal. 
But when we think, we renounce our selfish and particular 
being, sink ourselves in the thing, allow thought to 
follow its own course, and if we add anything of our own, 
we think ill. (1827/1973, p. 39 Zusatz 24) 
Dialectic 
Hegel perceives the dialectic as the force of all movement, for 
"wherever there is life, wherever anything is carried into effect in 
the actual world, the Dialectic is at work." Furthermore, the 
"dialectical principle ccnstitutes the life and soul of scientific 
progress, the dynamic alone gives inmanent connection and necessity 
to the body of science... and in a word, is seen to constitute the 
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real and true" in thought. Hegel maintains that "thought in its nature 
is dialectical" for when the "mind or spirit" is "sentient or 
perceptive" it finds its object in sanething sensuous. When the mind 
or spirit "imagines," the object is in a "picture or image." When the 
individual "wills," the object is in the "aim." In dialectical thought, 
however, when consciousness transcends itself, the mind seeks 
semething higher: 
But in contrast to, or it may be only in distinction from 
these forms of its existence and of its objects, the mind 
has also to gratify the cravings of its highest and most 
inward life. That innermost self is thought. Thus the 
mind renders thought its object. In the best meaning of 
the phrase, it comes to itself; for thought is its 
principle, and its very unadulterated self. (1827/1973, 
p. 15) 
Hegel asserts that experience is the beginning of thought, for 
"everything that emerges in conscious intelligence and in reason has 
its source and origin in sensation; for source and origin just means 
the first immediate manner in which a thing appears" (1827/1893, 
p. 176). The concept of the other begins then when the Actual Soul 
becomes aware of its surroundings and of itself as separate from 
these surroundings. It is the nature of the surroundings as objects 
that "moves the ego into consciousness": 
The pure abstract freedom of mind lets go from it its 
specific qualities,—The soul's natural life—to equate 
freedom as an independent object.—It is of this latter, 
as external to it, that the ego is in the first instance 
aware (conscious), and as such it is Consciousness. 
(1827/1893, p. 196) 
There is then the concept of the "other" rising frcsm what was formerly 
a part but which is now viewed as separate, as "something dark and 
beyond it" (p. 196); but there remains a reciprocity between subject 
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and object that is present in all stages of consciousness: 
Hence consciousness, like reciprocal dependence in general, 
is the contradiction between the independence of the two 
sides and their identity in which they are merged into one. 
(1827/1893, p. 196) 
The concept of the "other" requires an explanation of the relationship 
between the "other" and the concept of negation. In the concept of 
negativity, when the ego abstracts itself frcm its environment, is 
also contained the concept of infinity. Negation and infinity are 
central to the dynamics of the dialectic. Negation begins with Being 
since "mere Being as it is mere abstraction is therefore the 
absolutely negative... Nothing" (Hegel, 1827/1973, p. 128). In 
an inability to keep apart Being from Nothing and Nothing from Being, 
there evolves in the middle the state of Becoming so that "becoming 
is the first concrete thought and therefore the first notion" (p. 132). 
The result of this process "is not an empty Nothing but Being 
identical with the negation—what we call Being Determinate (being 
then and there): the primary import of which evident is that it 
has become" (1827/1973, p. 134). Negation then extends to the 
determinate being that establishes boundaries so that it can be 
distinguished from its surroundings. It therefore determines its 
existence as separate from the surroundings it has excluded. It 
is in this type of being, in space or having a place as here-and-
then, that negation is no longer abstract but is equally determined: 
Quality, as determinateness which is, as contrasted with 
the Negation which is involved in it but distinguished 
from it, is Reality. Negation is no longer an abstract 
nothing, but, as a determinate being and somewhat, is 
only a form of such being—it is as Otherness. (1827/1973, 
p. 135) 
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There develops then a being-by-self and a being-for-another. 
Hegel (1827/1973) points out that the "quality is Being-for-another" 
in that the limit has determined the self and the other as excluded 
from it. Being-by-self is determinate being in contrast with the 
other. It becomes clear that when the being is "implicitly made a 
negation, it is a Limit, a Barrier" (p. 136). It is seen that the 
"otherness is not something indifferent and outside it but a 
function proper to it" (p. 136). What is desired is the state of 
being-for-self. This state occurs through the dialectic when the 
being and its other, negate the original negation. In this concept 
of unity there is also participation in infinity. Hegel (1827/1973) 
proclaims that to reach one barrier and find another barrier arising 
is the infinity that is false. It is merely the "ought-to-be 
eliminated" infinity. The true infinity that Hegel perceives is 
contained in the dialectic and needs inclusion here. In this 
negating the limit and in recognizing its Other and in the Other's 
eliminating its barrier and recognizing its other, the movement of 
the dialectic releases infinity so that spirit is actualized and the 
desired state of being-for-self occurs: 
What we now, in point of fact have before us, is that 
scraewhat canes to be an other, and that the other 
generally cones to be an other. Thus essentially 
relatives to another, somewhat is virtually an other 
against it: and since what is passed into is quite the 
same as what passes over, since both have one and the 
same attribute, viz. to be an other, it follows that 
something in its passage into other only joins with 
itself. To be thus self-related in the passage, and in 
the other, is the genuine Infinity. Or, under a 
negative aspect: what is altered is the other, it beccmes 
the other of the other. Thus Being, but as negation of 
the same negation, is restored again: it is now Being-
for-self. (p. 139) 
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What must also be included in this explanation for its simplicity of 
expression and depth of meaning occurs in the Zustaz, that true 
infinity "consists of being at hone with itself in its other, or, if 
enunciated as a process, in ccming to itself in its other" (1827/1973, 
p. 137, Zustaz 94). One more reference is needed to develop this 
dialectical process, that of the ideality of reality. Hegel 
(1827/1973) reveals that being-for-another, which is reality or 
exclusion of the barrier distinguishing one from another, in 
interaction with being-by-self or the self as distinguished from the 
other, becomes being-for-self which constitutes the implicit ideality 
as an explicit reality: 
In Being-for-self enters the category of Ideality. 
Being-there-and-then, as in the first instance apprehended 
in its being or affirmation, has reality; and thus even 
finitude in the first instance is in the category of reality. 
But the truth of the finite is rather its ideality, (p. 140) 
Hegel is thus indicating that "when reality is explicitly put as what 
it implicitly is, it is at once seen to be ideality" (p. 141). 
Hegel's education for consciousness in working out the purpose of 
Spirit through moving into a progression for forms is to reach 
awareness that the "notion of ideality just lies in its being the 
truth of reality" (1827/1973, p. 141, Zustaz 96). Truth as "the 
essential nature reaching its completion through the process of its 
own development" (1807/1931, p. 82) beccmes the force in the 
movement of the dialectical thought processes. It is thus the 
dialectic that works out the purpose of Spirit and in moving frcm 
one mode of consciousness to an always higher one, the dialectic 
carries with it a fuller expression of Spirit in actual form. 
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Dialectic of Sense-Consciousness 
Since all thought originates in sense experiences, the beginning 
of dialectical thought is contained in the dialectic of sense-
consciousness; moreover, this dialectic serves to illustrate the 
dynamics of the dialectic with clarity, especially in this study which 
seeks to reveal the relevancy of Hegel's insight to the liberation of 
consciousness. Hegel (1827/1893) maintains that all consciousness 
seeks certainty of self: "The aim of conscious mind is to make its 
appearance identical with its essence, to raise its self-certainty to 
truth" (p. 197). In sense-consciousness truth seems most certain in 
appearance of the concrete. Hegel (1807/1931) notes that sense 
awareness of an object, of a concrete material, appears to be the 
"richest kind of knowledge" and "seems to be the truest, the most 
authentic knowledge" (p. 149). Hegel (1807/1931) reveals, however, 
that "this bare fact of certainty" is "really and admittedly the 
abstractest and poorest kind of truth" (p. 149). Ml that can be 
said of sense experience is that "it is" (p. 150). The implicit 
truth surfaces when the sense-experience is the object of reflection. 
Hegel makes his point by showing the universality of the "I" and the 
"this" or the "here" of the object. The self finds certainty of 
truth in the object only in the evanescent moment of pointing out. 
Any attempt to say what the object is moves the particular "self" 
and the particular "object" into the universal. Language is the 
nvsans that reduces this certainty, for it is impossible to say what 
is intended. The "I" that exists and the "here" of the object change 
into something else, into another "I" that sees and another "here" 
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that exists. Hegel (1807/1931) says that language has the "divine 
nature of directly turning the mere 'meaning' right round about it, 
making it into something else": 
They "mean" this bit of paper I am writing on, or rather have 
written on: but they do not say what they "mean." If they 
really wanted to say.. .so, that is impossible, because the 
This of sense which is "meant", cannot be reached by language, 
which belongs to consciousness, i.e. to what is inherently 
universal, (p. 159) 
Negation is involved in this process in that the "here" is a "not here" 
and the "I" is a "not I." Thus the particular passes into the universal: 
By saying "this Here," "this Now," or "an individual thing," I 
say all Thises, heres, nows, or Individuals. In the same way when 
I say "I," "this individual I," I say quite generally "all I's," 
everyone is what I say, every one is "I," "this individual I." 
(p. 154) 
Thus in the dialectic of sense-consciousness, the self perceives the 
first object but in looking again, the object has changed. The self 
reflects on this negativity of what constitutes the original perception 
and in this reflection on the negativity of what exists no longer, a 
new mode of thought occurs. It is this movement of the consciousness 
from its false perception into the creation of a second object of 
truth that contains or offers the tremendous possibility for creativity 
within consciousness. To include this explanation of the dialectic 
serves as a model for the dialectic occurring in the other modes of 
thought arising in the progression of consciousness through the 
phenomena of the mind, a progression of working out the purpose of 
Spirit and thus reaching evolving levels of consciousness. In this 
dialectical process the individual consciousness moves from a state 
of "passive indifference," which accepts what is given or told, into 
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the state of "purposive activity" by which the individual consciousness 
makes explicit the irtplicit spirit in this higher mode of consciousness. 
Hegel (1807/1931) says that in this state the individual will became 
conscious of his or her own consciousness: 
For consciousness is, on the one hand, consciousness of 
the consciousness of the object, on the other, consciousness 
of consciousness of itself: consciousness of what to it is 
true, and consciousness of its knowledge of the truth. 
(p. 141) 
When consciousness discovers that the first object is also what it 
is not in appearance and that consciousness of the object is also 
another consciousness, one of experience of the first object, then 
consciousness recognizes the universality contained in this mediation. 
The negativity that drives consciousness back into itself to reflect 
on the deception of this first object produces an anguish over the 
destruction of what consciousness thought to be true; but, out of this 
movement, the mind seeks another connection and a new object is born: 
But in the alternation of the knowledge, the object itself 
also, in point of fact, is altered; for the knowledge which 
existed was essentially a knowledge of the object; with 
change in the knowledge, the object also becomes different 
since it belonged essentially to this knowledge, (p. 142) 
The question arises of how the truth of this perception is to be 
discerned. Hegel (1807/1931) confirms that usually the truth of an 
object is measured by another external object, but "consciousness 
furnishes its own criterion in itself and the inquiry will thereby 
be a comparison of itself with its own self": 
In consciousness there is one element for an other, or, 
in general, consciousness implicates the specific character 
of the moment of knowledge. At the same tine this "other" 
is to consciousness not merely for it, but also outside this 
relation, or has a being in itself, i.e. there is the moment 
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of truth. Thus in what consciousness inside itself declares 
to be the essence or truth we have the standard which itself 
sets up, and by which we are to measure its knowledge, (p. 140) 
Hegel points out that consciousness is involved in the process and is 
unable to acquire a distance from the process in order to test its 
validity: 
Since both are for the same consciousness, it is itself 
their canparison; it is the same consciousness that 
decides and knows whether its knowledge of the object 
corresponds with this object or not. The object, it is 
true, appears only to be in such wise for consciousness as 
consciousness knows it. Consciousness does not seem able 
to get, so to say, behind it as it is, not for 
consciousness, but in itself, and consequently seems also 
unable to test knowledge by it. (1807/1931, p. 141) 
Hegel's further explanation becomes essential to understanding the 
relation of object and consciousness: 
Should both, when thus compared, not correspond, 
consciousness seems bound to alter its knowledge, in 
order to make it fit the object. But in the 
alteration of the Knowledge, the object itself also, 
in point of fact, is altered: for the knowledge which 
existed was essentially a knowledge of the object; 
with change in the knowledge, the object also becomes 
different, since it belonged essentially to this 
knowledge. (1807/1931, p. 142) 
Hegel concludes his explanation with an observation of the truth of 
the two objects and the experience of those objects: 
Consciousness knows something; this something is the 
essence or what is per se. This object, however, is 
also the per se, the inherent reality, for consciousness. 
Hence comes ambiguity of this truth. Consciousness, as 
we see, has now two objects: one is the first per se, the 
second is the existence for consciousness of this per se.... 
Consequently, then, what this real per se is for 
consciousness is truth: which, however, means that this is 
the essential reality, or the object which consciousness 
has. This new object contains the nothingness of the 
first; the new object is the experience concerning that 
first object. (1807/1931, pp. 142-143) 
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There are several observations that Hegel makes concerning this new 
object that occurs in the dialectical process. For one consideration, 
the participant is unaware of the process; it is the observer who 
perceives a "coming into being." For a second consideration, "the new 
object is seen to have cone about by a transformation or conversion of 
consciousness itself" (p. 143). It is true that "this way of looking at 
the matter" is the observer's contribution, for this awareness does not 
exist "for the consciousness we contemplate and consider" (p. 143). 
What is revelatory in this second consideration is the concept contained 
within the dialectic, for in the result of the negation is contained 
"what truth the preceding mode of knowledge has in it": 
...since what at first appeared as object is reduced, when it 
passes into consciousness, to what knowledge takes it to be, 
and the implicit nature, the reality itself, becomes what this 
entity per se is for consciousness; this latter is the new object, 
whereupon there appears also a new mode or embodiment of 
consciousness, of which the essence is something other than that 
of the preceding mode. (1807/1931, p. 144) 
Hegel affirms that "it is this circumstance which carries forward the 
whole succession of the modes or attitudes of consciousness in their 
own necessity": 
It is only this necessity, this origination of the new object-
which offers itself to consciousness without consciousness knowing 
how it cotes by it- that to us, who watch the process, is to be 
seen going on, so to say, behind its back. Thereby there enters 
into its process a moment of being per se or of being for us, 
which is not expressly presented to that consciousness which is in 
the grip of experience itself. The content, however, of what we 
see arising, exists for it, and we lay hold of and comprehend 
merely its formal character, i.e. its bare origination; for it, 
what has thus arisen has merely the character of object, while, for 
us, it appears at the same time as a process and caning into being. 
(1807/1931, p. 144) 
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In this rudimentary or elementary experience of sense-consciousness, 
that of perceiving an object, there appears not only the power of the 
dialectic to transform both consciousness and its object but also the 
microcosmic view of the progression of Spirit working out its purpose. 
This end result of the dialectical movement of consciousness, "pressing 
forward to its true form of existence," will be seen when consciousness 
reaches absolute knowing: 
In pressing forward to its true form of existence, consciousness 
will corns to a point at which it lays aside its semblance of being 
hampered with what is foreign to it, with what is only for it and 
exists as an other; it will reach a position where appearance 
becomes identified with essence, where, in consequence, its 
exposition coincides with just this very point, this very stage of 
the science proper of mind. And, finally, when it grasps this its 
own essence, it will connote the nature of absolute knowledge 
itself. (1807/1931, p. 145) 
It is necessary to refer once again to Freire's belief in the 
human's ability to create and recreate situation and self (1970/1984) 
and to refer as well to Hegel's concept of the "kingdom" that is mind's 
"own native element" and to the mind's "putting away old ways of 
thinking" to transcend and to make "transformation" (1807/1931, p. 86, 
p. 75). In the dialectic, central to both Hegel and Freire for the 
liberation of consciousness, is contained the means by which the 
potentiality can become more fully human: 
Consciousness, however, is to itself its own notion; thereby it 
immediately transcends what is limited, and since this latter 
belongs to it, consciousness transcends its own self. (1807/1931, 
p. 138) 
In working the purpose out, consciousness transcends into "new 
modes of thought" so that the creativity extends to both consciousness 
and objects; alteration of knowledge brings alteration of object. 
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Moreover, the "what this real per se is for consciousness is truth" 
or spirit implicit made actual. Not only does Hegel indicate that 
consciousness transcends but that a "new object is seen to have cane 
about by a transformation" as well. Although Freire speaks of 
acting upon a situation to create it, Hegel supplies the source for 
the vision .of truth in this acting although the origin of this vision 
is not apparent to the consciousness involved. It is a process that 
is going on in consciousness "behind its back." Such a phrase 
suggests the "Subliminal door" of which William James speaks as the 
means by which higher powers or forces have access to human 
consciousness: 
The hubbub of the waking life might close a door which, 
in the dreamy Subliminal might remain ajar or open.... 
If there be higher powers able to impress us, they get 
access to us only through the subliminal door. (James, 
1936, p. 198) 
James's concept parallels what occurs in the second object 
through the process of the dialectic. James Macdonald, in 
Curriculum offers a similar metaphor in conveying how sources not 
"explicable" might enter consciousness: 
The "back door" or "front door" of human being... 
must be unlocked and left ajar.... The process draws 
its power and energy from sources that are not 
completely explicable. ( 1978, p. 113) 
Added to this discussion to the formation of a new object in conscious 
and the transcendence of conscious in this dialectical process is 
Hegel's reference to the "infinite treasure" that contains the 
individual's world, cultivated during the time of the Feeling Soul. 
Hegel (1827/1893) maintains that "the ego is one and unccanpounded, a 
deep featureless characterless mine" where treasures are "stored up, 
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without existing" or -without being in consciousness (p. 179). Hegel 
adds that all that is contained within, as "sensations, ideas, 
acquired lore, and-thoughts" constitute the individual's world, that 
they belong to the individual's "implicit self" and that "the 
individual always retains this single-souled inner life" (pp. 179-180). 
Hegel is here referring to the recollection which holds the phenomena 
or the "wealth of by-gone days" and which is involved in the process 
of the dialectic- Ihe dialectic transcends but also preserves that 
which is transcended in recollection. This recollection reaches back 
to the age of the Feeling Soul and awaits intelligence qua 
intelligence to create from it. This "intelligence qua intelligence 
shows the potential earring to free existence in its development, and 
yet at the sane time collecting itself in its inwardness" (Hegel, 
1827/1894, p. 215). Hegel adds this "qua intelligence is the subject 
and the potentiality of its own specialisation" (p. 215) and is a part 
of the deeper consciousness level involved in the dialectic: 
Hence from the other point of view intelligence is to be 
conceived as this sub-conscious mine, i.e. as the existent 
universal in which the difference has not yet been realised 
in its separations. And it is indeed this potentiality which 
is the first form of universality offered in mental 
representation. (Hegel, 1827/1894, pp. 215-216) 
Since reality is Spirit, then the phenomena inwardised and 
recollected offer unlimited possibilities of expression and 
creation to the individual who experiences the creative force of the 
dialectic and undergoes the progression of forms that constitute 
the education of Spirit in past ages. The dialectic is then the 
dynamic force of movement that enables consciousness to transcend 
limitation through making that which is implicit in Spirit a reality 
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in explicit form. 
What has been, revealed within the dialectic of sense-conscious­
ness is only the beginning of liberation into consciousness, for 
"knowing as it is found at the start, mind in its immediate and 
primitive stage, without the essential nature of mind, is sense-
oonsciousness." For true knowledge to occur, Hegel (1807/1931) 
maintains a long journey of consciousness must be undertaken: 
To reach the stage of genuine knowledge or produce the 
element where science is found,—the pure conception of 
science itself—a long and laborious journey must be 
taken, (p. 88) 
Furthermore, this experience of the journey in that "consciousness 
knows and comprehends nothing but what falls within its experience; 
for what is experience is merely spiritual substance and moreover 
object of its self" (p. 96). Hegel reveals that the two aspects of 
conscious life, "cognition and objectivity which is opposed to or 
negative of the subjective function of knowing," occur at each stage 
in the evolution of mind (p. 96). Thus the "pathway" to be 
undertaken is the "conscious insight into the untruth of phenomenal 
knowledge, for that which is not real" is "only the unrealized 
nothing" (p. 136) . Therefore, the journey is the "actual carrying 
out of that process of development" (p. 135). One more reference to 
the road to truth as a way of educating consciousness needs 
inclusion: 
The series of shapes, which consciousness traverses on 
this road is rather the detailed history of the process of 
training and educating consciousness itself up to the 
level of science. (Hegel, 1807/1931, p. 136) 
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Hegel further maintains that on this journey "the exposition of untrue 
consciousness in its untruth is not a merely negative process" but is 
a "determinate negation," in which '-'a new form has thereby 
iirmediately arisen, "for in the negation the transition is made by 
which the progress through the complete succession of forms comes 
about of itself" (p. 137). The goal of this journey is as "fixed for 
knowledge" as is the "succession in the process" (p. 137). 
Furthermore, this journey is an ongoing process until "knowledge is 
no longer compelled to go beyond itself" but finds "the notion 
corresponds to the object, and the object to the notion" (p. 138). 
Although there are many stages on this journey, there are three 
divisions: consciousness, self-consciousness, and universal self-
consciousness. The second level of self-consciousness brings in the 
appearance of spirit. 
Dialectic of Self-Consciousness 
Hegel reveals the progress of consciousness to self-
consciousness as one of discovering the self to be reality: 
What the object iirmediately was in itself—whether mere 
being in sense-certainty, a concrete thing in perception, 
or a force in the case of understanding—it turns out in 
truth not to be this reality; but instead, this inherent 
nature (Ansich) proves to be a way it is for an other. 
(1807/1931, p. 218) 
The state of the consciousness that knows the reality of self 
is one of desire at first, for "convinced of the nothingness of this 
other, it definitely affirms this nothing to be for itself the truth 
of this other." Self-consciousness then "negates the independent 
object, and thereby acquires certainty of self, as true certainty, a 
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certainty which it has become aware of in objective form" (1807/1931, 
p. 225). 
Since the object is for the ego, then self-consciousness is 
appetitive and assures the certainty of self by consuming the object 
which offers no resistance. Hegel notes in The Philosophy of Mind 
(1827/1894) this "appetite in its satisfaction is always destructive 
and in its content selfish" (p. 210). As soon as the object is 
consumed, "the appetite is again generated in the very act of 
satisfaction" (1827/1894, p. 202). 
Hegel can therefore declare that "self-consciousness attains 
its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness" (1807/1931, p. 
226). In this encounter with another self-consciousness, there is not 
an object to be consulted but another ego: 
A self-consciousness has before it a self-consciousness. 
Only so and only then is it self-consciousness in actual 
fact; for here first of all it comes to have the unity of 
itself in its otherness. Ego which is the object of its 
notion, is in point of fact not "object." The object of 
desire, however, is only independent, for it is the 
universal, ineradicable substance, the fluent self-
identical essential reality. When a self-consciousness 
is the object, the object is just as much ego as object. 
(1807/1931, p. 227) 
Hegel considers this encounter with another self-consciousness a 
"turning point" in the development of consciousness, for it is here 
that Spirit is most noted: 
Consciousness first finds in self-consciousness—the notion 
of mind—its turning point, where it leaves the parti­
coloured show of the sensuous immediate, passes frcm the 
dark void of the transcendent and remote super-sensuous, and 
steps into the spiritual daylight of the present. (1807/1931, 
p. 227) 
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It is to be observed that there could never be a movement into 
the other for the experience of true infinity as long as self-
csonsciousness stays on the appetitive level. The object of the 
appetitive level is incapable of negating itself so that consequently 
the certainty of self, momentarily assured, rises in appetitive desire 
again. Humanity at this stage is a slave to the appetites. In the 
dialectic of one self-consciousness with another self-consciousness, 
the object as ego with its own desire for self-certainty cannot be 
consumed. The promise here is that there can be the negation of 
different consequences in that the object can negate itself for its 
other. What both self-consciousnesses desire is recognition of self, 
a mutual recognition that can only occur within the dialectic when 
object consciousnesses negate themselves for the other. What occurs, 
however, is a life-death struggle with either the loss of life or 
uneven results: 
The relation of both self-consciousnesses is in the way 
so constituted that they prove themselves and each other 
through a life-and-death struggle. They must enter into 
this struggle, for they must bring their certainty of 
themselves, the certainty of being for themselves, to the 
level of objective truth and make this a fact both in the 
case of the other and in their own case as well. (Hegel, 
1807/1931, pp. 232-233) 
In this even struggle there is risk of life or uneven results. 
Hegel (1807/1931) clarifies the necessity of risk, a necessity that 
Freire as well notes as essential for true liberation to occur. 
Freire acknowledges the risk but maintains that freedom involves such 
a risk. Hegel makes a similar observation: 
And it is solely by risking life that freedom is 
obtained; only thus is it tried and proved that the 
essential nature of self-consciousness is not bare 
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existence, is not the merely inmediate form in which it at 
first makes its appearance, is not its mere absorption in 
the expanse of life... . The individual, who has not staked 
his life, may, no doubt, be recognized as a Person; but he 
has not attained the truth of this recognition as an 
independent self-consciousness. (Hegel, 1807/1931, p. 233) 
There can be no certainty of self issuing from a "trial by 
death" and no certainty of truth in the "truth which was to result 
from it" as being within the self. Hegel (1807/1931) notes that 
"death is the natural 'negation' of consciousness" (p. 233). What 
is needed in this confrontation is a negation that "preserves and 
maintains what is sublated, and thereby survives its being sublated" 
(p. 234). What occurs, however, is an uneven result, that of master 
and slave: 
But because life is as requisite as liberty to the 
solution, the fight ends in the first instance as a 
one-sided negation with inequality. While the one 
combatant prefers life, retains his single self-
consciousness, but surrenders his claim for recognition, 
the other holds fast to his self-assertion and is 
recognized by the former as his superior. Thus arises 
the status of master and slave. (1827/1893, p. 203) 
Hegel perceives in this metaphor the master as the consciousness that 
"exists for itself." The slave is held in economic bondage to the 
master and the "master relates himself to the bondsman mediately 
through independent existence, for that is precisely what keeps the 
bondsman in thrall": 
It is as well his chain, frcm which he could not in the 
struggle get away, and for that reason he proved himself 
to be dependent, to have his independence in the shape 
of thinghood. (1807/1931, p. 235) 
Hegel (1807/1931), in this powerful metaphor, conveys the oppressor-
oppressed concept that Freire upholds, for the "master... is the 
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power controlling this state of existence": 
Since he is the power dominating existence, which this existence 
again is the power controlling the other (the bondsman), the master 
holds, par consequence, the other in subordination. (1807/1931, 
p. 235) 
The master, however, "relates himself to the thing mediately 
through the bondsman" (Hegel, 1807/1931, p. 235). In this relationship, 
as in the oppressor-oppressed relationship, both master and bondsman 
are enslaved or dehumanized; neither is free. The oppressor possesses 
others and reduces them to objects; in dehumanizing others, the 
oppressor is dehumanized as well. Freire makes clear that there can be 
no oppressor unless there exists as well the oppressed. Hegel reveals 
the same reciprocal relationship in that the master appears to be 
independent but is in actuality dependent upon the bondsman: 
In all this, the unessential consciousness is for the master, the 
object which embodies the truth of his certainty of himself. But 
it is evident that this object does not correspond to its notion; 
for, just where the master has effectively achieved lordship, he 
really finds that something has ccme about quite different frcan 
an independent consciousness. It is not an independent, but rather 
a dependent consciousness that he has achieved.(Hegel, 1870/1931, 
pp. 236-237) 
Freire perceives the liberation from oppression for both oppressor and 
oppressed as occurring frcm the actions of the oppressed. It is they 
who must liberate themselves frcm dehumanization or enslavement and in 
so doing liberate the oppressors as well. The oppressed must find 
their own liberation and thus restore to the oppressors the humanity 
they have lost in assuming lordship over the oppressed. Hegel also 
perceives that it is not the master who perceives the limitations of 
the master-bondsman relationship. Thus it is the servant or bondsman 
who moves toward liberation from dependency on the master: 
This other, the slave, however, in the service of the master, 
works off his individualist self-will, overcomes the inner 
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imrtediacy of appetite, and in this divestment of self and 
in "the fear of his lord" makes "the beginning of wisdati"— 
the passage to universal self-consciousness. (Hegel, 1827/1894, 
p. 203) 
What the oppressed and what the bondsman are proving toward in their 
struggle for liberation from oppression is the state of mutual 
recognition, where there is no distinction characterized by master and 
slave so that "as the other is for it, so it is for the other" 
(Hegel, 1807/1931, p. 232). Such mutual recognition occurs on the 
level of universal self-consciousness. 
Universal Self-Consciousness 
On the level of universal self-consciousness the flow of being is 
manifested through the concrete manifestation of Spirit. That which 
is a potential within humankind becomes an actuality. The 
relationship of master-bondsman is replaced by mutual recognition so 
that there is "the affirmative awareness of self in an other self" 
(Hegel, 1827/1894, p. 204). The reciprocal relationship of ego and 
its other, that of implicit unity in what appears as a separation, is 
now a reality, an actuality. In universal self-consciousness there is 
true reciprocity of being: 
Each is thus universal self-consciousness and objective; 
each has "real" universality in the shape of reciprocity, 
so far as each knows itself recognized in the other freeman, 
and is aware of this in so far as it recognises the other 
and knows him to be free. (Hegel, 1827/1894, p. 204) 
On this level of being the solidarity which Freire maintains must 
exist for true liberation from oppression, for a true dialectical 
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creation and recreation of self and society, becomes in essence Hegel's 
caimunity of consciousness. Mutual recognition in this community 
results in freedom. Hegel asserts in The Philosophy of History (1952) 
that the evolvement of consciousness is also an evolvement of freedcm. 
He states, "For if I am dependent, irty being is referred to something 
else which I am not" (p. 160). There can be no freedom in a dependent 
relationship. Freedom lies in the development of consciousness, in 
the act of knowing that liberates individuals frcm oppression. Hegel 
defines this knowing as one of knowing and of knowing what is known: 
This self-contained existence of spirit is none other than 
self-consciousness, consciousness of one's own being. Two 
things must be distinguished in consciousness: first, the 
fact that I know; second, what I know. In self-consciousness 
these are merged in one; for spirit knows itself. It involves 
an appreciation of its own nature, as also an energy enabling 
it to relate itself; to make itself actually that which it is 
potentially. (Hegel, 1952, pp. 160-161) 
Hegel affirms that universal self-consciousness, "the notion which is 
aware of itself in its objectivity as a subjectivity identical with 
itself and for that reason universal," is the basis for community life 
and of freedom; universal self-consciousness is the basis of "all true 
mental or spiritual life—in family, fatherland, state, and of all 
virtues, love, friendship, valour, honour, fame" (Hegel, 1827/1894, 
p. 204). 
Although this study focuses on the individual's liberation into 
being more fully human and not on all that being human contains, as 
revealed on the level of self-consciousness, some reference is needed 
here to the flow of being that results in speech and action. On the 
level of universal self-consciousness there is still the necessity to 
make the union of subject and object actual, but here it is "strictly 
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only a nominal passage over into manifestation, and is even there a 
return into itself" (Hegel, 1827/1894, p. 207). There still exists, 
even on this level of knowing, the need to make knowledge real so that 
freedom is manifested: 
So as far as knowledge which has not shaken off its original 
quality of mere knowledge is only abstract or formal, the 
goal of mind is to give it objective fulfillment and thus 
at the same time produce its freedom. (Hegel, 1827/1894, 
p. 207) 
Intelligence unifies the feeling of the soul, that which Hegel calls 
"an inarticulate embryonic life" which has the "whole material of its 
knowledge" (1827/1894, p. 212), with consciousness of that feeling or 
intuition. Intelligence uses the feeling by attending to the parts 
and totality and by recollecting the material contained in the inner 
world or nucleus of sensitivity. Through this "intelligible unity" 
the energy that tumbles and pulsates out of tlie unconscious or the id, 
forces that Freud perceives as necessary to know and control for 
integration of being, now becomes, under the control and shaping of 
intelligence, the source of creation and imaginative reproduction, 
summoned at will and possessed and shaped: 
Intelligence, as it at first recollects the intuition, places 
the content of feeling in its own inwardness—in a space and 
time of its own. In this way that content is an image or 
picture, liberated from its original inmediacy and abstract 
singleness amongst otter things, and received into the 
universality of the ego. The image when thus kept in mind 
is no longer existent, but stored up out of consciousness. 
(Hegel, 1827/1894, p. 215) 
Intelligence becomes then a "sub-conscious mine, i.e. as the 
existent universal in which the different has not yet been realised 
in its separations" (1827/1894, p. 215). Hegel then reveals how this 
inner material of intelligence is manifested: 
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To grasp intelligence as this night-like mine or pit in which 
is stored a world of infinitely many images and 
representations, yet without being in consciousness, is from 
one point of view the universal postulate which bids us treat 
the notion as concrete in the way we treat e.g. the germ as 
affirmatively containing, in virtual possibility, all the 
qualities that comes into existence in the subsequent 
development of the tree. (1827/1894, p. 215) 
Hegel maintains that "intelligence is thus the force which can give 
forth its property and dispense with external intuition for its 
existence in it": 
The image, which in the mine of intelligence was only its 
property now that it has been endued with externality, becomes 
actually its possession. And so the image is at once rendered 
distinguishable frcm the intuition and separable frcm the 
blank night in which it was originally submerged. (Hegel, 
1827/1894, p. 216) 
Hegel further notes that "in this unity (initiated by intelligence) of 
an independent representation with intuition" (1827/1894, p. 210), 
the "intuition does not count positively or as representing itself, but 
as representative of something else": 
It is an image, which has received as its soul and meaning 
an independent mental representation. This intuition is 
the Sign. (Hegel, 1827/1894, p. 219) 
This sign becomes then the speech or language of the individual. No 
longer is there the irrational speech that Freud notes is an expression 
of the impulse of the id; there is now the unity of inner knowledge and 
outer expression: 
This institution of the natural is the vocal note, where the 
inward idea manifests itself in adequate utterance. The 
vocal note which receives further articulation to express 
specific ideas—speech and, its system, language—gives to 
sensations, intuition, conceptions, a second and higher 
existence in the ideational realm. (Hegel, 1827/1894, p. 221) 
Not only speech in unity with inner being but action is as well. The 
inpulse, often irrational and resulting in irrational acts or in 
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physical symptoms of illness, is now an impulse directed toward what 
ought to be. This impulse is unified with the ideal of what should be 
and becomes passion. Hagel reveals that "passion is neither good nor 
bad; the title only states that a subject has thrown his whole soul— 
his interests, talent, character, enjoyment,—on one aim and object" 
(1827/1894, p. 234). There is no action of greatness unless passion 
is involved; "Nothing great has been and nothing great can be 
accomplished without passion" (p. 235). 
When the ideal of freedom to be more fully human is formed within 
the mind and this ideal is converted through passionate action to make 
this freedom a reality, then the dialectic in which Spirit is at work 
to express itself does indeed create and recreate self and reality. 
Freire's dialectic, initiated and maintained through an ongoing 
dialogue in solidarity of humankind and on an ongoing reality, not 
only liberates an individual into becoming more fully human; through 
Hegel's perception of dialectical movement of Spirit, it becomes 
evident that the individual also continues this development into 
fullness of being human and of possessing freedom. 
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CHAPTER IV 
PEDAGOGY OF LIBERATION 
Freire's pedagogy of liberation gathers strength and focus from 
the Hegelian and Freudian concepts of liberation that were presented 
in Chapters II and III. Hegel's dialectic clarifies the spiritual 
force at work with the dialectic that enables the individual' 
participating in its creative process to move into a new mode of 
thought or consciousness and thereby find a new reality stemming frcm 
this perception. Hegel's dialectic thus lends strength to Freire's 
premise that it is not the existing situation itself but the 
individual's perception of that situation that is important for 
liberation from the limitations of that situation: 
Thus, it is not the limit-situations in and of themselves 
which create a climate of hopelessness, but rather how they 
are perceived by men at a given historical moment: whether 
they appear as fetters or as insurmountable barriers. 
(Freire, 1970/1984, p. 89) 
Friere furthermore reveals that since individuals "exist in a 
dialectical relationship between the determination of limits and 
their own freedom" that perception of a situation leads to action. A 
perception that the situation is "insurmountable" results in passive 
acceptance of it; the perception of that situation as false in 
appearance and thus only limiting at the moment leads to decisive 
action upon it to transform it: 
Men, however, because they are aware of themselves and thus of 
the world—because they are conscious beings—exist in a 
dialectical relationship between the determination of limits 
and their own freedom. As they separate themselves from the 
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world, which they objectify, as they separate themselves frcm 
their own activity, as they locate the seat of their 
decisions in themselves and in their relations with the world 
and others, men overcane the situations which limit them: the 
"limit-situations." Once perceived by men as fetters, as 
obstacles to their liberation, these situations stand out in 
relief from the background, revealing their true nature as 
concrete historical dimensions of a given reality. Men respond 
to the challenge with actions... directed at negating and 
overcoming, rather than passively accepting, the "given." 
(1970/1984, p. 89) 
Moreover, Freire's encompassing transformation of both self and 
situation gathers focus frcm Freud's analysis of the inner oppressor 
that controls being and the inner conflicts that fragment and alienate 
the individual within. Freud's emphasis on the critical reflection or 
psychoanalytical thinking, on the correspondence between inner 
compelling motives and outer resulting action from these inner forces 
therefore underscores the dynamics of Freire's praxis that encompasses 
the inner dimensions of an individual as well as the outer reality in 
which the individual is placed. Freire's praxis is critical reflection 
on the self and on the situation; it is accompanied by a corresponding 
action upon the situation that not only changes, alters, and 
transforms the situation but also the self. It results in creating 
and recreating both self and reality of situation for higher levels of 
being and freedom in which self-becoming is possible. 
In enabling adult illiterates of the Third World to emerge from 
an acceptance of a situation as a given reality, to perceive 
themselves in a new mode of thought that dissipates the power of the 
internal oppressor, and moreover to integrate new energy of self-
awareness with new perception to create a higher level of being, Freire 
reveals the very force which empowers an individual involved in the 
dialectical process. When Freire reveals the steps in developing the 
critical processes of dialectical thought in Pedagogy of the 
Oppressed (1970/1984) and demonstrates the reality of these thoughts 
translated into action in Pedagogy in Process (1976/1978), he 
clarifies how the dialectic embodied within the context of a pedagogy 
can enable an individual to emerge from a limiting situation or gain 
distance frcm it for critical thought of it and transforming action 
upon it. What Freire demonstrates is that Hegel's "purposive activity" 
of reason, of breaking down "fixed and determinate thoughts" is indeed 
movement into new thought, into new levels of being more fully human, 
into making the implicit potential of being more fully human an 
explicit reality. 
What Hegel does not include but Freire does is the method that can 
be used to bring the individual to the initial stage of liberation, that 
of being able to objectify the situation, to acquire needed distance 
frcm the situation to perceive that it is not a static one but an 
ongoing process, and to perceive that what is the reality in which he/she 
is immersed is an historical occurrence amenable to change. Frcm that 
distance and frcm that perspective, the individual is then enabled to 
perceive the self as capable of effecting change. Hegel thus starts 
the dialectical process that empowers the individual with the 
recognition of false reality. Freire, however, starts at an earlier 
stage, that of the individual who has no perception other than that of 
the oppressor that has been internalized and that serves as the model 
to be emulated. Thus Freire starts with the emergence frcm the 
situation. It is of primary importance to begin an examination of the 
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pedagogy for liberation at Freire's starting point, that of enabling the 
individual to emerge from an unquestioned acceptance of a limiting 
situation. Freire concedes that initiating the liberational process 
through emergence frcmi a situation is not a simple process, for true 
liberation engenders fear of responsibility; Freire, however, affirms it 
is not an impossible task, for critical reflection can enable the 
individual to achieve the necessary distance or the emergence to begin 
the liberation process. 
The method Preire uses in his pedagogy is that of dialogue. The 
dialogue in turn initiates the dialectical process so that liberation 
replaces limitation, love replaces violence, and subjects replace 
objects. In essence the pedagogy of humanization overcomes dehumaniza-
tion in both oppressor and oppressed. Before the nature of the dialogue 
can be brought into focus, it is necessary to examine the pedagogy of 
liberation from its inception, that of the emergence of individuals 
from the situation in which they are submerged. 
Emergence from Situation 
It must be recognized from the beginning in a discussion of the 
pedagogy of liberation as an instrument by which the oppressed can be 
enabled to emerge frcan the oppressive reality of a situation to begin 
a process of liberation, that the oppressed are locked into a reality 
created for them and inflicted upon them by the oppressors. Freire 
acknowledges i_n his Pedagogy of the Oppressed that the extent of 
oppressed consciousness makes liberation from this depth a difficult 
process, comparable to that of a birth: 
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Liberation is thus a childbirth, and a painful one. The man who 
emerges is a new man, viable only as the oppressor-oppressed 
contradiction is superseded by the humanization of all men. Or, 
to put it another way, the solution of this contradiction is 
born in the labor which brings into the world this new man: no 
longer oppressor, no longer oppressed, but man in the process of 
achieving freedom. (1970/1984, p. 34) 
Freire maintains that as long as the oppressed "live in the duality in 
which to be is to be like" the oppressor, the oppressed cannot 
"contribute to the midwifery of their liberating pedagogy" (1970/1984 
p. 33) . They are at this point still immersed within the oppressive 
reality so that freedom to them is limited to their moving into the 
power position held by the oppressor. Freedom in any other definition 
generates fear within them: 
The oppressed, having internalized the image of the oppressor 
and adopted his guidelines, are fearful of freedom. Freedom 
would require them to eject this image and replace it with 
autonomy and responsibility. (1970/1984, p. 31) 
Freire realizes that individuals "who have adapted to the structure of 
domination in which they are immersed" are consequently "inhibited from 
waging a struggle for freedom so long as they feel incapable of running 
the risk it requires" (p. 32). The oppressed cannot feel capable of 
changing a situation until they are brought to a recognition of what 
constitutes the reality of that situation. Thus to move individuals 
of oppressed reality from that reality to a recognition of it, the 
oppressed must come to understand the causes of their passivity: 
As long as the oppressed remain unaware of the causes of their 
condition, they fatalistically "accept" their exploitation. 
Further, they are apt to react in a passive and alienated manner 
when confronted with the necessity to struggle for their freedom 
and self-affirmation. (1970/1984, p. 51) 
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When Freire's attempt to enable the oppressed to emerge frcm their 
situation is examined within the context of what Freud describes as an 
unknown but powerful influencing factor of the internal oppressor, then 
the difficulty of Freire's beginning praxis ccraes into focus. Freire's 
perception that overcoming this internal oppressor is "one of the 
gravest obstacles" gains significance. It is not just that the internal 
oppressor controls thoughts and action; it is that the internal 
oppressor "absorbs those within it." At the same time, since Freire1s 
praxis begins with critical reflection upon a situation, the power of 
critical thought to dissipate the control of the internal oppressor is 
implied as well. The following is Freire's expression of the difficulty 
encountered in enabling the oppressed to surface from this suhnergence 
within oppressive reality: 
One of the gravest obstacles to the achievement of liberation 
is that oppressive reality absorbs those within it and thereby 
acts to submerge men's consciousness. Functionally, oppression 
is domesticating. To no longer be prey to its force, one must 
emerge frcm it and turn upon it. (Freire, 1970/1984, p. 36) 
It is obvious that the oppressed cannot "turn "upon" oppressive reality 
until they "emerge frcm it" and that the emergence requires that they 
be aware of themselves and of their world as existing in oppressive 
reality. Freire therefore indicates that it is necessary to make 
"oppression and its causes" the "objects of reflection by the 
oppressed" for only in that critical reflection will arise their 
"necessary engagement in the struggle for their liberation" (p. 37). 
Thus it is at this beginning of Freire's pedagogy of liberation that 
recognition must occur so that the oppressed can commit themselves to 
their own liberation frcm oppression. Freire indicates that this 
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initial ccranitraent of the oppressed forms the basis of the pedagogy and 
that once the struggle for liberation is in process, the pedagogy 
itself will be in process of being "made and remade": 
This pedagogy makes oppression and its causes objects of 
reflection by the oppressed, and from that reflection will 
ccme their necessary engagement in the struggle for their 
liberation. And in the struggle this pedagogy will be made 
and remade. (1970/1984, p. 33) 
Freire's pedagogy thus begins with an objectification of the reality in 
which the oppressed are placed so that they can emerge from it. It is 
of significance that the oppressed are very much aware of being 
downtrodden. The problem is that they have a distorted perception of 
humanity as a result of being submerged within oppressive reality. 
Their perception of humanity to be emulated is formed on the only model 
they know, that of the oppressor: 
Their ideal is to be men; but for them to be men is to be 
oppressors. This is their model of humanity. This phenomenon 
derives from the fact that the oppressed, at a certain moment 
of their existential experience, adopt an attitude of 
"adhesion" to the oppressor. Under these circumstances they 
cannot "consider" him sufficiently clearly to Objectify him— 
to discover him "outside" themselves. (Freire, 1970/1984, p. 31) 
Freire's pedagogy thus starts with objectification. Frcm this 
objectification of oppressive reality, the oppressed emerge through 
recognition of the situation as an historical reality in which they are 
placed and not one to which they are fated. Recognition brings 
resistance to such limitation and fosters commitment of the oppressed to 
win their freedom. Freire insists that this concept of freedom must 
beccstve part of the consciousness of the oppressed engaged in a struggle, 
that freedom must be won: 
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Freedom is acquired by conquest, not by gift. It must be 
pursued constantly and responsibly. Freedom is not an ideal 
located outside of man; nor is it an idea which becomes myth. 
It is rather the indispensable condition for the quest for 
human completion. (1970/1984, p. 31) 
It becomes evident that Freire's pedagogy of the oppressed, that of 
liberation, is a "pedagogy which must be forged with, not for, the 
oppressed in the incessant struggle to regain their humanity" 
(1970/1984, p. 33). Thus to attempt a pedagogy for liberation by 
instructing or informing the oppressed of their condition is to resort 
to the pedagogy of the oppressor and thereby to continue the 
dehumamzation of the oppressed. To tell the oppressed of their freedom 
is to relegate freedom to a myth or ideal or gift. It is to deny the 
oppressed the reality of freedom by keeping them from the development 
of critical thought that brings commitment to winning that freedom. 
The struggle for freedom begins for the oppressed when they emerge frcm 
the depths of oppressive reality to reflect critically on their 
situation and to understand that "they have been destroyed precisely 
because their situation has reduced them to things" (1970/1984, p. 55). 
Freire asserts on the basis of his praxis as a catalyst to begin the 
liberation process, that "the point of departure must always be with 
man in the 'here and now,1 which constitutes the situation within 
which they are submerged, from which they emerge, and in which they 
intervene" (p. 73). Freire can furthermore assert on the basis of 
experience gained within the pedagogy of liberation that "a deepened 
consciousness of their situation leads men to apprehend that situation 
as an historical reality susceptible of transformation" (p. 73). When 
the oppressed can objectify the oppressor by removing themselves frcm 
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the oppressor consciousness, they discover "they have been the 'hosts' 
of the oppressor" and that "to regain their humanity they must cease to 
be things and fight as men" (p. 55). Freire furthermore reveals that a 
discovery of what has occurred through the oppressor domination enables 
the oppressed to start believing in themselves: "It is only when the 
oppressed find the oppressor out and become involved in the organized 
struggle for their liberation that they begin to believe in themselves" 
(p. 52). Freire points out that this belief in self is a "radical 
requirement" in that the oppressed "cannot enter the struggle as 
objects in order later to became men" (p. 55). The liberation of the 
oppressed is always a "liberation of men, not things": 
Accordingly, while no one liberates himself by his own efforts 
alone, neither is he liberated by others. Liberation, a human 
phenomenon, cannot be achieved by semihumans. Any attempt to 
treat men as semihumans only dehumanizes them. When men are 
already dehumanized, due to the oppression they suffer, the 
process of their liberation must not employ the methods of 
dehumanization. (1970/1984, p. 53) 
One important consideration must be noted here. Simply reflecting on 
the oppressive reality and thereby discovering they have been reduced 
to objects is not to make the oppressed into instantaneous Subjects or 
"men": 
It would indeed be idealistic to affirm that by merely 
reflecting on oppressive reality and discovering their 
status as objects, men have thereby already became Subjects. 
But while this perception in and of itself does not mean that 
men have became Subjects, it does mean...that they are Subjects 
in expectancy—an expectancy which leads them to seek to 
solidify their new status (Freire, 1970/1984, p. 125) 
Moreover, Freire stresses that in enabling the oppressed to gain the 
status of "Subjects in expectancy" there can be no employment of the 
banking concept of education: 
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The capability of banking education to minimize or annul the 
students' creative power and to stimulate their credulity 
serves the interests of the oppressors, who care neither to 
have the world revealed nor to see it transformed. The 
oppressors use their "humanitarianism" to preserve a profitable 
situation. Thus they react almost instinctively against any 
experiment in education which stimulates the critical faculties 
and is not content with a partial view of reality but always 
seeks out the ties which link one point to another and one 
problem to another. (1970/1984, p. 60) 
It is also clear that Freire calls attention to the methods used in 
the pedagogy of the oppressor as those that do not bring about 
liberation. Moreover, Freire stresses that "education as the exercise 
of domination" renders students passive and prohibits the development 
of critical thought "with the ideological intent of indoctrinating 
them" (p. 65) so that they adapt or adjust to the demands of oppressive 
reality. Freire reveals that it is in marked contrast of method and 
purpose that the pedagogy of liberation is forged. To use the methods 
of the oppressor is to "negate" the "pursuit of liberation": 
This accusation is not made in the naive hope that the dominant 
elites will thereby simply abandon the practice. Its objective 
is to call the attention of true humanists to the fact that they 
cannot use banking educational methods in the pursuit of 
liberation, for they would only negate that very pursuit. 
(1970/1984, p. 65) 
Since the educational method of the oppressor, as indicated by 
Freire' s concept of the banking educational method, is antidialogical 
and antihuman, the method of Freire's pedagogy of liberation is 
dialogical and prohuman> It is necessary to examine the nature of 
the dialogue as Freire perceives it and the humanizing effects as 
Freire utilizes it in his pedagogy of liberation. 
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Dialogue 
The pedagogy of the oppressed that Freire offers as the instrument 
of humanization or liberation is dialogical in nature: 
The only effective instrument is a humanizing pedagogy in 
which the revolutionary leadership establishes a permanent 
dialogue with the oppressed. (1970/1984, p. 55) 
Dialogue liberates, for it stimulates critical thinking. Freire 
affirms that "only dialogue which requires critical thinking is also 
capable of generating critical thinking" (1970/1984, p. 81). Freire 
also reveals that "any attempt to analyze dialogue as a human 
phenomenon" must discover "something which is the essence of dialogue 
itself: the word" (p. 75): 
But the word is more than just an instrument which makes 
dialogue possible; accordingly, we must seek its constitutive 
elements. Within the word we find two dimensions, reflection 
and action, in such radical interaction that if one is 
sacrificed—even in part—the other immediately suffers. There 
is no true word that is not at the same time a praxis. Thus, to 
speak a true word is to transform the world. (1970/1984, p. 75) 
In Freire's perception of the creative nature of the word, individuals 
naming the world are actually creating their world: 
Human existence cannot be silent, nor can it be nourished by false 
words, but only by true words, with which men transform the world. 
To exist, humanly, is to name the world, to change it. Once named, 
the world in its turn reappears to the naners as a problem and 
requires of them a new naming. Men are not built in silence, but 
in word, in work, in action-reflection. (1970/1984, p. 76) 
True dialogue consists in "an encounter between men, mediated by the 
world, in order to name the world" (p. 76); furthermore, since "apart 
frcm inquiry, apart from praxis, men cannot be truly human" (p. 58), 
"dialogue is an existential necessity" (p- 77) for gaining the 
significance of being human: 
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If it is in speaking their word that men, by naming the world, 
transform it, dialogue imposes itself as the way which men achieve 
significance as men. (1970/1984, p. 77) 
Freire is not making these observations of dialogue in reference to 
the oppressed alone. He clarifies or reveals what comes into the 
universality of liberation as it concerns the oppressor: 
The pedagogy of the oppressed is an instrument for their 
critical discovery that both they and their oppressors are 
manifestations of dehumanization. (p. 33) 
In oppressing others into objects, the oppressors have at the sane time 
dehumanized themselves. They cannot perceive this result of their 
action; thus it is left to the oppressed to restore humanity not only 
to themselves but to their oppressors as well: 
As the oppressors dehumanize others and violate their rights, 
they themselves also become dehumanized. As the oppressed, 
fighting to be human, take away the oppressors' power to dominate 
and suppress, they restore to the oppressors the humanity they had 
lost in the exercise of oppression. (Freire, 1970/1984, p. 42) 
Thus the dialogue as the method of a pedagogy of liberation is the means 
by which all individuals share so that no one prescribes for another: 
Hence, dialogue cannot occur between those who want to name the 
world and those who do not wish this naming—between those who deny 
other men the right to speak their word and those whose right to 
speak has been denied them. Those who have been denied their 
primordial right to speak their word must first reclaim this right 
and prevent the continuation of this dehumanizing aggression. 
(1970/1984, pp. 76-77) 
Dialogue constitutes the right of all humans: 
But while to say the true word—which is work, which is praxis—is 
to transform the world, saying that word is not the privilege of 
some few men, but the right of every man. Consequently, no one can 
say a true word alone—nor can he say it for another, in a prescrip­
tive act which robs others of their words. (Freire,1970/1984, p. 76) 
Freire maintains that "critical and liberating dialogue, which 
presupposes action, must be carried on with the oppressed at whatever 
the stage of their struggle for liberation" (1970/1984, p. 52). It is 
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therefore a continuing method of liberation that is a vital part of a 
continuing education for liberation: 
Because liberation action is dialogical in nature, dialogue 
cannot be a posteriori to that action, but must be concomitant 
with it. And since liberation must be a permanent condition, 
dialogue becomes a continuing aspect of liberating action. 
(1970/1984, p. 134) 
It must, however, be a genuine dialogue, one with a foundation of love, 
for only love can oppose the "lovelessness which lies at the heart of 
the oppressors' violence" (p. 29). Freire makes clear that the true -
dialogue is an act of love: 
Dialogue cannot exist, however, in the absence of a profound love 
for the world and for men. The naming of the world, which is an 
act of creation and re-creation, is not possible if it is not 
infused with love. Love is at the same time the foundation of 
dialogue and dialogue itself. It is thus necessarily the task of 
resonsible Subjects and cannot exist in a relation of domination.... 
Because love is an act of courage, not of fear, love is ccrardtitient 
toother men. No matter where the oppressed are found, the act of 
3o\e is commitment to their cause—the cause of liberation. 
(1970/1984, p. 78) 
True dialogue involves humility in that the world cannot be named by the 
arrogance of those who perceive the ignorance of others and cannot 
perceive their own. Authentic dialogue requires "an intense faith in 
man, faith in his power to make and remake, to create and re-create, 
faith in his vocation to be more fully human (Freire, 1970/1984, p. 79): 
Faith in man is an a priori requirement for dialogue; the 
"dialogical man" believes in other men even before he meets them 
face to face. His. faith, however, is not naive. The "dialogical 
man" is critical and knows that although it is within the power 
of men to create and transform, in a concrete situation of 
alienation men may be impaired in the use of that power. Far frem 
destroying his faith in man, however, this possibility strikes him 
as a challenge to which he must respond, (p. 79) 
Thus it becomes clear in examining Freire's dialogical method of 
pedagogy that the process of liberation requires the dialogue as a 
continuing encounter among individuals so that true communication 
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results in a resolution to the contradiction between oppressor and 
oppressed or teacher and student. Freire1s explanation of the 
cartinunication opened by the dialogue also indicates the dialectic that 
the dialogue initiates: 
Without dialogue there is no ccranunication, and without 
cotmunication there can be no true education. Education which is 
able to resolve the contradiction between teacher and students 
takes place in a situation in which both address their act of 
cognition to the object by which they are mediated. (1970/1984, 
p. 81) 
The dialectic is an integral part of authentic praxis. Freire maintains 
that "in dialectical thought, word and action are intimately inter­
dependent" (p. 38). The dialogue initiates the dialectical process. 
In the content of the pedagogy of liberation, Freire uses generative 
themes pertaining to the world and the "reality which mediates men" (p. 86)5 
It is to the reality which mediates men, and to the perception of 
that reality held by educators and people, that we must go to find 
the program content of education. The investigation of what I 
have termed the people's "thematic universe"—the complex of their 
"generative themes"—inaugurates the dialogue of education as the 
practice of freedom. The methodology of that investigation must 
likewise be dialogical, affording the opportunity both to 
discover generative themes and to stimulate people's awareness in 
regard to these themes. Consistent with the liberating purpose 
of dialogical education, the object of the investigation is not 
men, but rather the thought-language with which men refer to 
reality, the levels at which they perceive that reality, and their 
view of the world, in which their generative therrv=s are found. 
(1970/1984, p. 86) 
Freire also reveals that abstraction for a "coded" situation may be 
vised. He furthermore asserts that if "men perceive reality as dense, 
impenetrable, and enveloping, it is indispensable to proceed with the 
investigation by means of abstraction" (p. 95). It is in this coded 
situation that Freire reveals the essential action of the dialectic: 
This method does not involve reducing the concrete to the 
abstract (which would signify the negation of its dialectical 
nature), but rather maintaining both elements as opposites 
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which interrelate dialectically in the act of reflection. This 
dialectical movement of thought is exemplified perfectly in the 
analysis of a concrete, existential, "coded" situation. Its 
"decoding" requires moving frcm the abstract to the concrete; this 
requires moving frcm the part to the whole and then returning to 
the parts; this in turn requires that the Subject recognize himself 
in the object (the coded existential situation) and recognize the 
object as a situation in which he finds himself, together with 
other Subjects. (1970/1984, pp. 95-96) 
Freire notes that "if the decoding is well done," then the movement frcm 
the "abstract to the concrete which occurs in the analysis of a coded 
situation leads to the supersedence of the abstraction b£ the critical 
perception of the concrete" (p. 96). Freire clarifies the 
interdependence of thought and action, of individuals and their world: 
Men, as being "in a situation," find themselves rooted in 
temporal-spatial conditions which mark them and which they also 
mark. They will tend to reflect on their own "situationality" to 
the extent that they are challenged by it to act upon it. Men are 
because they are in a situation. And they will be more the more 
they not only critically reflect upon their existence but 
critically act upon it. ((1970/1984, p. 100) 
Freire furthermore implies the dialectical nature of this 
interdependence of individuals and their world that in turn affirms the 
need for an ongoing dialogical pedagogy for liberation: 
There would be no human action if there were no objective reality, 
no world to be the "not I" of man and to challenge him; just as 
there would be no human action if man were not a "project," if he 
were not able to transcend himself to perceive his reality and 
understand it in order to transform it. (1970/1984, p. 38) 
Central to this human action of transforming the self and world is the 
act of knowing. In Pedagogy in Process (1976/1978) Freire defines the 
"radical" form of being more fully human as involving critical thought. 
These are then human beings who "not only know but know that they 
know" (1976/1978, p. 24). It is this knowing that the pedagogy of 
liberation undertakes through its dialogue and its praxis. Solidarity 
is insured in this liberation process for there is no distinction to 
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be gained. Furthermore, in the pedagogy there is no distinction 
between teacher and students, for they are both involved in recreating 
the world: 
Teacher and students (leadership and people)...are both 
Subjects, not only in the task of unveiling that reality 
and thereby coming to know it critically but in the task 
of re-creating that knowledge.(Freire, 1976/1978, p. 56) 
Freire balds the concept that the individual's potential to be more 
fully human, to become a "subject who acts upon and transforms his 
world," lies in the meaning of the act of knowing found in the true 
dialogue, the catalyst of liberating dialectic, the methodological 
instrument of Freire*s liberating pedagogy: 
Finally, true dialogue cannot exist unless the dialoguers 
engage in critical thinking—thinking which discern an 
indivisible solidarity between the world and men and admits 
of no dichotomy between them—thinking which perceives 
reality as process, as transformation, rather than as a 
static entity—thinking which does not separate itself frcm 
action, but constantly immerses itself in temporality without 
fear of the risks involved... For the critic the important 
thing is the continuing humanization of men. (Freire, 1970/1984, 
p. 81) 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS: AN OVERVIEW 
In referring to Freud's concept of inner oppression and to Hegel's 
dialectic of consciousness for self-becoming, while at the same time 
examining Freire's pedagogy for liberation, it becomes clear that Freud, 
Hegel and Freire are emancipators-educators in that they share a concern 
for enabling the individual to literate himself or herself frcm 
lindtations into becoming more fully human with all that being human 
implies for development of potential. The complexity in Freud's and 
Hegel's concept of liberation reveals a corresponding complexity 
existing in Freire's praxis. Any overview cannot convey this complex 
texture of liberation in fullness; there can, however, be a sketch of 
interweaving of these concepts of liberation in order to give focus to 
the premise that consciousness of humanity can be educated, that 
consciousness can in this education be liberated frcm oppression or 
limitation, and that the potential for such liberation into beccming 
more fully human is the birthright of all individuals existing in any 
culture. 
Freire's premise that it is an individual's "ontological 
vocation" to became more fully human through the development of 
critical thought places the development of being within the context of 
knowing. An examination of Hegel's ontological concepts reveals a 
similar assertion that critical reflection on the externals of reality 
enables the individual to be emancipated from that reality. The 
hegemony that makes up Freire's society of limitation is present in 
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Hegel's concept of knowing as well. Hegel maintains that accepting 
any external dictate or tradition limits the individual from developing 
into fullness of being. Whereas Freire looks to the irmiediate situation 
of social reality as limiting, Hegel perceives any external, even the 
abstraction of truth, as limiting if the individual accepts it without 
reflection on it, without working out its purpose in a dialectic so 
that it.becomes actual for that individual. Hegel then agrees with 
Freire on the given reality as false if accepted uncritically but he 
clarifies that it is not the iirmediate result of the dialectic but the 
working out of the purpose to the end that makes spirit actual and 
truth whole. Still there remains the unconscious aspect of the 
individual that Hegel maintains holds the promise of spiritual richness 
for development of being if the rational processes are developed 
through the dialectic to utilize this energy. This spiritual reservoir 
is not under the control of the being restricted in development. It is 
here the study must turn to Freud for understanding of what this 
unconscious involves for the development of the individual into 
becoming fully human. Freud is also concerned with the ontological 
development of the individual into "becoming more human" (Bettelheim, 
1983, p. 4). He too perceives the act of knowing as the means by which 
the unknown forces that limit the development of the soul can be 
integrated into being when liberation occurs. Thus knowingbecomes for 
Freud a recognition of inner forces that limit development. It is 
Freud's premise that "by isolating and examining the neglected or 
hidden aspects" (Bettelheim, 1983, p. 12) of the soul that the 
individual can understand the influence they have in the individual's 
life and hence the individual can be liberated frcm such limiting 
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and controlling influence frcm within. Freud's ontological concern for 
full development of being centers on integrating this primal energy, on 
making the unknown known, so that the rational processes can direct this 
energy into the individual's becoming integrated for full expression of 
being. What Freud does is to reveal the depth of oppressive reality 
that must surface for recognition so that the limitation of being does 
not continue frcm this unconscious oppression. Psychoanalytic thinking 
is Freud's term for critical thought; it is the means by which the dark 
forces that limit development are brought into recognition for 
integration into rational thought processes. Bettelheim explains how 
liberation frcm limitation occnirs when a confrontation with unconscious 
forces occurs: 
Freud shows how... when we are able to confront dark forces 
with the power of our rational mind, unencumbered by 
unconscious pressure, the rationality wins out; and when 
rationality dominates our actions, we can overccme the 
destructive powers and free ourselves of their ability to 
harm us. (Bettelheim, 1983, pp. 25-26) 
Freire proposes the dialectic as the means by which transformation 
of self and society become actual. The dialectic then results in an act 
of creation and recreation of self and situation. Freire's dialectic is 
inmediate, employed to liberate self for fuller being from an oppressive 
situation. Hegel takes Freire's dialectic as a starting point for all 
dialectical thought. When Freire claims that the ontological right of 
an individual is "to be subject who acts upon and transforms his world, 
and in so doing moves towards ever new possibilities of fuller and 
richer life individually and collectively" (1970, p. 113), his concern 
is for inmediate reality of a situation and for inmediate release frcm 
an oppressive situation. In working with illiterates on the most 
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oppressed level of consciousness, Freire does not elaborate on what "a 
richer and fuller life" could ultimately be. He indicates, however, that 
it can became one of solidarity and love if the dialectic on reality is 
continued. Here is where Hegel provides the philosophical basis for 
Freire's premise and an explanation for his success with the dialectic in 
enabling these illiterates to emerge frcm their situation and begin to 
move into liberation of being. Hegel takes what is the beginning 
dialectic, when, consciousness first recognizes the untruth of phenomena, 
and reveals the power operating within the dialectic to move 
consciousness into new modes of thought, into higher levels of being, and 
into new realities created and perceived by evolving consciousness. Thus 
Freire"s adamant insistence on the ongoing process of reality that calls 
for education for liberation to be an ongoing process as well becomes a 
philosophically sound one, for Hegel's education for consciousness moves 
in constant dialectic of self and reality to annul the existing situation, 
preserve it for memory, and transcend it in creation of a new reality. 
Thus Hegel not only confirms the power of Freire's dialectic to effect 
change through creating and recreating self and society but Hegel also 
indicates that the inner force, perceived by Freire as creative, issues 
frcm a spiritual energy inherent in the nature of the dialectic. Hegel's 
education for consciousness nvoves in constant dialectic and follows in 
this dialectical thought the means by which Spirit, the force of the 
dialectic, has evolved. Hegel gives spiritual depth and validity to 
Freire's work. It must be toward a better, more just, and more ethical 
society and self that Freire's dialectic indicates, for in the 
dialectic as Hegel perceives it, the spiritual force that moves the 
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dialectic becomes in concrete form what it is implicitly. Moreover, 
Hegel organizes this education of consciousness and thereby moves frcsn 
immediate creation of self and society to evolvement of self and 
society to the level of ultimate reason where fullness of being exists, 
where mutual recognition of the solidarity proclaimed by Freire exists 
among all, where freedom is expressed externally because it exists 
internally, and where the inequity of justice cannot flourish when 
individuals obey laws arising frcm within them and thus obey 
themselves. What Freire does is to translate Hegel's act of knowing 
that leads to fullness of being into Freirean praxis, where thought or 
awareness of a situation effects corresponding action on that 
situation. Freire confirms Hegel's premise that only in questioning 
critically, in reflecting on what is perceived as reality, can 
consciousness start its education into full liberation of being. 
Oppression is the chief concern of Freire, perceiving as he does 
through the dialectic of his own experience and study, the oppressor 
class is a reality and it exists because there is also an oppressed 
class that serves it. Freire moreover recognizes how pervasive is the 
control of this oppressor class. It is one in which the oppressor is 
born and in which he or she is shaped with a resulting consciousness of 
the rightness to possess and control others. Freire also perceives 
that the oppressor consciousness can became internalized and become the 
oppressor within. It is here that Freud lends substance to what Freire 
is saying. Freud knows the oppressor is indeed within, existing as an 
•unknown but an influencing part of the individual. Freud's premise is 
that there is "a controlling and often overcontrolling institution of 
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the mind which is created by the person himself out of inner needs and 
external pressures that have been internalized" (Bettelheira, 1983, p. 
8). Freud's insight into the inner conflict of consciousness and the 
internal oppressor that is often shaped by the external oppression of 
civilization reveals that such struggle diverts spiritual energy from 
its integration and moreover dissipates the life force with resulting 
limitation of physical or mental development so that fullness of being 
is thwarted frcm development. What Freud does is to reveal the depth 
of oppressive reality that must surface for recognition so that 
limitation of being does not continue frcm this unconscious oppression. 
Freud moreover reveals how limitation of being occurs when the flow of 
being is impeded by unconscious oppression. Hegel serves to 
illuminate the fullness of being that can result when the flow of being 
develops through an ongoing process of dialectical knowing. Hegel takes 
this level of the soul and reveals what can be, what is ontologically 
possible, when the dialectic of critical thought releases being in that 
it enables consciousness to annul the existing situation and transcend 
into new creations of self and society. 
A better self and society is a goal for Freire, Hegel, and Freud. 
Freire has no desire to build on the existing one. What he proposes is 
a new society, where oppressive reality and its classes are dissipated 
by an ongoing dialogue and dialectical process. What Freire is 
proposing is a revolutionary consciousness that examines reality in 
solidarity with others as an ongoing dialectic and creates/recreates 
self and society for a "richer and fuller life," where ccanmunity of 
mind is reflected in and created by cormunity of society. Hegel too 
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speaks of a ccmnunity of consciousness and speaks as well of a new 
birth and of a new spirit where there exists mutual recognition or 
Freirean solidarity. Freud too speaks of the emergence of a new 
person, a new personality, through the critical reflection of 
psychoanalytical thought. Taken together, Freud, Hegel, and Freire 
reveal the possibilities inherent in humankind that can surface for 
expression and be released for development through the pedagogy of 
liberation that never gives freedom frcm oppression but aids in the 
birth of the new individual. 
It becomes evident in examining Freire's pedagogy of liberation 
that both Freud and Hegel have relevancy for the full projection of 
Freire's thoughts and practices. This study attempts to show that 
both Freud and Hegel lend substance and insight to the tenets and 
praxis of Freire"s belief in the pedagogy of liberation as an ongoing 
process; that Freire, Hegel, and Freud share a concern for the 
ontological development of humanity into becoming more fully human; 
and that all three recognize the act of knowing as vital to the 
development and liberation of the individual into fullness of being. 
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